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reverse the PUC 
of 
file 
conclusions. The opinion of the (ALJ) is the proposed decision 
and a part of the publ record in the proceeding. The decision 
of the (ALJ) shall be filed with the commission and served upon 
all parties to the action or proceeding ... (t)he commission shall 
issue its decision not sooner than 30 days following filing and 
service of the proposed decision by the (ALJ)." Various parties 
say these two sections work at odds with each other--one saying 
the ALJ has a relationship to the assigned commissioner, the 
other section can be interpreted as allowing an independent ALJ 
role. 
AB 3391 (Moore) enacted in 1984, requires the PUC to compile 
and report to the Legislature on its rules of procedure on an 
annual basis. 
No state statute exists concerning how discussions between 
decision makers at the PUC and parties to specific proceedings 
should undertake "ex parte" communications. 
II. HEAVY PUC AGENDA 
Increasingly, concerns have been raised at legislative 
hearings and in other forums about maintaining a fair PUC 
hearing process. It is very difficult for a party to various 
PUC proceedings to criticize a commission it must also deal with 
in the future. However, as the speed and scope of several 
recent PUC proceedings have pitted various distinct competitive 
groups against each other, and as this commission has moved in 
regulatory directions that some contend favor the general 
deregulatory goals of large utility interests, criticisms about 
the hearing process have been raised. 
Monitoring how the PUC undertakes its proceedings, then, has 
become increasingly important because, as the following list of 
actions and decisions indicate, many more revisions of the 
present regulatory structure are taking place. 
Recent significant PUC Proceedings and Actions: 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS-- o Changed AT&T's Regulatory Framework 
o Allowing AT&T to provide new services 
o Revamped the way local telephone 
service is regulated 
o Conducting a proceeding to establish a 
new regulatory framework for 
cellular telephones 
o Will investigate how to share Yellow 
Pages information 
o Developing ways to implement 900 & 976 
services 
o Decided on local telco competitive 
services 
o Will decide on competition in local 
ENERGY--
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BILL NUMBER: SB 1125 
BILL TEXT 
agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. 
Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement. 
This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a 
specified reason. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. 
State-mandated local program: yes. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS: 
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following: 
(a) The Public Utilities Commission is required by law to confine its 
decisions to the official record of a proceeding. However, commissioners, 
staff, and administrative law judges of the commission actively discuss 
upcoming decisions with principal parties to the decisions, with no provision 
in law to specifically regulate ex parte communication. 
(b) At the direction of the commission, its staff recently developed ex 
parte procedures. These procedures were never adopted by the commission. 
Basic ex parte procedures become even more important because the commission is 
presently undertaking several significant proceedings which will change the 
very manner in which several utilities are regulated in this state. 
(c) The Legislature agrees that, in the long process of a commission 
proceeding, the flow of significant information is important for commissioners 
and staff and that personal contacts with affected parties should only be 
curtailed where absolutely necessary, but that disclosure of those contacts 
should be public information and made a part of the record. 
(d) It is the Legislature's intent to establish for the Public Utilities 
Commission an ex parte disclosure act in order to preserve the integrity and 
fairness of the ratemaking process while allowing for ample access for all 
interested parties to decisionmaking personnel of the commission. 
SEC. 2. Chapter 2.3 (commencing with Section 351) is added to Part 1 of 
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BILL NUMBER: SB 1125 
BILL TEXT 
ex parte communication to decisionmakers during the period of time that this 
section has been made applicable to the matter. That period of time shall 
commence with the release of a public notice that a matter has been made 
subject to this section, and shall terminate when the commission takes one of 
the following actions, whichever occurs first: 
(a) Releases the text of a decision or order relating to the matter. 
(b) Issues a notice that the matter is no longer subject to this section. 
(CJ Issues a public notice stating that the matter has been returned to the 
staff for further consideration. 
357. The rules and orders adopted pursuant to this chapter may be enforced 
by an action in mandamus or for an injunction or declaratory relief by any 
interested person who shall, if a violation is found, be awarded costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. The remedy provided by this section is in 
addition to any other remedy provided by law for the enforcement of this 
chapter. 
358. Notwithstanding Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 2100), any person 
who violates a rule or order of the commission adopted pursuant to this 
chapter, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not 
less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more than five thousand dollars 
($5,000). 
Any person who engages in any collusion or conspiracy to violate any rule 
or order adopted pursuant to this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall 
be punished by a fine of not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more 
than fifty thousand dollars {$50,000). 
SEC. 3. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of 
Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs which may 
be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this 
act creates a new crime or infraction, changes the definition of a crime or 
infraction, changes the for a crime or infraction, or eliminates a 
crime or infraction. Notwithstanding Section 17580 of the Government Code, 
unless otherwise specified in this act, the provisions of this act shall 
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BILL NUMBER: SB 1126 
BILL TEXT 
commissioner, £E any other person. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS: 
sse~%eN i• See~iefi ii3~8.6 ie added te the seve~ftmefit eede, te 
~ead~ 
ii3~9·6• tat ~he~e is established within the e££iee e£ 
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tet Adminis~~a~ive ±aw ;~a~ee em~±eyed in ~he division eha±± be 
a~~eineed by ehe di~eeee~ £~em a ±iet e£ e±i~ib±e eandida~ee 
eem~i±ed by ehe P~b±ie B~i±i~iee eemmies±en• 
tdt Adminee~a~ive ±aw ;~a~ee em~±eyed in the divie±en need ne~ 
be admieeed ee ~~aeeiee ±aw in ehis s~ate. 
tet Adminie~~a~ive ±aw ;~d~es em~±eyed by the P~b±ie B~i±i~iee 
eemmiseien en ~he e££eetive da~e e£ the eta~~~e whieh added ~hie 
see~ien ~e ~he Seve~nmen~ eede are deemed a~~ein~ed by ~he di~eete~ 
and are em~±eyed in ~he division withe~~ ±eee e£ ea±a~y e~ 
bene£iee. 
sse. ZT See~ien 399 e£ the P~b±ie Bti±itiee eede is amended te 
~ead~ 
389. ~he exee~eive di~eeter may em~±ey e~eh e££iee~s7 ex~e~es, 
en~inee~e7 e~atie~ie±ane7 aeee~ntante7 ine~eeee~s7 e±erke7 and 
em~±eyeee as ~he exee~tive di~eete~ determines ee be neeeesary ee 
ear~y e~t ~hie ~a~e er ee ~e~£erm the d~tiee and exereise the 
~ewers een£e~red ~~en the eemm±esien by ±aw. A±± e££±eers and 
em~±eyeee eha±± reeeive ~nat eem~ensatien whieh is £±xed by ~he 
eemmieeien. 
sse. a. See~ien 389•i is added ~e the P~b±±e Bt±±ie±ee eede7 
te read~ 
389•i• A±± ~ewers and dtlt±ee herete£ere exereised by 
adminietra~ive ±aw ;~d~ee em~±eyed by the eemm±ee±en are hereby 
vee~ed in ~he Bivie±en e£ P~b±ie B~i±i~ies eemmissien Adm±nis~rative 
baw a~d~ee e£ the e££iee e£ Adminie~~a~ive Hearin~s e£ the 
Be~ar~men~ e£ Sene~a± Serviees ~tlrs~ant te See~ien ii3~8.6 e£ the 
Seve~nmen~ eede. 
sse. 4• See~ien 3!8 e£ the P~b±ie H~i±i~ies eede is amended te 
~ead~ 
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BILL NUMBER: SB 1126 
BILL TEXT 
eemmieeieft eha~~ The proposed decision shall be filled and made 
public without the consent ££ approval of the commission, ~ 
commissioner, or any other person. The commission shall issue its 
PAGE 4 
decision not sooner than 30 days following filing and service of the proposed 
decision by the administrative law judge, except that the 30-day period may be 
reduced or waived by the commission in an unforeseen emergency situation or 
upon the stipulation of all parties to the proceeding. The commission may, in 
issuing its decision, adopt, modify, or set aside the proposed decision or any 
part of the decision. Every finding, opinion, and order made in the proposed 
decision and approved or confirmed by the commission shall, upon that approval 
or confirmation, be the finding, opinion, and order of the commission. 
(e) The commission may specify that the administrative law judge assigned 
to a proceeding involving an electrical, gas, telephone, railroad, or water 
corporation, or a highway carrier, initiated by customer or subscriber 
complaint, need not prepare, file, and serve an opinion, unless the commission 
finds that to do so is required in the public interest in a particular case. 
TRANSCRIPT 

CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL Good 
Vice Chairman of the committee and Terry 
to welcome Senator Russell, 
Friedman who has an interest in 
the subject matter in terms of his ion. 
I want to thank all of those who the Los at this busy 
many might think holiday period to join us the UCLA campus discuss a 
not especial sexy for a ative is Processes of the Public 
Utilities Commission". 
On first blush, the issue sounds dull, bureaucratic and arcane. But, on closer 
review, making sure the PUC has a fair open process is of critical concern to every 
Californian, because what is decided at the PUC has a dramatic effect and impact on how 
we get, and how much we pay, for ut 1 services. 
It seems that various s of the PUC process have once again raised some 
concerns. The reason for this may be that never before has the commission entered into 
and decided on so many which have changed or will change the 
very regulatory structure of whole industries utilities. Never has so much 
regulatory been so swift sectors ike local and long distance 
telephones utilities, the 
industry, and now even the 
merger of utilities, the cellular 




and services of the utilities, and to 
We are glad that exist so that 
0 However it is the 
parties to the PUC are treated 
correct the situation if it sees fit. 
o It is the responsibil 
has decided for its constituent 
o And, since the time the 
Legislature's responsibil to oversee the 
the 
the structures to accomplish those 
lature doesn't have that onerous 
res pons 
and 
l to make sure that the 
to make changes to 
to see if it agrees with what the PUC 
if it sees fit. 
railroad commission, it has been the 
of the PUC to make sure decisions 
are made on the basis of merit and fact--and not made because of the control of 
here personalities or This are 
PUC oversight is the purpose of this As Chairman of this committee for 
the past six years, one of my themes has been opening up the process and keeping it 
fair to everyone involved. 
The speed by which this commission has moved to change traditional regulation has 
led me to be more sensitive to the critics which have complained about certain fairness 
questions. I admit that. And, I just happen to have a couple bills which I introduced 
last year to address the concerns about which I have heard the most--ex parte 
communication and the administrative law judge system at the PUC. 
Now, I know each of these bills will have a difficult time becoming law with this 
commission and this Governor. But it is important that we do discuss them, and it is 
important for the PUC to know that their process must be held publicly accountable. 
To the PUC, I say that I know these housekeeping matters are not issues you would 
like to deal with, but this forum is for you to state your case as to why you believe 
the system works just fine without legislative involvement. 
And to the other parties, I say that I know it is not easy to raise criticisms of 
the same commission you must go back to and deal with. (Certain witnesses invited 
have, in fact, chosen not to appear for this reason.) But if, in fact, some concerns 
are legitimate and you have reasonable suggestions to share about how the process might 
be improved, we are here to listen, and are willing to act if need be. 
We may be dealing with either fact or perception here. But either way, if it is 
fact that the PUC system somehow is unfair, or it is perception, we must address those 
concerns and try and correct them. 
We will begin with a panel 
complicated world of administrative 
this relates to our PUC. 
I am anxious to hear from all of you. 
to help us better understand the tremendously 
procedures law, how it might be changed, and if 
Senator Russell, do you have any opening comments? 
SENATOR NEWTON RUSSELL: No. That's a pretty clear statement. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblyman? 
ASSEMBLYMAN TERRY FRIEDMAN: Go right ahead. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Professor Asimow of this campus, this UCLA campus, is heading 
a study on this topic for the California Law Revision Commission and will now begin. 
Please identify yourself for the record. 
PROFESSOR MICHAEL ASIMOW: Thank you, Senator, very much. My name is Michael 
Asimow and I'm Professor of Law at UCLA Law School. I very much appreciate your 
scheduling the hearing right here on the UCLA campus, even before you knew I was going 
to speak. 
I've submitted written testimony much more detailed than I have the time to cover 
in my brief statement here. So I hope that the staff and the committee members will 
consult the written testimony. 
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and 1126. 
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act that would cover all state 
have state statute, 
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contacts, written and oral, but them to be on-the-record. It's an 
expedite compromise; I would go further. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I ask a ion? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes 1. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: There's asked sometime or other. 
But how do ex parte In what context are And why are 
they handled in the current -- reasons for the current use of ex 
parte communications? If you that to your test , in your testimony, fine. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Yes I was about to come to that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: At 
ratemaking These are 
regulated industries, ic 
They have hearings that go 
ALJ, hears the case, prepares a 
then goes to the commission. Now 
utility side and the consumer 
of the commission, to come 
writing, as to how these 
indeed even at the 
commissioners be made. To 
with administrative law 
discouraged. The 
by presenting facts or arguments 
presenting it in the 
the office and make their communication 
amount of individualized 
set the rates or trade practices for 
do this by conduct trials. 
administrative law judges, the 
this is a proposed decision which 
interested in this, both on the 
free access to the members 
off-the-record, or in 
It's been tolerated, 
off-the-record approaches to the 
so off-the-record contacts made 
much less of a and is 
wish to influence the commission either 
do so off-the-record rather than by 
Instead to go into 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Has that been a traditional long-standing, forever process? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: At the PUC, yes, it has, Senator. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And you're going to explain why it should be changed now? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: I'm going to try. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: What you have here is something like the NBA season, that is you 
play season games and they really don't count for anything. All they do is get you 
into the playoffs. The hearings before the ALJ are like that: tremendous expense; 
tremendous time, three or four months perhaps of hearings; tremendous record of report. 
It doesn't count for much. What counts are the few well chosen words spoken into the 
ears of the commissioner which can set at naught all that occurred during the hearing. 
I believe this is offensive to fair play and substantial justice. It makes judicial 
review a sham because the facts and arguments that were decisive were not in the 
record. And it breeds an attitude of cynicism that politics and influence counts for 
more at the PUC than any well prepared case. 
Now, these hearings that occur in individualized ratemaking cases are required by 
the statute which requires hearings, and by constitutional law. Due process requires 
in the case of individualized ratemaking that trial-type hearings occur. And when you 
have a trial-type hearing required by statute, by the Constitution, it is inconsistent 
with due process with the concept of a hearing that factual material coming 
off-the-record. It all has to be on-the-record, both facts, as well as arguments. And 
there's a great amount of law, of case law, arising from the Constitution, from 
statutes, from ethical guidelines applicable to attorneys, and so on, that ex parte 
contact in the context of a trial-type hearing is improper. 
I believe that someday that the California Supreme Court is going to confront this 
issue squarely and will reverse a PUC decision, showing to be tainted by ex parte 
contact. So far, by some miracle, the PUC has avoided having the California Supreme 
Court confront its long-term practice 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: .•• but I believe the result will be inevitable. 
Yes, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In a 
Superior Court, I understand 
court trial, aside 
I'm not a lawyer 
from PUC, regular court trials of 
but I understand that the judge 
sometimes invites the parties into his chambers, one party or the other or both, and 
they discuss various aspects of the case. Is that correct? Do they do that? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Well, sometimes the judge will invite both attorneys to come in 
and discuss the case, particularly to settle it, off-the-record. But it would be most 








SENATOR RUSSELL: Are 
allow ex Would 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: 
sides. In these very 
just two sides 
lawyers for all of the 
all of them are 
they can be rebutted. The 
•t do that? 
ear of the commissioner, and that has 
Now, as I understand the commies 
their First 
lots of ways that can 
industries and with consumers. 
hearing, the informat 
through the record and 
the information or 
be false, 
testing that goes on 
A second 
different from what you described, 
is ive, and not 
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I have a lot more to say 
probably move on to the second 
is to enhance the 
There's been a 
gone from a mere 
process 
of the team 
that the way it worked was 
the case, he would file a --
but 
that situation, as in 
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a lot of 
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because they may 
the adversarial 
context is that, well, this is 
the court case. This 
reject that because of 
the rates. If they were 
icable across the board to 
the But when they're 
norms, and the mere 
any less udicative. 
within my time frame I should 
law j Now here the goal 
that I very support. 
in ich administrative law judges have 
factor. It used to be 
a officer. He would hear 
decision, but the party wouldn't 
even see it. It would just go to the commissioners. And the commissioners and the 
staff and everyone would work together to produce the decision. so that the hearing 
officer was little more than just a referee at the hearing. 
Now, this has changed. And today the ALJs have independence within the PUC; 
they're not supervised by prosecutors; they write a proposed decision which is 
circulated to the parties; and that proposed decision becomes the focus of the appeal 
at the commissioner level. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How was that changed? By law, or by practice? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: It was changed by law. There was a statutory change that 
occurred some years back that made the -- said the proposed decision had to be released 
to the public. 
Now, because this has been an evolutionary process, some vestiges of the old system 
remain. One of them is the assigned commissioner system at the PUC. And I think 
that's the problem here that should be corrected. Under that system, each ALJ is 
assigned a commissioner, and that commissioner works with the ALJ on the case. 
Procedural matters that come up on negotiating the decision. And although it has some 
advantages, I think that on the whole that's a bad idea, that it's a vestige on the old 
system in which the ALJs were mere hearing officers. Many ALJs have told me that they 
resent the assigned commissioner system. They want to control their own cases. They 
want to write their own decision and not negotiate it with a member of the commission. 
IQ addition, I think it isn't fair for one commissioner to have undo influence on a 
case. If that commissioner's views are at variance with the other commissioners, could 
have too much influence on the ALJ decision. I don't think it's a good use of the 
commissioner's time to be involved in the nuts and bolts of ongoing cases. They have a 
great deal to do besides sharing the ALJ's job. 
And finally, in a world of ex parte contacts, I'm highly concerned that the 
assigned commissioner will be the vehicle, the conduit for transmitting ex parte 
contacts that he or she has received to the ALJ. So, all in all, I would strongly 
support dispensing with the assigned commissioner system. And that alone would have a 
great and positive influence in enhancing the independence of the PUC ALJs. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What would you put in its place? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: I would say that like all the other agencies that I know about, 
state and federal, the cases assigned to the ALJ, the ALJ is in charge of that case 
while it's before him or her. And the ALJ then files a proposed decision and the case 
goes to the commission. In other words, you don't need the involvement of a 
commissioner at the ALJ level, in my opinion. And so far as I know, no other agency 
has a system like that, and it's really a vestigate of what used to be. 
Now, SB 1126 goes further -- oh, I'm sorry, Senator. 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Chairman, may I ... ? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes ahead. 
SENATOR RUSSELL Did 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I was is it or -- we've heard it's from inside of 
the PUC that the the works with the ALJ, that in 
decision that the commissioner wants. Is that what fact, the ALJ comes out 
we're trying to avoid? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: In some 
ALJs at the commission don't ike 
decisions. In other cases the 
it. so what you do have is 




in some cases, no. In other words, some 
and simply refuse to negotiate the 
with the commissioner and negotiate 
one commissioner out of five 
What I'm saying is that you should think of it more like a trial court and an 
appellate court. The trial j 
to the appellate court and 
judges to get involved in 
of that 
tries the case and makes his decision. Then it goes 
handle the There's no need for appellate 
the trial render his decision. That very much 
undercuts the 
SENATOR RUSSELL: don' we just do away with the PUC and let the ALJ be the 
whole show. That's what it sound ike what you're advocat 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: No, Senator wouldn' favor that. I think that the five 
members of the PUC are the ones entrusted with great discretion, as 
Senator Rosenthal said ions of enormous moment to California 
consumers and business. should not be made by an ALJ. Those 
should be made the commissioners. What I'm simply 
saying that when way of review of the ALJ 
decision. That's the agency does the ratemaking agencies 
at the federal level 
SENATOR RUSSELL: It that these issues are so technical and so complex 
there down sides to that, 
as I -- but the benefit of that is you have the ALJ, the commissioner sort of 
moving in tandem in terms of issues at least theoretically, and that 
when a decision is made rendered, the one person who is expert in 
that area that• been , has the understanding to be 
able to then as to what the issues are. You have a 
five-man PUC or your recommendation, you don't have any 
experts. And it's like the members this committee, we're supposed to be experts in 
all this stuff, but we' knows, we're sort of generalists. And we 
mess around these decisions that affect •s lives, and by the grace of the 
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Lord, it comes out most of the time okay. 
So that's my concern, if your recommendation were to be implemented, you would 
eliminate that expertise on that issue, I would think. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: I think there's a good deal in what you say, Senator Russell, 
and I think that's the best argument that can be made in favor of retaining the 
assigned commissioner system. That is, that you do have the advantage of having a 
commissioner who is up to speed on the particular case. I think that's fair to say 
that that's an advantage. But I think that the disadvantages outweigh that in terms of 
undercutting the independence of the ALJ, in giving that one commissioner undo 
influence over the case, and in acting as a conduit for ex parte contacts that that 
commissioner might have received. I'm not persuaded on my study of the PUC that the 
advantage that you mentioned of having one of the five commissioners that already has 
some familiarity with the case before it gets to the commissioner level, outweighs the 
disadvantages to PUC adjudication that occur. 
Now, SB 1126 goes further than this ... (cross talking) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, finish, will you. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Okay. I just have a couple more points to make and I'm done. 
SB 1126 goes further than this and would actually remove the ALJs from the PUC and 
place them into an independent agency, the Office of Administrative Hearings. Now, I'm 
not persuaded that this is necessary or really a good idea. The advantage of doing so 
is that it enhances the appearance of impartiality. It makes all the people who deal 
with the PUC more confident that the ALJs really are independent of the PUC and that 
their career path cannot be affected by their decisions, and that in itself certainly 
would be a good thing. 
However, let's consider the fact that the only agencies in California which are in 
the Office of Administrative Hearings are the prosecutorial ones agencies, plus a 
couple others; ones that take punitive action against people. Regulatory agencies, 
like the PUC, generally have employed their own ALJs and that's true completely at the 
federal level as well as in California. I don't see the strong conflict between 
prosecution and adjudication in the PUC that might lead us to take the ALJs out. 
In addition, I think there are some real down sides to doing it. One of the 
positive things about present PUC practice is that the ALJs can be used in helping to 
prepare the final decision, which responds to your question, Senator Russell. The ALJ 
is the expert on the hearing record, has lived with that record for perhaps three to 
four months and knows better than anyone else what's in it. And when the PUC comes to 
prepare its final decision, I think a very good thing that ALJs are available and 
frequently are used to help make sure that that final decision is responsive to what is 
in the record. And I think you'd lose that if you took the ALJs outside of the PUC. 
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Secondly, it also was of the ice and both of you mentioned this before 
these cases are 
understanding, for 
technical somet are -- the ALJ needs help in 
economic models that are involved. And the ALJ now freely 
can consult the staff of the commission that have not been involved in the particular 
case. It's perfectly , in my it's the practice in these kinds of 
cases for the ALJ to in touch with on staff, the sort called, for 
example, the CADC staff that have not been adversaries in the 
case, for in for new facts, but for in understanding it. 
And there again, I think you'd lose that if you took the ALJs outside the commission. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I ask another ion? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL Yes Senator. 
of your of the PUC, don't you think that 
reviewer of facts and then their decision results in 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In your 
the PUC is more than just a 
assimilating the facts but also relat to the real world out there which is 
oftentimes, I would the of the ALJ? The ALJ looks at facts, two 
plus two is four. The PUC looks at that too, but recognize that there are other 
concerns, political issues, social issues, other kinds of things that aren't readily 
related to just black and white mathematical 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Oh, I agree with that, Senator Russell. There's no 
doubt that these decisions I mean, I think that it's up to the parties to convey 
issues of social and discretion to the ALJ as well. And these certainly try to 
do that in the course But I very much agree that questions of great 
discretion and do involve about the economic climate in 
California 
everything 
have to be 
to 
to bear on these cases. And therefore, we need to do 
the best possible decisions out of the ALJs as well as the 
commissioners. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But the ALJs, 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
upon who is governor. 
we may or may not agree 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Of course. 
•re what? 'reappointed by ... 
a process; and the commissioners come and go based 
commissioners reflect a particular philosophy which 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The direction I hear you advocat is that the ALJ becomes more 
of a factor that cannot be these decisionmakers; that you want them 
to become more the person who decides what it should be; and that if the commission 
then deviates from the facts that the ALJ has come up with his decision, they do it 
perhaps at their would be the case today. Now there's good sides 
and down sides to that, but would that not be true? 
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PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Well, it's a complex question, Senator. I think that as to 
matters of fact that the commissioners should not deviate from what is in the record. 
And the ALJ is very helpful in assisting them to understand the factual inputs that are 
in the record. But when it comes to matters of policy and discretion, I think it's up 
to the members of the commission to do that the best that they can. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But what I hear-- and maybe I'm incorrect-- but what I hear is 
that the ALJ will be more, not only a factual presenter of the facts, but will be also 
a decisionmaker, writing his own opinion with the door closed between him and the PUC 
commissioners, so to speak, and then handing this out that this is my opinion, and that 
it's -- would be that pretty difficult for the PUC, whatever the reasons, to come up 
with some other kind of a proposal than what the ALJs have. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Well, I ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And the AJLs are not appointed to do that. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: I don't think that it's difficult, 
commissioners when they review the proposed decision of the 
Senator, for the 
ALJ to substitute a 
different political point of view, a different economic analysis, a different balancing 
of the equities. That is their job. What they are limited to are the factual inputs 
that are in the record. 
Now, I'm really striking a compromise on this. I'm sympathetic with which you're 
saying and that's why I really do not support SB 1126 which would take the ALJs outside 
the commission and cause them to really render an independent decision such as occurs 
in the Pharmacy Licensing Board or something like that. I think that the evolution 
that has gone on whereby the ALJs are independent within the PUC and render a proposed 
decision is good. I think you get a better decision that way, by building up ALJ 
independence to that degree. I don't think it makes sense, however, in light of the 
kinds of factors you suggested, to take the ALJs out of the PUC completely into an 
independent agency. There, I think, you are cutting them off too much from the staff 
and from the commissioners. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you see the current practice of the ALJs more than just a 
fact-finder and a presenter of facts? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Oh, definitely. Much more. The ALJs not only hear the facts 
and make decisions about facts, they themselves do the best that they can in trying to 
solve the economic and social problems that are presented in that case. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Has that been their traditional role? Or has that evolved fairly 
recently because of the changes in the law? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Oh, I think that's traditional, and it also has been evolving; 
that that is proposed decision, the ALJ does his or her best to resolve the entire 
problem that has been presented. And that obviously includes not only finding one plus 
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one equals two, but what is best for California business and California 
call. consumers. It isn't the final cal on that. But it's a very 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And that's their traditional role. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: that's very much been role since the statute 
was changed whereby their 
SENATOR RUSSELL: When was 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: I don't 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Five 
decision is released to the ic, yes. 
law 
the date 





come from -- and it may show a tremendous amount 
I administrative law judges get 
out and all the and the facts and take that amount of time, which the 
commission does not have, and mass it together and it in a form that's then given 
to the PUC. take that and make the decision. I wasn't aware that the law judges 
were, in a sense, decisionmakers ect to review. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW No very much are the latter Senator. They are 
decisionmakers ect to review. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: , thank you. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: And that' 
to find an 
dependence. 
SENATOR RUSSELL 
to a law and 






ASSEMBLYMAN TERRY FRIEDMAN 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes 
bel that' 
between 
, but you still have 
independence and complete 
for the commission to come down 
decision he feels is appropriate. 
ion --well I'm struggling with 
gone over my 10 minutes, Senator, so perhaps I 
I ask ... ? 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Thank you very much, Senator. Professor Asimow, my interest 
is back to your initial area of test ex parte communications. I've had 
legislation in to the Coastal Commission similar to Senator Rosenthal's. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: One 
regulatory bodies approach the 
have an 
ex 
interest in knowing how the whole range of 
issue. Are they all, like the PUC and the 
Coastal Commission, in a posit leave ex communications wholly unregulated? 
Or do we have any here in California or if not, elsewhere in other states, 
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or in the federal system where either ex parte communications or the middle ground, 
which Senator Rosenthal's legislation and my legislation is taken, to require the 
disclosure of all ex partes has proven to be an effective approach? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Well, Assemblyman Friedman, my understanding of the Coastal 
Commission's practice is that they do that now. That is, the written ex parte contacts 
are in the record and oral ex parte contacts have to be written down and placed in the 
record. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Without any sanction, though, so as I understand it, it's at 
the discretion of the commissioners to -- and some of whom are quite interested in 
abiding by that policy; and others who object to it have indicated that they could not 
possibly abide by it. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: That's my understanding, too. But at least they have the 
aspiration of ••. (cross talking) .•. on the record. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Some of them do. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: But as you say, it isn't required by anything, by rule or by 
statute. And so it's often honored in the breach. 
There are other California agencies that where ex parte is a problem. But by and 
large, the practice is quite different. They're viewed as wrong, demeaning to the 
process that to the adjudicatory process, and they are generally prohibited, 
particularly oral ex parte contacts. The PUC and perhaps the Coastal Commission are at 
the other extreme. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Has there been experience to show any serious problems 
impeding the work of either of those bodies, or the interest that come before those 
bodies as a result of such a broad band that they have on ex parte communications? 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Certainly, as far as I can tell, in asking questions like that 
many times, Senator (sic), the answer is no, no problem. It simply-- you have to 
change the prevailing culture of the agency. The culture has to become one. At the 
federal level, these are generally prohibited in these kinds of proceedings: telephone 
ratemaking, utility ratemaking by the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee. They don't 
allow ex parte contact. And the culture (cross talking) 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: is really an aberration from the general approach in the 
state and across the country. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: I believe it is a very serious aberration, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: One other question. Have you been able to analyze the 
difference in appellate court review of decisions by the PUC or the Coastal Commission 
where perhaps, though we don't know, much of the basis for those decisions are ex parte 
communications that are not on the record as compared to those bodies whose decisions 
are reviewed by appellate courts where the entire basis for their decisions is on the 
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record? It's seemed to me that one of the is how can the court of 
appeals or supreme court review a record that is because of the 
possibil or actual real of communcations there way to 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Well, agree that judicial review is indeed a 
sham. I've not been able -- there's real no way to know how ultimate decisions are 
skewed because you don't know what the ex contacts were. In California we don't 
have any cases the PUC or Coastal Commission where the litigants have 
raised this issue. I think should raise it. And I think when they do, you're 
going to find the the decision as has often 
occurred at the federal level. In famous cases for , the FCC and the 
Federal Labor Relations , the decisions tainted ex parte contacts are 
simply set aside But I do not it's real hard to say whether particular 
outcomes have been skewed this. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: It's my 
Commission, perhaps the PUC as well that as 
, at least in regard to the Coastal 
General George Deukmejian and now 
letter the coastal Commission that current General John de have warned 
to any sort of ex cont 
for the commission and for their decisions 
co~~unications raises serious legal problems 
as a result of the sort of point that you 
just made. 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW: Oh, I ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Has that 
communicated that 
PROFESSOR ASIMOW 
commission has and 
And the commission chooses to 
If one last 
issue, Senator. 
with the PUC? Have any attorney generals 
know. But I do know that the staff of the 
told the commission that this is a risk. 
advice. 
because I to make it before on the ALJ 
In the course of my work, I took a I sent a questionnaire to 
every 
agency. 
PUC and asked them how 
And because ALJs have 
would vote for it unanimous 
and of the j who 
vote of 10-to-8. It was almost 
among the ALJs, the clear-cut 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We ran 
we're some 
felt about switched to an independent 
favored this kind of move, I expected that they 
did not. I about a 70 percent response; 
voted to switch to an independent agency by a 
it down the middle. So you don't have, even 
for the switch that you might want. 
on the particular presentation because 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Because asked al the ions. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, no, that's all That's fine. That's what we're 
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here for is to ask questions. However, because we're laying some groundwork. But I am 
going to hold the rest of the participants to the time allotted to them. 
The next -- Honorable Litt, Chief Judge of u.s. Department of Labor. 
JUDGE NAHUM LITT: Thank you, Senator Rosenthal 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And formerly an administrative law judge at FERC. 
JUDGE LITT: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Please, and welcome to 
Sacramento or to Los Angeles. I thought I was in Sacramento. 
JUDGE LITT: Thank you. I've submitted a resume which I request be made a part of 
the record. I appear as a representative of the National Conference of Administrative 
Law Judges for the American Bar Association, and in my personal capacity. None of my 
views reflect those of the Department of Labor. 
On ex parte communications, I would like to say that I 
Asimow's statement that they should be absolutely prohibited. 
too support Professor 
The hallmark of fair 
adjudications and procedures is the right for all litigants to appear and file on a 
public record at the same time, place and level as all other parties. That record, the 
so-called on-the-record hearing becomes the sole basis for all subsequent review. 
The evils of ex parte communications can be seen easily in a case alluded to by 
Professor Asimow which is the so-called PATCO case -- it's 685 F.2d 547 --where the ex 
parte communications from one of the parties is if 
you'll never get another job in this industry. When 
became a problem. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What's the PATCO case? 
you decide this case against me, 
that came to light, it obviously 
JUDGE LITT: It's a Federal Labor Relations Aut~ority case which involved the air 
traffic controllers. I would invite you to read that case if you want to see where the 
evils of ex parte communications flow and what they do and how corrosive they are to 
the procedures. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Who was saying that you'll never get another job? 
JUDGE LITT: One of the parties went to one of those who was going to decide the 
case and literally threatened them, is what the underlying cause was in that case. 
That was the ex parte communication, as I understand it. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And if this recommendation that you're suggesting were to be a 
force of law, were there have to be then some penalties for those kinds of 
communications? Suppose ..• 
JUDGE LITT: The penalty's public exposure, sir, normally. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Public what? 
JUDGE LITT: Ex parte communications are usually cured by public exposure, which is 
one of the ... (cross talking) ... SB 1125. 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: So, if I came to you and made that kind of a statement that you 
would have to -- you 
JUDGE LITT: That' 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
JUDGE LITT: That's correct. 
subsequent board of 
facts and the decision was 
Ex communications 
whether formal or informal 
corrosive and destructive 
know of no on the 




As a matter of fact 
record ••• 
became known, and there was a 
master to investigate those 
as the agency was concerned. 
in every form 
of fair procedures and as 
of fairness. I 
I will have years of federal service, 
4 of this year --
lowed the fact discovered are not roundly 
of the FOIA, the Freedom of Information Act 
legislation that was 
communications where 
disclosed. 
was in order to a better handle on 
and where 
ies to ex parte 
were not publicly 
I would like to 
the heart of the 
Federal 
take the Public Utilities 
Commission of New 
1126 would do 
Commission 
ions because I think that they go to 
of administrative law judges. The 
now is where Professor Asimow would like to 
California. It is where the Public Utilities 
moved from what they had to what SB 
administrative law judges handling public 
utilities commission work as New experience was that after 
ities commission basically were in business 
mounted 
back. And what 
panel held and 
bring with me I 
before I left, and wil 
and if the 
attack which 
I was at the 
under the 
against what they 
system was somewhat flawed 
Energy Bar 




That blue ribbon 
ronn~r, which I had hoped to 
it did not arrive in time 
think it would be instructive 
in New Jersey. And the 
Commission for seven years working 
would be appropriate as 
Cal fornia Public Utilities Commission. That 
better than what occurs now. And the Federal 
in California, recently adopted 
the American Bar Association recommendat would take the judges out of the 
agencies and move them to the type of process suggested by SB 1126. 
Now, the question of how independent judges are and what's the role of the judge in 
an agency, I worked for 17 years as either the chief judge or a working judge or a 
working attorney at agencies that handled public utility-type regulation: the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for roughly 10 years; and seven years at the -- actually 
19 years -- 10 years at the -- seven years at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
and its predecessor the Public Utility Commission; and two years as chief judge CAP. 
And we all did utility ratemaking and licensing and most of the other processes which 
are done here. 
Judges do not make policy. They do recommend policy. And the courts do not defer 
to judges when the policy and discretion as to whether or not you're going to have a 
high indebted rate of return or low indebted rate of return, and whether or not you're 
going to encourage growth or not encourage growth. 
based upon the materials put in the record. But 
The judge can make a recommendation 
it's a commission which makes that 
decision and the courts will defer uniformly to the commission decision as long as it's 
reason, and they give any reasons for it. But the judges do and what the agencies 
expect them to do is marshal the record and the facts presented in a meaningful way and 
to the extent that these issues are raised, to present what the alternatives are and to 
decide among those alternatives what they will recommend. If the agency chooses to 
accept that recommendation or not on the policy is up to the agency and the political 
appointees who bring with them the leavening factors of where the public interest lies 
and the political realities in the state in which they're appointed. 
What it does say is that the commissions can't ignore record. There are few areas 
where administrative law judges have finality. And the reason for it is if you have 15 
cr 25 judges and they come out all over the board, there is no uniformity of decisions; 
and secondly, you have a tremendous burden when the courts -- it's most of the cases 
involving hundreds of millions of dollars will certainly be appealed and will go into 
the courts where without any direction, without any focus they will become a tremendous 
burden in the courts' more complex cases. As a matter of fact, the Department of Labor 
which and my office administers roughly 80 different statutes arising through labor 
protective legislation that has been passed -- we have had administrative finality in 
one area which was the immigration area, so-called card certification, the alien 
certification appeals. It didn't work. Each judge -- we had 85 judges -- issued their 
own decisions. And what we had was pick and choose between 15 or 20 judges on one side 
of an issue and 15 or 20 on the other. There was no predictability for the Bar, and it 
got to be a serious problem. We created a board of alien certification of appeals in 
order to avoid that problem. And those are simple adjudications essentially as the 
state from these complex litigation problems arise here. 
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I , the American Bar Association the American Medical Association 
supports the Association ired a core of administrative law 
judges on the federal which is what SB 1126 would do for California. This has 
been for six years before the Senate of the Unites states, has had 
three sets of has been out with favorable recommendation twice 
from the subcommittee, and we' told will out by Senator Heflin 
in Subcommittee on committee sometime or February. It 
is moving on the federal but this of amendment that you're wrestling with 
is not an easy , is a that has to be addressed. And I think 
where you are now is a heck of further in some ways than that process has 
occurred in five years federal you're to be commended for 
wanting to come to with it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Litt. Our next witness ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL I ask a ion? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, 
SENATOR RUSSELL The Professor apparent didn't go 
You're an SB 1126 of a where 
The Professor did not advocate that. The law j were 
feel that that let's assume we don't allow ex 
law judge do their own and 
as far as you're advocating. 
're completely separate. 
it on that. Why do you 
, but we keep the present 
it -- what's wrong with that 
as opposed to a 
JUDGE LITT 
isn't very fair. 
, there's a perception that it 
and it uses those judges. 
It has control over them 




spaces or don't, how 
're housed, all the ittle that go with what 
or not 
it is what you've had at social security where judges were 
directed 
second 
to courts of decisions, even in the same circuit, which turned 
out to be serious intra-circuit nonacquiescence, inter-circuit 
The abuses have been known. In this PATCO case, if you should read 
it, you'll find that what the commissioner did when he was approached and threatened, 
was he went and he had lunch with the chief j and suggested to the chief judge that 
he take the case himself and because he'd know how it'd come out. Now that's the vice 
that you have to address. 
The system, with the among the j , is that there's been an evolution of 
the bill that Senator Heflin has. The or problem with most judges is the 
unpredictabil of whether be moved from an area of their expertise and 
whether could be moved from where live. The current Heflin bill 
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says that you can't do that for more than 120 days in a two-year period against the 
will of the judge, and you can't physically move the judge. Had it been a problem also 
in the federal system and we had a split among our judges as to whether they would 
support it. I would suggest that if you went back to the PUC judges with the current 
Heflin proposal and also stated that you would grandfather in current appointees --
some of them, I'm informed, are not necessarily lawyers -- that you might have a 
different response to Professor Asimow's request, well, you know, and survey. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Chairman, I don't imagine you want to take the time, but I 
would find it, I think, instructive or interesting to determine why in New Jersey, the 
PUC felt so strongly that they mounted a campaign to get their judges back; one of two 
things, either they wanted to completely control them; or they found that the judges 
were being completely independent from the kinds of decisions that the appointed board 
would expect. And I think there's problems in both cases. And I don't imagine you 
want to take the time to get into that today, but I think that 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, maybe we can 
SENATOR RUSSELL: ... staff would 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: ... get that information for us. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: •.. get that information and 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, I would like that. 
What about the provision which only asks that the commission need not approve an 
ALJ decision before it becomes public? Isn't that more important than a physical move? 
JUDGE LITT: Well, that would be certainly a necessary step in any move towards 
independence of the judges and the decisionmaking authority. I know of no federal 
agency where a judge's decision is circulated to the agency prior to publication. I 
mean, if a judge walks in and he asks me to read it, I'll read his decision and give 
him 
the 
my opinion. But he does not submit it to me as the chief judge, nor submit it to 
agency for any type of review or input. I mean, you do the best job you can; you 
write your decision; you say what you have to say; and then it goes on appeal if the 
parties don't like it. Every case I ever wrote at the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission went on appeal. I mean, there were literally -- in one case, the Alaska gas 
transportation case which affected California, there were billions of dollars at stake. 
My decision certainly wasn't going to be final. And I was under no illusion either. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you look at the Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. You see, that's one of the things that I'm trying to get 
at in our PUC, for example, before it's released. I mean, a for~ is filled out before 
it gets to the public in which the judge has to indicate to the commissioner and then 
they review it before anything happens. Just seems to me that that's almost getting to 
the point of where the commissioner determines what the judge will do, which is the 
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thing that I • m to deal with in discuss this ect. 
See, I don't have 
doing whatever 
think there appears to be 
to be based upon the 
particular commissioner would 
real or unreal, that 'm 
a decision and the commission 
's decision. But I 
's decision is going 
commissioner and what that 
case. That's the perception, 
JUDGE LITT ion. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
SENATOR RUSSELL have 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes 
SENATOR RUSSELL 
appellate court. The law 
what you're 
JUDGE LITT: The PUC is a 
policy You 
judges that are in another 
adj 
the federal and 
the state system that the 




SENATOR RUSSELL Wel 
we're all 
being has that to confront 
that ies 
j and forth. 
I'm the feel 
them want to be in a 
decision, but you want 
other than what the law 
I'm 
I'm with that. 
conclusion, but I 
says. 
JUDGE LITT: Well, I can't 
that reflect what you've 
myself included, are 
Profesor 
there 
that the PUC be merely an 
and then it goes up on appeal. Is that 
and also has appellate authority and 
imow refers to the fact that if you have 
be ferences with that agency as an 
is is that where that has occurred, both with 
even say on he in his report on 
, the PUC, could change its regulations or if 
ion in it would go to court which 
say and not what the judge would say was 
ust 1 a life and being in 
And every individual human 
are more to be power than others. And 
it applies to the 





you about all j 
to law 
for 
and you're an advocate for 
decision. Maybe not the 
for the commission to do 
position to be in. And 
reasons you come to that 
I guess I know one or two 
But I can tell you that most judges, and 
happens to it afterwards I don't usual 
the best job we can; and what 
care about, when it goes on appeal. The 
decision is changed on a political basis or political reason. Whatever I had to say is 
going to stay or fall on what I had to say. I wouldn't consider it that I was doing my 
job well and my position well if, in fact, I tried to block an agency in so it could 
not make a political decision or a decretionary decision that was before it. That 
would •.. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you. 
We'll move on now to an administrative law judge at the PUC, Judge Weiss. 
JUDGE JOHN B. WEISS: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senators, Assemblymen, ladies and 
gentlemen. The views and opinions that I give you are based on 8 years prior 
experience as a member of the California Unemployment and Insurance Appeals Board, and 
14 years present service as an ALJ with the commission. The views and opinions are my 
own. I am not authorized to represent the commission. I am a member of ACSA and a 
member of the California Bar. 
When asked to appear I was asked to give my views on SB 1125 and 1126. As to 1125, 
the ex parte bill requiring prohibition but disclosure requiring not prohibition, 
but disclosure of ex parte contacts, I am in full support, but would argue that it does 
not go far enough. Where Rule 7-108 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State 
Bar, a rule which is approved by the State Supreme Court and has a force of law, if 
this were followed by the commissioners, their aides, and all ALJs, there would be no 
need for SB 1125. But most commissioners, some of the aides, and a number of ALJs are 
not members of the Bar, and therefore are not subject to the rule. The rule prohibits 
direct or indirect communication in the absence of opposing counsel and requires 
furnishing opposing counsel with a copy of any written communication on the merits of 
contested matter. 
The commission's staff today is divided between the Division of Ratepayer Advocates 
and the Commission Advisory and compliance Division. DRA is a full litigate as well as 
being a part of our staff, and it is also a conduit to other parties who are 
participating in a case. There is also interchange between the divisions, promotional 
opportunities and transfers between these divisions and career opportunities involved. 
And finally, the commission's chief counsel, the legal advisor to the commissioners, is 
also head of all of the legal division including DRA. Therefore, I would enlarge 1125 
to require commission practice by all commissioners, all their aides, all ALJs to 
conform to State Bar Rule 7-108. Such a requirement would not matter to the good guys, 
but is needed so that bad guys when caught could be punished. 
As to 1126, transfer of all PUC ALJs to the Office of Administrative Hearings. 
This proposed resolution of the problem that exists of interference with ALJs' conduct 
of cases and their attainment of independent decisions causes me to have some personal 
reservations, I must say. There exists some very real morale problems amongst a number 
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of the PUC ALJs. 
case under the 
derive from interference with the ALJs' conduct of the 
within the 










, desire for consistency and 
natural desire of the 
conclusions in the ALJa' 
into a degree of 
a number of the ALJs of 
to this urgent 
of changes are incorporated 
into SB 1126. These that and their administrative 
headquarters would remain in San Francisco assurances of grandfathering present 
nonlawyer ALJs; and and publication of the 
ALJs' own decision of the commission, a 
commissioner, or any before it is filed. I understand that access propose 
changes have been to the committee independent of my appearance today. 
The concept of a state ALJ core of ication as need dictates, but 
afford economies. But I 't is the divergent specialized 
legal and technical that characterizes agenc such as the PUC. 
The most valuable of the ALJ rests in the knowledge and the 
independence of the ALJ in the evidence the decisions which he 
presents to the commission. Workmen's comp comes closer to this goal with the ALJ 
decision, the initial decision of record. The PUC ALJs are not yet free of 
interference, the PU 1 were a initial step. Our value to 
the commission, I a of it. But it should be as a 
quasi-independent access to the commissioners and support staff. 
Two short other items. I very ieve that full due process can never be 
assured until 
to a court of 
review more than a 
that fact in the 
from commission final decision can be taken as a matter of right 
than direct the Court. The latter just cannot 
matters a year, and 
And I think due process 
the corr~ission, , has counted on 
ffered in different cases. 
the commissioners' aides very part because of the vast 
determine to some extent their number of cases ion, and 
vote 
decisions are an 




s' final vote. I would require 
the same ing laws as apply to 
their ' conferences. 
at 
Thank you for this 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL 
the of a case indicat 
to be heard. 
Honor, are you aware of an assigned commissioner 
to the ALJ what the outcome should be based upon 
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ex parte discussions that may have taken place before the case? 
JUDGE WEISS: I have been told within the past week when I have discussed the fact 
that I was going to be here in the absence of Judge Jarvis with a number of my 
associates, and several have led me to understand and these are newer ALJs who are 
still within their probation period and we now have a two-year step, so that you're 
under probation for two years, so the hold is pretty strong -- several have been 
assigned very important cases and it has been inferred to them at least that they 
should follow direction in reaching these decisions. This has been reported to me by 
several within the past week. 
CHAIRP~N ROSENTHAL: Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that point. You've been with the PUC did you say 14 years? 
JUDGE WEISS: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In that 14 years, is what you've just told us, a new phenomenon? 
or is it something that has been a part of the PUC process for that 14 years that 
you've been there? 
JUDGE WEISS: It has been a part of the process, sir, with some ALJs and some 
commissioners, during my entire tenure, and I believe extended before that. I know of 
at least one instance where the hearings were held, and when it came down to the final 
number the percentage that was to be applied, the president of the commission it is 
not the present President, it is a prior president -- gave the ALJ the figure that was 
to be used. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So, basically 
JUDGE WEISS: Regardless of the record. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Yeah. In those cases then, over that 14 year period, the 
situation is that the commissioner comes in, regardless of what the facts may show, 
says this is what I want it to be, in general terms? 
JUDGE WEISS: Yes, sir. Very recently, another ALJ -- or last week another ALJ 
reported to me that very recently he had a 311 decision; he drafted his decision; it 
went to the commissioner's office and the commissioner said he would not release for it 
unless it was changed. The ALJ refused to change it. As it turned out, the 
commissioner then did change his mind and released it. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Can you comment? Give me your feeling on this particular 
form, not necessarily yours, but the general concept ... 
JUDGE WEISS: I have no problem with the concept, sir. I do feel that the ALJ's 
decision should be signed by the ALJ and should be issued by the ALJ, not subject to a 
review by his supervisor, the assistant chief or the chief ALJ, or as it now happens 
where it goes to a department. In one case that I had not very long ago, one of the 
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witnesses for the staff drafted a decision which he 
aide after my decision had been turned was 
then sent to the commissioner's 
a witness to one of the parties. 
it was there. Now, that was not used. The not 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: you very much. further questions? 
Aaron Read, 
Judges Welcome. 
ive of the Association of Administrative Law 
MR. AARON READ: Thank you very Senator Rosenthal, Mr. Chairman, members. I 
am here 
Law Judges. I'm 
panel with such 
Much of what I was 
all of it, 
judges that I represent. 
to be 
to 
State Attorneys and Administrative 
invited the committee and also pleased to be on a 
has 
some of 
been said, so I'll try not to repeat 
those issues that are important to the 
The ex communication issue is issue. We believe the legislation is 
tremendously needed. We're astounded at the breadth and scope of ex parte contacts 
that are 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Which bill do you refer , Aaron? 
MR. READ: That's the ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 1125 
MR. READ: ••• 1125, correct. 
so, we favor as the other witnesses have mentioned, 
As -- Senator Russel ion a 
decisions, and there 
ion in this area. 
ittle bit earlier about the 
ion that changed the way they 
do I believe it was bill, and it was more than 10 years, a dozen years 
at least, that carried that So it's been a good while 
that that ion has been on the books. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Can say ical that lation said? Paraphrase it. 
MR. READ: '11 let Weiss it. The 311 Procedure is what it 
established in law. 
JUDGE WEISS: The 311 Procedure, sir, came later. I beg your pardon. The 311 
Procedure followed bil . was a clarification or addendum in effect. The 
Duffy bill first for the distribution and -- well, for the placing in the 
record of the ALJs' decision. At first it was in the record, but only when the 
commission issued its decision. Procedure for the ALJs' decision to 
be to this yellow form that 
will; and there was some 
to that; and there are dif 
provided that that decision 
Senator Rosenthal showed us -- to be reviewed, if you 
ion about whether it is review or merely a conference as 
in the commission as to that. But it 
would be sent out to the parties and there would be a 
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20-day comment period by the parties and a 5-day rebuttal period. At the end of that 
time, the ALJ -- as my understanding and the way I have followed it the ALJ reviews 
the comments, revises his decision if he feels the comments are too well taken, and it 
then goes to the assigned commissioner who may put it on or he may issue his alternate. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Before that procedure became law, what was the practice? 
JUDGE WEISS: Before that procedure, the ALJ finished his decision; it then went to 
the internal review, if you will, sir, of the ALJ division; it then went to the 
departments that were concerned through the commission even though sometimes they were 
parties; it then went to the assigned commissioner; and the assigned commissioner may 
or may not distribute it amongst his associates or he could put his own version before 
or he could put both. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: He could bury it and never see the light of it. 
JUDGE WEISS: He could bury. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, it sounds like the Duffy proposal was certainly a step in 
the right direction. But .•. 
JUDGE WEISS: I said that, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Yeah. But what I'm asking now is that when you make your 
decision and it goes through this process -- what'd you call it, a 311 process? 
JUDGE WEISS: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Could not we keep that and after both parties, in other words, 
both sides or all sides get to review and make comments and so forth, don't you think 
as an administrative law judge, that you're having the ability to read those 
conflicting statements might help you make an even better decision? And then at that 
point, after you modify that, outside the PUC commissioners' involvement, then you 
present that to the co~~issioner, and then he must -- that must be part of the record. 
Can't we keep that process? 
JUDGE WEISS: I would like to see that process be adopted, sir. It is not 
necessarily so at this time. I have a memorandum here which was sent by one of the 
assistant chief judges to one of the administrative law judges and this is a well 
experienced judge who handles some very, very important cases. And amongst the things 
he is telling him is that: I need to review and approve all written work products which 
you prepare for distribution outside the ALJ division before they are distributed. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: This is a senior judge? 
JUDGE WEISS: This is an assistant chief. We have a chief judge, three assistant 
chiefs, and I think there are about 27 or 28 ALJs. So, we are grouped in groups of 
roughly 7 or 8 under an assistant chief. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And you're observations on this kind of a thing are what? 
JUDGE WEISS: I think that this -- telling him that he has to decide whether or not 
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that is, the assistant chief has to decide whether or not the judges• rulings and 
orders are correct and to icies of the commission are justified 
And that he to review with what he is to discuss 
with the commissioner discusses it with the commissioner is grossly 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I that review were allowed had to be made in other 
words, if your in some areas and had to be part of the written 
record, that you could either say well or no, •m going to keep it as 
it is, which then with all the the information and you take 
all this and you come up with your final decision, which would include all the 
other stuff would that be a And then that and require that 
to be of the record? 
JUDGE WEISS: I have 





sir. But in one instance here, 
he had conferred with three 
commissioners and they had agreed with what he to do, but this particular 
that even to the point of holding assistant chief with that, and 
workshops over the head of the ALJ, which a decision. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Was it on a matter of technical 
was it more a 
JUDGE WEISS: A matter of what he felt the outcome should be. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I see. Well, it would be interest 
ion of the law? Or 
JUDGE WEISS Let me say this, sir. I believe that the commissioners, the 
five commissioners are necessary necessary. represent the voice of 
the the governor and your process of approving them 
through your committee. 
decisions. And as the j 
ours. 
can't 
But I think that the 
the record. 
social, economic, and political guidance to 
, the courts will follow their decision, not 
is that the commissioners must act at least in 
our the facts that we develop easily. 
They must come up with a reason and for 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you the ass commissioner process that some of the 
other have raised about? 
JUDGE WEISS: No. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You do not? 
JUDGE WEISS: No, sir. The ass 
influence the outcome. 
commissioner is -- it's a temptation always to 
SENATOR RUSSELL: To be a maker. I mean a ... 
JUDGE WEISS: Well, I don't think -- I don't think there are any ulterior motives 
or evil motives in this. I this is just a natural function. They're involved 
deeply in their work and want to see it come out the way they think it should. 
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SENATOR RUSSELLs Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Summarize, Mr. Read. 
MR. READ: Thank you. Relating to the bill on separating the ALJs. You've heard 
mention of a survey; the judges though narrowly do support that concept and think it's 
viable. 
talked 
However, there are certain amendments that we think we would recommend. We've 
to your staff about them. Some of those include that we believe the judges 
ought to be lawyers with five years of experience which is the pattern generally used 
in other state agencies and at the federal level. And your bill currently doesn't 
require that. We would strongly make that recommendation to you. 
And the second has been mentioned already, and that is about the location of the 
judges in San Francisco. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: More lawyers. 
MR. READ: Not more members, Senator Russell. But really, it's a new ..• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Doesn't want any more lawyers. 
MR. READ: Well, we really do see it as a fairness, a due process issue and one --
things are so complex. And you're talking about due process here. We think lawyers 
add to that, obviously. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Like to thank you very much for your presentation. Thank you 
again. 
We'll now have the PUC, Mr. President. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: We've loaded the dice there, Mitch, and now let's hear what you 
have to say. 
PRESIDENT G. MITCHELL WILK: That's right. I must admit, it's the first time in my 
life I'm glad I'm not a lawyer. 
First, Mr. Chairman and members, I want to thank you very much for accommodating my 
schedule today. As you well know, this is our busiest time of year. We have to get 
all cases done by Monday. And so I do appreciate accommodating the schedule. 
I'd like to begin, Mr. Chairman, by suggesting to you that, number one, I represent 
the unanimous view of my five colleagues on both these measures. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: People resist change. 
PRESIDENT WILK: That's true. But we don't resist it where we think we need it. 
And I think if you take a look at some of our decisions, we've been more than willing 
to change things where we feel change is necessary and appropriate. 
But, 
represent 
in this particular instance, Mr. Chairman, we don't think that these measures 
solutions to problems that exist. And frankly, nothing I've heard this 
morning convinces me to change my view on these bills. In fact, if anything, I'm 
deeply disturbed by some of the views I heard this morning. I think they confuse 
entirely who is constitutionally responsible to make the decisions. The process of the 
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California Public Utilities Commission, all of the staff functions exist to support and 
to assist us in those 
Now, I am very 
would not open 
I think that these bil 
drafted, Mr. 
objectives, but 
of those. And I think, 
in fact, the doors would be drawn, and in the final 
analysis our 
Let me first turn to 
california Public Utilities 
communications. We so 
order of the ALJ or 
orders on several 
cases warrants it. My col 
the imposition of a 
is both, in our j~u,yu•~· 
Let me say at the outset that the 
Commission does ect to restrictions on ex parte 
or by a case basis upon a motion any 
ex 
commission has imposed such 
the circumstances of those particular 
and I, however unaminous object to the -- frankly, 
ru on all commission proceedings. Such a rule 
unnecessary and harmful to the ability of the 
commission to reach informed decisions on very matters. California is not New 
Jersey. And I should I come from both 
Such concerns shared, as I understand it other states, by virtue of 
the fact that we can find 
come to this conclusion after careful examination 
years. 
rule. We have 
of this issue over the past four 
SENATOR RUSSELL What's 
PRESIDENT WILK 
understand it and 
that in fact may not 
should; it doesn't say 
Let me go on to this. 
a 
There's Minnesota, as I 
In fact, I think it's either Pennsylvania or Minnesota 
We have as I said, 
says, the commission 
issued ex parte rules in five cases and 
rule, as many of you know. Based conducted 
upon this 
that a 
, we reached conclusions there is no convincing evidence 
rule icable to is necessary or appropriate; 
no consensus what form rule would take could be reached by any 
of the dozens of parties that were involved in our ru a case-by-case 
which tailors a rule circumstances of a proceeding works best 
for all 
SB 1125, on the other hand, is flawed in our judgment and unnecessary. It is 
portrayed as a simple disclosure matter and thus similar to the FCC, but I fear that 
these characterizations SB 1125 is dramatically different 
from the FCC rule and goes well the FCC rule. 
SB 1125 is not simple disclosure, but rather applies to all persons, including the 
general public, not just parties to a proceeding. At the same time, SB 1125 ignores 
the fact that the DRA is a party to cases by exempting them from the rule, thereby 
clearly disadvantaging all other parties. 
All of this could lead to the -- frankly, I'm sure, unintended but nonetheless 
absurd result that while DRA could lobby commissioners without obligation, a 
commissioner's wife could be subject to criminal prosecution should she ask her husband 
how his day was. The penalty provisions, together with the bill's all inclusive reach, 
would create an unfair trap with terribly harsh consequences for the less sophisticated 
participants and our proceedings at the very time that we're trying to encourage public 
participation and representation. 
Rather than encouraging such participation, it is clear in my judgment that the 
provisions of SB 1125 would discourage the openness and the equity that this bill in 
its current form seeks. In fact, the only results I can envision from enactment of SB 
1125 are mountains of paper work of practical little consequence or interest to just 
about anybody, and the emergence of a new cottage industry. Litigation and 
investigation of suspicions on who talked to whom, about what, and when. And I frankly 
fear this to be a colossal waste of time for everybody. 
The final analysis, a statutory rule along the lines of SB 1125, if enacted, would 
seriously and deeply impair the ability of this commission and its staff to reach 
timely and informed decisions. Such rules also ignore the fact that the vast majority 
of our proceedings are in fact quasi-legislative, not judicial. We are not a court. 
For example, I could cite a litany of court cases holding that our most frequent 
proceeding, ratemaking, is considered a legislative process in California and virtually 
every other state in the country. And I believe that ex parte rules have no place in 
legislative matters. 
We cannot establish regulatory policy in a vacuum. California deserves better and 
deserves informed decisions and an open decisionmaking process. Given the complexity 
and broad impact of our decisions, anything less, I fear, would be a travesty for 
ratepayers' utilities and California's economy as a whole. 
Turning very briefly to SB ••. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me just break in. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Do you find something wrong with the FCC's form? 
PRESIDENT WILK: I beg your pardon? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you find something wrong -- disclosure about the subject 
matter that now takes place at the FCC? 
PRESIDENT WILK: Along the lines of the FCC, I have some problems with the FCC as 
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well. But I fear that 
simple disclosure and 
parties. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
your bill does not do that, Senator. 
it contains very 
Well but we could work to eliminate ... 
PRESIDENT WILK: But, Senator ... 
Your bill goes beyond 
ies to all 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: ••. consider to be a if, in fact, you would support 
this kind of a All I' to , is that when someone says 
something to you about a ect matter that others who are party should know about 
that subject matter. I mean, I'm not to into details. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, Senator, I, as you canvassed all of my colleagues at 
your request, and we believe that our 
rule, and that what I would assume 
itself. 
works best, not a generic 
the minds of my colleagues to the FCC rule 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL 
PRESIDENT WILK: 
Well, tell me how you do 
The process is that anybody a 
tell me what the process is. 
an ALJ, or an assigned 
the ALJ, on the San Diego commission -- can an ex rule. I did so, 
Southern California Edison merger case; we that. We also imposed it on Diable 
Canyon. We imposed it on Pacific Bell's rate case. We imposed it on the Women 
Minority Business Enterprise for reasons that, address the specific 
circumstances of that case. For , in the merger case. We imposed the ex parte 
rule, Senator, because of the of that case, the obvious controversy, and the 
fact that there are a lot of very -- and I hate to say because it sound derogatory and 
it's not meant to be that way but there are icated parties involved for the 
process. And I felt, as did the very first time that don't understand our 
administrative law j , that this would be 
appropriate to have an ex parte rule on that icular case. 
that it would be more 
But I don't think we'd want to an ex rule, for example, on our Telco 
on alternative regu frameworks. I think that would have been a 
for this commission to try to decide an issue that complex without an ex parte 
rule -- with an ex rule, me. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, it appears, at least protection-wise, that you implement 
an ex parte situation when the 
PRESIDENT WILK: I don't recall 
involved. There's nothing in the 
general is involved in that particular case. 
that we did it because the attorney general was 
ionale, at least that I used, to support the 
imposition of that ex parte rule because the attorney general was involved. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, how do the individual commissioners deal with ex parte? 
That's the 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, I mean, if we written materials on a case -- and we get 
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written materials all the time on all our cases -- most of that is copied to all other 
parties; we send all of our written material to the central office to the extent we can 
identify the proceeding and make sure that is in the file for that proceeding. Now, I 
have not received an ex parte oral contact from anybody, otherwise it would have to be 
disclosed. 
If I could just turn very briefly to SB 1126 .•• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: If some constituents come to me about a case that's before the 
PUC and I call you to relate to you their concerns and let's say, mine, too, yeah, I 
think they're right; and what are you going to do about this; I think you ought to do 
this or that or the other thing? Under current procedures now, how is that treated? 
Do you just take that in and that's fine and ..• ? 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, you take it into consideration, Senator. But in the final 
analysis, our decisions on any case have to be decided completely consistently with the 
record. Despite what you heard earlier this morning, if we did not do that, there'd be 
a lot more application for rehearing and successful actions taken to the California 
Supreme Court, and there haven't been. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Under this proposal that's before us, the lawyers who were 
advocating it, under those same circumstances, that communication by telephone to you, 
what would you have to do with it? Would you have to reduce it to writing? 
PRESIDENT WILK: You would, as I understand it, and that is one of the problems 
with ex parte bills of this sort. As I understand the legislation, you have to fill 
out a document by the close of that day. So if you called me at 5:45p.m. and you 
didn't get it into our office by 5:00, assuming that we close at 5:00 and I guess we 
do, you'd find yourself up against criminal penalties and fines. That's the way we 
read the bill right now. And I understand that this is a draft legislation. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The burden's on me, not on you then. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, as I read the legislation, that's exactly right. But of 
course, that doesn't mean that we don't have a burden ourselves because we do. My 
biggest fear in the generic ex parte rules like this and I'll give you a practical 
instance, Senator. And that's this merger case that's pending right now. The 
practical effect of even just disclosure only, and that rule was basically disclosure, 
sunshine, totally legitimate in this instance, has been to throw a bucket of cold water 
on any communication. Now, I'm concerned about that, frankly, because that's a very 
complex, convoluted issue with a lot at stake. And that's one of the consequences. 
It's one that I, frankly, felt in that particular instance, we should live with simply 
because of the complexity of the issue and the number of people who are involved in 
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that proceeding that have never been involved in PUC proceeding previously. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You say you're a ive agency rather than a judicial 
agency. But you have to follow the record 
PRESIDENT WILK: That's what the court says, 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Now, my understanding is that the administrative law judge 
presents the record, and we've also understood that you can then add your own 
philosophical, social, twist to it and come up with some other decision other 
than what the law judge makes. That doesn't jive with what you just said about you've 
got to follow the record. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, in the first , I'm not aware of the severity of the 
problem that has been described to you. We don't twist -- we make no changes. At 
least I can speak for myself. I have never made a change to anything that was not 
consistent with the record, at least as far as I know. In the first instance, that 
just opens it up to potential Supreme Court action, and we don't want that. We don't 
want that at all. But the testimony that you heard earlier seems to suggest an 
independent 
contemplated 
rule for the administrative law judges that I, frankly, think was never 
by the people of this state with respect to the process of the California 
Public Utilities Commission. We, the five commissioners, are the only constitutionally 
authorized body to make any decisions. And I I look at our staff as existing, 
as talented as they are, and I would like to make this perfectly clear to all of the 
committee that I think-- I've been around government for a while now-- that I think 
and I'm not this just because our executive director is sitting next to me 
here -- but I think our staff is among the most talented of any governmental agency 
that I've ever seen or been associated with. Very proud of them. Obviously, there are 
some who disagree with us, and you're going to have that in any large 
organization. 
Division of 
But the fact remains that that staff exists, including the independent 
Advocates, frankly, to assist the commission in reaching a 
decision based upon a record. 
SENATOR RUSSELL Do you think that is 
let's assume an administrative law judge 
for an administrative law judge, 
and they call all shades and hues and 
philosophical events, and so forth, and hear things differently-- that's coming 
up with a decision that's at variance with the losphical overtones of the commission 
that is for their superiors to review that and mold it into a shape that is 
more consistent with what the commission may agree to? Do you think that's 
appropriate? 
PRESIDENT WILK: Senator, I'm not sure that the administrative law judge should not 
have the right to issue his decision as he sees fit. Now, he should be advised that 
it's inconsistent with commission policy. He should be advised that it may have other 
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problema. These judges, administrative law judges exist in an organization with a 
hierarchical of managerial oversight, as they should. These are not members of the 
judicial bench. These are civil servants accountable, frankly, not to the public. 
We're accountable to the public for our decisions. And therein lies, I think, the 
basic flaw in all due respect with SB 1126. It confuses who is accountable. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So, the supervisorial role of the administrative law judges is to 
generally shape their decision or encourage their decisionmaking process to take the 
facts as they see it and relate it to the commission's philosophy or rules or 
direction. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, I can just kind of share, Senator, my view, my own personal 
view in the way I manage the cases I'm assigned to. Incidentally, I think assigned 
commissioners play an exceedingly important role when you deal with the complexity of 
the issues that the California PUC has to deal with. 
The way I deal with these cases is that obviously I want the administrative law 
judge to share with me periodically the status of the case to which I'm assigned and I 
am responsible. And I want., on occasion, to find out the path that that administrative 
law judge might take, and encourage them if they want to seek guidance from me if they 
chose. And many of our administrative law judges, I think, do go to the commissioners 
to get their view, and I think that's entirely appropriate, entirely appropriate. I 
think it results in a better decision in the final analysis. What good is it to have 
an administrative law division, independent from the commission more or less, 
promulgating draft decisions that are constantly and consistently overturned or 
dramatically changed by the full commission? What possible public good and benefit is 
there in that? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, my 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, it may be based upon facts at the hearings. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, but, Senator, that implies that our decision wouldn't be. 
And if that were the case, where is the track record that demonstrates that we have 
consistently abandoned the record in our decisions. There is none, I submit. In fact, 
I don't know of a recent case where the California Supreme Court has overturned any of 
our decisions based upon some kind of 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That may be one of the concerns. What would you think -- you 
know, there's some people who are thinking about that maybe it shouldn't go to the u.s. 
Supreme Court; maybe it ought to go to the appellate division to take a look at the 
situation. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Senator, we very strongly oppose that because we feel as a 
practical matter that will increase litigation, not decrease it. And I think that the 
record is virtually clear on that. We sympathize with the California Supreme Court, 
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and you know philosophically I want them to concentrate on the big issues. But the 
fact of the matter is I do fear to an late court will not achieve the 
ectives that we al have in mind, which is resolution of these cases. I 
think it would not only I think it in fact would invite more 
litigation by the parties. And I'm not sure that that's 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Chairman. 
either. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What I'm with, Mitch, is that if this chairman and I 
were both administrative law judges, we would view things and hear things through our 
own particular 
we'd come up with some 
each one with his own 
and social views. And we take the same information and 
on what it should be, 
and honesty and so forth. And it would seem to me that 
it is appropriate then for, in that process, for there to be some shaping or some 
understanding on both of our parts as to what the goal of the commission is. And I 
think then that perhaps Senator Rosenthal as the law judge may disagree with that 
objective, but then could take the facts as he saw them and present them in a manner 
that's consistent with his integrity in view of what the commission objectives are, and 
I could do the same. That's what -- you think that's appropriate. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, let's --Senator, I don't want to confuse integrity and 
philosophical orientation. My view is that obviously we should maintain, preserve, 
protect -- you want to call it -- the integrity of the hearing officers at the 
california Public Utilities Commission or for that matter any other administrative 
agency. have to be of the caliber. But to suggest that, in some fashion 
or another, that administrative law judges should be free independently to pursue their 
own , their own orientation in a case where they in fact 
exist basical to build a record of fact, I think is wrong. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you believe that the administrative law judges' report should 
be presented and publicized before this low review sheet is circulated around and 
to ... ? 
PRESIDENT WILK: Yellow? I'm not sure what you're talking about. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, apparent as I understanding it, the law judge makes his 
recommendation, and then he presents to his administrators and to you, the 
commission ... 
PRESIDENT WILK: Oh, the cover -- you're talking about the cover sheet, the 
signature sheet, okay. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: and that it comes back to him saying well, we don't agree 
with this; we've changed that; do something else. And then he takes it back and 
modifies it. 
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PRESIDENT WILK: Again, let me speak for myself and how I manage cases like that. 
I'll sign off on that -- I mean, if I read the case, I think it's appropriate. I don't 
see the problem that would exist to the extent that the assigned commissioner in the 
case, the one who has been not unlike legislators who carry bills, these people are 
assigned to that proceeding to read that case. If they have problems with it or 
questions, perhaps it is not a bad idea to go and talk to the administrative law judge. 
I have not imposed, as far as I can remember, I have not imposed a requirement on the 
administrative law judge that they should change that draft decision to suit me. Now, 
if I see a major philosophical difference with where I think the commission might go, 
I'm going to forewarn the administrative law judge, do you want to be overturned by the 
commission? It's up to you. 
But again, I just want to make sure that we're all kind of on the same level here, 
and that is that, you know, who is responsible for public policy at the California 
Public Utilities Commission? Who makes the decisions? We're the ones that are 
appointed; we are confirmed by your esteemed body; we are accountable to the people of 
this state, not the administrative law judges. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And that's the way it ought to be. There's no question about 
that. And you've indicated •.. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, some days I'd like to see it changed. (chuckles) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You've indicated how you deal with that particular subject 
But is there any policy that would create that same way of dealing among the matter. 
other 
they 
four commissioners, for example? In other words, is there a process by which 
deal with it the same as you? We just heard that that's not necessarily so. And 
so I don't know whet.her there is a policy set down. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Senator, if there were abuses that occurred on a regular basis or 
even on infrequent basis along the lines that you heard this morning, I would 
personally urge my colleagues to avoid situations like that. But frankly, I don't know 
the circumstances behind that allegation. I don't even know, even though Judge Weiss 
I'm certain is very sincere about this, I have absolutely no knowledge of the 
circumstances or facts in those instances. And if I thought there was an abuse, an 
abuse that was inconsistent with good government, not just constitutional authority, 
but just good government and good practice and good management, then I would urge my 
colleagues to take on a certain action. I'm not sure that in itself justifies a 
statutory approach to resolving -- if there is a problem, and I still don't think there 
is -- solution. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: There continues to be complaints from PUC staff, from judges, 
about the kinds of things that are taking place, and I'm sure you've heard of them as 
well as I have. There's a perception that there's something wrong, whether there is or 
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not. And it seems to me that the PUC 
which tries to calm the waters of that 
to be moving in some sort of a direction 
ion. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Senator, unti these bills were introduced, until this morning, 
I've never heard that there was a 
administrative law judges, and I 
, that we had a problem with our 
doubt that there is. You also heard this morning, 
frankly, a very close "vote" of a small of our administrative -- a 
small sample of our administrative law j so I don't think there's any 
consensus that a exists at all. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Do you know why the chief ALJ did not want to testify at this 
hearing today? 
PRESIDENT WILK: I have no idea. I think you've the person that you need, both 
her boss and the President of the commission. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. So, since you have not heard of any problems, there are 
no problems. 
PRESIDENT WILK: I've heard -- I mean this morning I heard of a problem. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
PRESIDENT WILK: But I'm not sure -- I think to a statutory -- a permanent 
statutory change along the lines of SB 1126, I think you would want to have far greater 
evidence of a severe problem and a consistent of mismanagement than you have. 
I don't think that the record of this proceeding will show that. It might show some 
problems. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah. That's why we're having the hearing. I'm not 
suggesting that there are , I'm just that there's a perception 
that there is something wrong, and I'm trying to see about what we can do about helping 
you clean up that situation. And if in fact the ion goes further than it ought 
to You know, talk to me. 
PRESIDENT WILK: I am. I'm tell you, Senator, I don't think there's a problem. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, okay. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Senator, excuse me. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Before Mr. Franklin , if I could just ask a question 
that ••. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: ... I' to have to leave and I want to just focus on 
the 1125, which I'm most interested in. 
I think Senator Rosenthal touched on one of the most important rationales for some 
regulation of ex parte communication and that's ic confidence. No one here is 
accusing you or any of the commmissioners of making decisions based on anything outside 
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of the record. But we don't know. Nobody knows. We're taking your word for it. And 
I know your word is good, but there's an important relationship between the public and 
those that have constitutional authority to act and make decisions for the public. And 
the way that that confidence can be achieved and maintained is through open 
information. And I would submit that in the long run, the integrity of the commission 
and the integrity of all present and future commissioners rests upon their ability to 
convince the public that's interested in the matter that's before you that you are 
making the decision based solely and entirely upon the record. 
Now, you can't tell me that anything besides what your own experience has been. 
You can tell me that no ex parte communication has influenced your decisions on past 
matters, but you can't assure me, it's impossible to, it's not within your ability 
unless you have ESP, to say that the other commissioners are the same. They may state 
that they have not done so, but we don't know. So it seems to me that the public 
policy rationale for either a ban or more prudently perhaps a requirement of disclosure 
of ex parte communications is to assure us that there aren't some cases, few perhaps, 
but maybe important, where there's been influences that produce a result different than 
they otherwise would have been. 
And as for the point that, well, you're going to throw a lot of cold water on the 
participation of necessary individuals or parties. Well, what are they afraid of? I 
wonder about any party to a matter before the commission that so fears the public 
knowing about the communication that they've had with a commissioner, that they don't 
want it to be known, and don't want it to be on the public record. What are they 
hiding? Maybe nothing. But maybe something. And I think natural human suspicion 
based upon all of our experiences teaches us that in some of those cases there probably 
is something, embarrassment perhaps, maybe nothing illegal, but something that we ought 
to have a chance as members of the public to know about, to comment upon, to be able to 
evaluate the performance of the commission and therefore make determinations on who 
ought to be in the position to appoint commissioners. 
so, I think that your absolute resistance to any statutory regulation on ex parte 
communications is a disservice to the commission and to the people of the state's need 
to know of the basis for commission decisions. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Assemblyman Friedman, I appreciate your views on this, and let me 
share with you with respect to the public perception of what we do, that no one, no one 
that I know of is more sensitive to public perception about their job than the people 
that are affected by that perception. And in this instance, it's the commissioners. 
We are all very concerned that the public have a positive perception and confidence in 
our process, that we will reach just and reasonable conclusions based on the record, 
based on the facts. And in fact, one of the things I did a couple of years ago when I 
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first got on the commission, is I asked our staff to include some questions in a field 
poll about the California Utilities Commission and what the thought of 
the California Public Utilities Corr~iasion what knew about the California Public 
Utilities Commission and what our role was, so that in fact we could target educational 
programs, outreach programs ic to better inform them 
of what we do, how we do it and also 
admittedly, polls, even Mervin field's 
to an idea of what we're doing. Now, 
their biases and problems. But 
the of this state that were asked 
of the job the California Public Utilities 
overwhelmingly, Assemblyman, 
those questions , strongly 
Commission was and that were fair. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: I bet you, Commissioner, that if one of the questions in 
there had been as follows that the answer have been more consistent with what I 
have been saying. Let's say the ion was: "Do you believe that it should be put 
on-the-record whenever there is a private conversation between an individual interested 
in a matter before the commission and a commissioner?" And I'll bet you just as, if 
not more overwhelming, a ority of the persons led would have said yes. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, after I des some ions that would reach the same 
issue, but perhaps a very different conclusion. Polls work. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: ... makes the whole idea of ls as a justification .•. 
PRESIDENT WILK: I m just trying to 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN of your ic ion suspect and not convincing. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Chairman. You know, it seems to me that maybe there's a 
similarity here. We are a ive are a legislative body. And if we 
had to put -- if we were to prohibit ourselves from with any lobbyists or any 
constituents about the issues on which we pass laws which affect the lives of the 
people of this state, I don't think we could function. And I'm wondering how similar 
that would be as it relates to the PUC's responsibil Maybe you can help ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Senator, if I could just make one quick comment and then 
I'll unburden everyone because I'm to have to leave. I think that there is a 
difference. When we make a decision on how to vote on the Floor or in a committee, 
we're not bound by a particular record. We make our decision based on our conscience, 
based on representation of our constituents, based on what we think is best for the 
policies for the State of California. And we can give a reason for it, advised to give 
a reason for it if we want to be reelected. But we don't have to. We're not bound in 
the same way as the commission is to make a decision based on a particular factual 
record which is why our lative responsibilities are different from the 
commission's responsibilities which are termed legally to be quasi-judicial and 
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quasi-legislative. And therefore, I think that whereas I totally agree with you, it 
would not make sense, it would be anti-democratic for us to have that responsibility to 
disclose. I think that it's a different situation and therefore justifiable to have 
the commission make such a disclosure. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you agree, Mitch? 
PRESIDENT WILK: Not entirely, at all, actually. I feel that even though we're 
constrained by our record, we still need to deal on facts, and presumably so should you 
as the Legislature. We also have philosophical orientation; we also have a view of 
regulatory policy that as we all know factual circumstances in records do allow 
discretion. That discretion has to be exercised. And so I'm not certain that I 
totally agree with you, Assemblyman Friedman, about the 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: I like the implication that you may possibly agree, though. 
(laughter) 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, always leave doors open. 
In this particular instance, once again I would urge the committee to give careful 
thought as to whether or not you want to pursue a permanent, fairly harsh ex parte 
rule, when in fact most other states have not. The vast majority have not for reasons 
I'm sure that can be explained by those states on a process that requires openness and 
public participation. If a problem existed, we would see a trend in Supreme Court; we 
would see people taking these cases to the Supreme Court alleging ex parte contact. No 
one has done it. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Ask the Executive Secretary. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yea, why don't we hear from Mr. Franklin, Acting Executive 
Director of PUC. 
MR. WESLEY FRANKLIN: Well, I just wanted to say that I think the main problem, 
Senator -- and I'm going to be talking about the role of the ALJ -- stems from how the 
organization is viewed. You view it as our president views it and as I know 
commissioners have viewed it over the 15 years that I've been there; the staff, being 
there to serve the commission, exists for that purpose. Then you have to put the ALJ 
role in perspective. They're an element of staff. They are responsible for putting 
the record together. They come from staff, mostly. They are lawyers who have been 
appointed by the chief ALJ in consultation with both the assistant chiefs and in an 
advise and consent fashion with the commissioners. And so the perception problem I 
think stems from how the phrase "administrative law judge" is striking people. It 
means something very different, at least at our agency, than what you would have if you 
were looking at a judge in the state system. Commissioners are the ones who make the 
decisions, and the ALJs' role is to gather the information, gather the record and bring 
that forward through the process. 
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As to the assistant chiefs and the chief, it's not so much going into what they do 
to rewrite it for the sake of rewrit it. A lot of that review has to do with the 
vast body of commission icy that's been built and to make sure that the drafts 
that come through before are as a Section 3lls are consistent with 
what's gone before. 
Now, again, it goes back to how do you view the If you view the ALJ as being 
totally independent, then don' have to adhere to the that's been built up 
over the years or the most recent 
that they wanted. 





The difference is that all the 
And so there's a different 
icies are changing. 
ive then on 
All the 
what's 
In other words, most that's now happening because of the 
multitude of issues are all from what used to be. And because of it, we 
run into what I think are some of the problems, because it's not the same as it always 
was. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Excuse me, Wes, if I could. Mr. Chairman, I think that's 
precisely the reason why we need to leave it the way it is. Things are changing 
because the philosophy of this commission is being exercised. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And I don't ... 
PRESIDENT WILK: I know, Senator. I know you don't. You and I have talked quite 
often about the philosophical changes that are taking place. 
I think that in fact if you have SB 1126 in place, you could find almost a 
paralysis existing in the process. I think it would be an absolute 
travesty given the kinds of things that are occurring in California and indeed 
throughout this country with respect to utilities and the advance of technology and the 
options that people have now. It ain't what it used to be. It's very different. And 
I think if you were to the decisionmaker from the decisionmaking process, it 
would be a travesty for the ratepayers of this state; and not just the ratepayers, but 
frankly else is involved. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you see, Mr. Franklin, that if we separated the judges, they 
would no longer be there to serve the commission, but they'd be there to render their 
own independent views as they see the facts? 
MR. FRANKLIN: What you would be sett 
that is an late -- you'd be in feet 
up is what Professor Asimow suggests and 
the commission an appellate group. I 
disagree with that concept for a number of reasons. I think the primary reason why I 
disagree with that is my view that the commission is responsible to the public, as much 
as our President has stated. It' an group coming through from the Governor 
and being approved by the Legislature. To remove the ALJs from the internal workings 
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of that, the creators of the record, to me, makes the process inefficient. You remove 
them from the technical people that they have to interact with. 
But again, it depends on how you want to structure it. I could sit here all day 
and say I like the current system, I think it works. If you disagree with me, then 
you're going to have a perception problem because you're going to see a judge different 
than I do. They're a member of staff, much like the Division of Ratepayer Advocates, 
whose charge it is not to be totally independent; they're charged by the commission, if 
you're talking ORA, is to look after the interest of the ratepayers, have that interest 
developed on the record. It's the commission ultimately that's going to take all of 
this stuff, including what ORA has put together, and arrive at a decision. But again, 
it gets back to how you view the role. If you want to make the commission appellate 
board, so to speak, or an appellate agency, then sure you could remove the ALJs, put 
them in a separate group. I don't think that's an efficient way to go. 
PRESIDENT WILK: I think in essence what you would end up with, Senator, if I might 
add on that, is two PUCs. 
MR. FRANKLIN: Yes. 
PRESIDENT WILK: You'd have the ALJs 
SENATOR RUSSELL: That's my concern. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Yeah. Well, it certainly is mine. I mean, again, let's take a 
look at the Constitution, something frankly that surprised me by some of the statements 
made in the earlier panel, by people, frankly, I think should take another look at the 
State Constitution. Who did the people of this state entrust with the responsibility 
and the accountability for regulatory policy in terms of utilities? It's the five 
commissioners. If the people of the state want to change that, that's fine, we all 
work for the people. But so far, my reading is they want one commission; they want to 
hold five people accountable for the results and the policies as it should be; and 
they've given us, through the generosity of the Legislature, the funds and the staff to 
carry out our responsibilities. That's the way I read the balance right now. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And that's the way it should be. Commissioners should make 
the final decision. But I come back again to a commissioner which tells the ALJ what 
sort of a decision to make that they can approve. That bothers the hell out of me. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But maybe, Senator, maybe that's if we have given the commission 
the responsibility to make those ultimate decisions, whether we agree with them or not. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's right. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: If that is the case, and they have a philosophy going in this 
direction, maybe it's appropriate that the staff, the supervisors of the ALJ, 
communicate to the ALJ the direction they want them to go, based upon the record that's 
presented. Maybe that's in keeping with the philosophy that the PUC makes those 
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decisions. We may not agree with them, but the PUC is appointed to make those 
decisions and the ALJs are who serve the commission. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Then you don't need an ALJ. If in fact a commissioner says to 
an ALJ, I want the following decision to come out, do you need the record? 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, no. Senator, I think there's a difference here. I don't 
think any commissioner has ever said: The conclusion is X, build the record that way. 
At least as far as I know. But let me -- can I just build one other thing just very 
quickly. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
PRESIDENT WILK: There are a lot of states in fact, Mr. Chairman, that don't have 
ALJs. Their commissions are small, their jurisdictions are relatively narrow, that the 
commissioners hear all the cases. Now, , given the of this state, we 
just simply couldn't handle it, and that's why I think the Legislature provides the 
funds to allow us to have hearing examiners who will go in and run the hearing to make 
sure that the record is built. The record is going to contain discretion; that 
discretion should be exercised by the person accountable for the decision, and that is 
the commissioner, not the judge. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's right. And I ... 
PRESIDENT WILK: And that means tell 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I think Senator 
the judge, Senator, you're going too far. 
Rosenthal feels that the facts that the judge 
hears should be presented in that 
the PUC comes and says, you're 
PUC member may make. 
struggling with is that at what 
he questions, there's some concern on my part that 
too far. Well, that may be the decision that the 
I think where he's coming from and what we're 
do we allow the PUC to say to a law judge, your 
judgment stops here because this is the we want to make. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, that's a very difficult decision, except in my mind, in my 
mind again the discretion and the decisionmaking authority rests with the commission, 
not the staff. Staff exists solely to assist the commission in building the record. 
And I think if I were going to err on this side, to try to find where that correct 
balance is, I think you might waste a lot of time. My feeling is you ought to error on 
the side of the fact of who is accountable to make the decision. If the error is that 
the assigned commissioner or the commission tells the judge, no, it goes this way, then 
at least the person that's accountable for the result is making that choice as opposed 
to the administrative law judge , look it, I get my discretion right up to 
this point, point X. 
I'm not sure that it's worth trying to carve out an exception to, frankly, a 
problem that I don't see really exists. Certainly there are going to be some judges 
who believe in their mind that they ought to be on the bench, that they view their job 
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as a judge. And I frankly do, too, in all do respect. I have a lot of respect for the 
ALJ division, even those who may disagree with me, for example, Judge Weiss. But the 
fact of the matter is that I think this is a distinction without a difference. If I 
were the Legislature, what I would be primarily interested in is that the person that 
the people are going to hold accountable is the one that's making all the decisions, 
not staff. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Franklin then. What do you -- what kinds of things do the 
supervisors -- whatever you call them -- of the ALJs do in terms of reviewing, working 
with, overruling, shaping, whatever you want to call it, the decisions that the judges 
make. We've heard a couple of references where there was workshops and so forth. 
What's that all about. 
MR. FRANKLIN: I'm not aware of the examples that Judge Weiss mentioned, but just 
in the overall, what I've been able to observe -- both as Acting Executive Director and 
as a long time member of staff and as heading up certain areas and being on the 
advocate as well as the adversarial side of the staff-- the review process that's been 
alluded to here, again is to make-- again if you buy off on a concept ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Yeah, but what I want to ask you, what do these people do? 
Here's a judge comes up and presents his findings. Let's say it's off in left field 
somewhere from what the philosophy or rules or the record has been built up. What do 
then these administrators do to work with that judge to overrule, to whatever? 
MR. FRANKLIN: Okay. A lot of that depends on the interaction between the 
particular judge and the supervisor. What the supervisor would probably do is say 
you're going off course. If you get a real resistent ALJ who is a permanent civil 
servant, they can say this is as far as I'm going to take it. Mitch alluded to that 
earlier. At that point, what's happening is, what's going to go out as a Section 311 
matter, even if it's not consistent with past policy or the direction that the 
commission is going in. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What does go out then? He says, forget you, this is my decision, 
I'm going off in left field; and your supervisor thinks it should go off in right 
field, let's say. What happens in that circumstance? 
MR. FRANKLIN: I am not aware of that happening recently on anything significant 
where an ALJ has gone in this direction and the commission wants to go in that 
direction. It's usually been worked out, to my knowledge. I'm not aware of cases 
where that's 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What kinds of things then are worked out where there are these 
smaller differences? 
MR. FRANKLIN: Let me come up with a hypothetical example. You have a case where 





case there that the commission 
a situation where a 
also taking this very 
is not going in this policy direction. I could 
would say, it's not going to fly. I could see a 
role , this is my view of the matter. I 
haven't seen any of those get so bad that what you have out there is schism where 
you've got this incredible difference. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me ask, follow up on that. 
MR. FRANKLIN: Sure. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How about a judge being removed because the decision he made 
was contrary to what the commission wanted. 
MR. FRANKLIN: Again, I am not aware of a situation where a judge has been told, 
hey, you're off of this. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Then you ought to take a look at what's happening at 
the PUC in terms of the ALJs. Okay? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is that happened? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, it happened. And so -- and I'm not suggesting that that 
goes on all the time. What I'm suggesting is that's beginning to percolate now into 
the general community about what's happening. And so, all I'm suggesting, and if the 
legislation is the wrong way to go, you know, that the PUC ought to be at least 
reviewing, ongoing, what ought to take place in terms of ALJ proceedings. 
And Mr. President, in your responsibility as the head, ought to be talking with the 
commissioners about what you would expect should happen from the other commissioners 
over whom you don't have, you know, body and soul, but you certainly as the President 
of the commission can be influential in terms of allaying the perceptions that are 
percolating out of your commission all over the place, from ALJs, from staff, from 
parties to the proceedings. And I don't want to see that happen. I want you to close 
those kinds of things off. And the fact that you have not heard about them, maybe 
because you haven't been in that position long enough, doesn't mean that things are not 
happening. How do we clean it up? How do we shape it up? How do we get away from the 
perception, which is a growing one, which the press is beginning to look at as well, 
that something is happening that ought not to be happening? And I want the commission 
to be responsible and make those decisions without having anybody cast dispersions of 
you. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Senator, you and I have exactly the same concerns. We are 
concerned about perception, as I said to Assemblyman Friedman. There is no one in this 
room, no one in this state that's concerned more about public perception of the 
California Public Utilities Commission than the members of that commission. As a 
practical matter, and I have to disagree with you, Senator, if there is such a severe 
problem that warrants a legislative solution, it is amazing to me that it has ~ 
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been brought to my attention, considering the kinds of problems that are brought to my 
attention, and they include staff problems. They include staff problems and there is 
no reluctance on the part of many staff people to come directly to me to air 
complaints. I have never heard of, other than isolated, and you know, we're an 
organization of 1,100 people who have a lot of -- there are a lot of legitimate 
ego-interests in their own job, professional interest, they want to be able to do the 
best job possible, they get frustrated by management. I mean, we've all been employed 
and we know what the frustration of management can be. That's where I think the 
problem exists. We can handle that to the extent that there's a persuasive problem. 
In fact, I want to avoid it before there's a persuasive problem. But so far I've 
heard a couple of gripes that I don't happen to like to hear. We can handle them. If 
somebody feels that they are being inappropriately constrained, inappropriately 
constrained--that's a very important distinction, then they do have avenues of remedy. 
They can go to the Executive Director, and they also know that I have an open door 
policy as well. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Senator, thank you. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 1126, so you're not through yet. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Oh, oh, I'm through. I've said everything I think I need to say, 
probably not as eloquently as I prepared in my address, but we oppose that as well, 
obviously. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Right. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The commission is opposed to anything which -- they're opposed 
to change. We all are opposed to change. (laughter) 
PRESIDENT WILK: We are opposed -- as you said, Senator, we are opposed to change 
for change sake. We don't oppose change where change is appropriate. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And I agree with you. We should not change for change sake. 
I will have some private conversation with you regarding some specifics. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Very good. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay? 
PRESIDENT WILK: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I did that once before, and I was told there was no problem. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Where? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Among commissioners. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Okay, you'll need to fill me in, Senator, because I don't know 
what you're referring to. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. I related a situation and the answer came back, you 
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know, you checked it out and it wasn't so. And so I don't know how to deal with that. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Well, we'll have to talk about that perhaps privately. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, correct. 
PRESIDENT WILK: That will be an ex parte contact, however, Senator. (laughter) 
Thank you. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: No ex discussion. 
PRESIDENT WILK: You'll have to put that on 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I'll sign. 
PRESIDENT WILK: Okay. Thank you, again, very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Okay, now James Wheaton and Audrie Krause. Okay, 
this is James Wheaton, Executive Director of Center for Public Interest Law (CPIL). 
Welcome. 
MR. JAMES WHEATON: Thank you, Senator. I should correct my title. Professor 
Robert Fellmeth, Director of the Center will be surprised to learn that I have replaced 
him. I'm actually the Supervising Attorney of the San Francisco office. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Oh, Supervising Attorney. Okay. For the record. 
MR. WHEATON: Thank you. The Center for Public Interest Law has been in existence 
for 10 years. It's an academic center at the University of San Diego School of Law. 
It's Director is Professor Robert Fellmeth, a recognized expert in administrative and 
public interest law. The center monitors all the boards and bureaus in the State of 
California professions or the economy of California. Currently, there's in excess of 
40 different boards regulating everything as diverse from the guidedogs for the blind 
to the Public Utilities Commission, the Coast Commission and others. In addition to 
that, we have an active advocacy program in Sacramento; and my office in San Francisco 
which participates heavily in many different aspects of the Public Utilities 
Commission. In transportation, we've been active in the household goods, dump trucks, 
general freight; and over on the other side we've been very, very active in the 
telecommunications hearings and the PacBell rate case. 
We're here to provide our input on the two bills and also the question of appellate 
review of decisions. We bring to that not only our experience with the other boards 
and bureaus and PUC, but also experience with the State Bar. Professor Fellmeth is the 
State Bar discipline monitor. We recently reformed the Bar's system; and also the 
Board of Medical Quality Assurance, which we are currently in the process of seeking a 
reform. In addition to that, the Department of Insurance. The Center was quite active 
in the Proposition 103 debate and, in fact, wrote the administrative procedure portions 
of Proposition 103 which contain an explicit ex parte rule. 
By way of background, we wish to join in the comments of Professor Asimow. Indeed, 
I had the pleasure of rereading his testimony just last night and it is a scholarly and 
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excellent review of ex parte rules and I urge it upon you in the strongest terms. 
Rather than repeat what he has said, I will simply highlight the concerns of the 
Center. We see two problems with ex parte communication. They're first, they're 
secret, they're off-the-record. That contains two sub-elements. First of all, it is 
deeply unfair, for one party to a proceeding to have a back channel to one of the 
decisionmakers. Second sub-part of that is that review becomes truncated and difficult 
by whatever judicial body reviews the decision. If portions of the thinking process 
are off-the-record, so too the review cannot review that. 
The second portion, the second problem we see with ex parte is the opportunity to 
respond. Where an ex parte communication occurs, it necessarily involves factor 
argument which the opposing parties have no opportunity to rebut. It has been said 
that cross-examination is the finest devise ever created by the mind of man to get at 
the truth. The testing of assertions, facts, argument in the crucible of the hearing 
is really the best way we have to distinguish between the true and the untrue, the 
believable and the unbelievable, the probitive and the unprobitive. That does not 
occur in an ex parte proceeding. Indeed, we believe that we should drop the use of 
Latin here in ex parte and call them what they are, secret communications. A secret 
communication does not help the process. It does not help the integrity of the 
commission. 
Touching upon each of these problems in order. The unfairness and the secrecy are 
particularly damaging for the public. It's a well known fact that the individual 
consumers have only the most modest ability to participate in the proceedings. The PUC 
does have a Division of Ratepayers Advocates which is an outstanding example of 
protection for the public, but it's role is necessarily a balanced one. There are 
groups such as TURN which have a history of providing outstanding representation for 
consumers. But again, the 
that we can compete with 
resources available are always limited. There is no way 
PG&E, with PacBell and with the others in ex parte 
communication at the same time we're trying to compete down in the hearing room. 
Indeed, the unfairness has become so manifest that if a young lawyer came to me 
today and said how shall I participate in a PUC proceeding, what is the best way to do 
it? I would say with all candor that if you want to serve your client well, you'll 
make a showing down on the first floor of the hearing room, but the real action's up on 
the fifth floor; that is where you should spend your time because in five minutes with 
the commissioner you can do more work than you can do in three weeks down in the 
hearing room because of the availability of an ex parte communication. A single 
argument up top where no one can test it, no one can rebut you, where you have the 
undivided attention of a commissioner is so much more effective than three weeks of 
argument with the attorneys down on the first floor. 
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Indeed, I have to tell you that an attorney who I regret will have to stay unnamed, 
when I myself went to the PUC for the first time as a young attorney, went and asked 
him, how shall I participate in these proceedings, where are the rules of for 
the PUC? He reached upon his shelf in his office and he pulled down a volume from 
Lewis Carroll and said these are the rules of procedure for the PUC, and he handed me 
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. That was in jest, and I knew that was not true. But 
I also know that there are two sets of procedures at the PUC. There are those which 
are written and which are subject of the OAL procedures, whichever one falls and 
there's the other set on the fifth floor. And as the other set on the fifth floor were 
to address on the unfairness. The review, the judicial review, the problem of judicial 
review has been well stated. And I think Professor Asimow is correct, at some point 
the California Supreme Court will take a case, the issue of ex parte will be raised, 
and they will treat it both as an ethical matter for the attorneys involved if any, but 
also 
will 
as a matter which effects their review. I do not think that a review in court 
take kindly to finding out that the real decision is not in the record, is not in 
the papers in front of them, but occurred somewhere else. 
The last, and most important, I think, is the opportunity to respond. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: May I ask a question? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you have any evidence that these ex parte communications --
because they're confidential maybe you don't -- but that these ex parte have been the 
pivotal factor of which cases? It's easy to come up here and make all these 
allegations about what's going on on the fifth floor, and Lewis Carroll. It makes very 
good headlines and so forth, and it sort of denigrates the people who are on the PUC, 
which may be what you're getting at in the first place, but do you have any evidence 
that you can point to for this case? 
MR. WHEATON: I have a three-part answer for that, if I might. The first is a 
concern that I felt listening to Commissioner Wilk for whom I have nothing but the 
highest regard. The concern is that Commissioner Wilk indicated that he was not aware. 
Yet those of us who practice there do know of instances where ex parte communications 
occur, do know of instances in which decisions have changed between an ALJ and a 
commissioner. Indeed, I suspect that the committee has that information. 
The fact that the Commissioner does not know is the second part of my answer. The 
problem is we do not know. These are secret communications. No one can know. It is 
proving not just a negative, but a negative which is secret. No one can ever know what 
the effect of a five-minute conversation in the midst of a hearing might be later. It 
is never provable. It is, indeed, the concern. It is -- in the judicial sphere it is 
not just a fact of bias or impropriety, but the appearance of it. 
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And with the third part of my answer, I wish to be very circumspect about this is, 
yes, I know about them. I know of one that I did and it worked. And I don't feel 
comfortable about that. But to serve my client, I must do that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, obviously, you wouldn't go to the Supreme Court on your own 
ex parte communication. But the ones you've heard about and your colleagues have heard 
about, if they have why hasn't somebody in the public interest law section taken it 




MR. WHEATON: The dual problems are, first of all, that to amass the evidence if 
fact of a communication is per se impossible. I cannot point to a conversation I 
not know about and disclose the contents which are secret to me. Nor can I prove 
that was the precise thing which turned a commissioner's mind to turn a vote or 
which turned a phrase in a decision which resulted in the particular evidence going on 
way or the other. I can't prove that. I can never get that to Supreme Court. And the 
problem of review, of course, is insurmountable at the Supreme Court. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Then you're asking us, though, or you're suggesting that we make 
a decision on the basis that the perception is that it's going on and we ought to 
change the rules so that perception would be dealt with. Is that basically what you're 
saying? 
MR. WHEATON: As I understand SB 1125, which we support, the principle virtue of it 
is precisely to bring those out of the darkness, bring those communications out of the 
darkness and simply have them disclosed. Then we will know if there is a problem. We 
will know how they effect. That kind of sunshine rule is what the APA has, and it 
seems to work very, very well in the other agencies where there is a problem. It comes 
to the fore where it is no longer hidden. And that to me is the principle virtue. I 
think no one would argue with the principle that the best government is open 
government. And that sunshine as Justice Black said is the best disinfectant. And so 
a sunshine rule like that proposed in 1125 will have that effect to bring them out and 
then we will know and then we shall see them. And if there is a problem such as 
occurred in the grotesque case of the PATCO case, where an actual threat was made, that 
kind of thing will either be disclosed or probably will not occur in the first place. 
It is to bring those out so that we can know better what is happening, so the decisions 
can be more open that were supported. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Did I ever hear correctly, and as a lawyer you would certainly 
know, somebody said once I thought when I was taking business law or around the 
Legislature that you never make a law or a case on the basis of one instance? Is that 
for you lawyers, does that ever ring any kind of bell? 
MR. WHEATON: The one that rings a bell for me is, hard cases make bad law, where 
you have one specific bad act, you tend to make a whole law based on the one bad act. 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: Right. And that PATCO case sort of rang a bell that maybe that's 
what we might be doing. 










that is not 
correct that 
what we have. 
this is a 
We have 
representatives from the consumer side; representatives from the Attorney General; from 
the actual utilities themselves; and not just this large stationary utilities, but also 
the transportation utilities; the staff; the ALJs. It is becoming nearly unanimous 
that we need to do something. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And they're all basing their concerns on ex parte communications 
which nobody knows about because they're secrets. 
MR. WHEATON: That is one of the concerns. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But they're saying it's going on. 
MR. WHEATON: That is correct. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How do you know it's going on if it's all secret? 
MR. WHEATON: I can tell you there are two sources for the information: one are, 
those of us who participate in the proceedings know that they go on either because we 
ourselves have to do it; and the ALJs certainly know it goes on. In fact, the 
instances of hall walking, as they're called -- that's the informal term that I've 
heard, hall walkers -- moving up and down the fifth floor, is so renown that indeed 
when this particular piece of legislation was debated two years ago a memorandum 
surfaced from one of the large stationary utilities in Southern California which 
depicted a chart. On one side we had the executives of the utility ranging from the 
CEO down to a vice president, there were about 10 of them as I recall; on the other 
side we had the staff of the PUC, ranging from the commissioners down to the executive 
director of legal counsel, ALJs, with lines between how often they were supposed to 
contact each person, daily as needed, weekly, monthly, weekly during cases. It was an 
extraordinary document. It was a little road map for how we do our ex parte contacts. 
Now, I understand that that utility disbanded that practice, but the fact that it did 
go in and can still go on is the problem. That was about the hardest evidence I've 
ever seen. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: That's the kind of evidence I'm looking for. 
MR. WHEATON: I think what I need to do is go back into the files and provide that 
to the committee, and I will do so immediately upon my return to San Francisco. 
Coming to the specific legislation, 1125, we do support that with two modest 
changes. One, is that we would require not merely that the notice provided by the 
party go into the docket, which would then be distributed because I can tell you the 
docket of the PUC is so enormous, the number of things that are before the commission 
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are so tremendous that for a party in one proceeding to have to dig through all the ex 
parte contacts to find the one about their case is nay unto no notice. The better 
practice would be to do what we do when we have a contact at all with the judge, with a 
pleading or a piece of evidence or anything else, and that is, you serve it on the 
parties. If you have an ex parte contact, you simply notice it and you serve it on the 
parties just like you do with a brief or a piece of evidence or a letter, or anything 
else. It happens all the time, that I have to write a letter to an ALJ or perhaps to a 
commissioner. And I simply notice all the parties. That is a burden and I can tell 
you that that is a burden that is enormous on us small groups. And the effect of that 
I can tell you will be that I will diminish my ex parte contacts because my secretary 
will strangle if I have to put out letters every time I talk to a commissioner. 
The second piece of advise I would have for 1125 would be, however, to retain a 
publication in the public docket to come from the commissioners themselves or the ALJ. 
The reason for this, and it may be hard cases making bad law, is as an example the 
PATCO instance. I can assure you that a notice to the parties in that particular 
proceeding from the official involved who made the threat, would have been no more 
suspicious than a simple statement that a discussion was had about the case and its 
potential outcome on the union involved. That does not disclose what in fact the 
communication was. So, to have a dual disclosure, a simple one by the commissioner, a 
quick memorandum simply publishing the written material right into the docket is of no 
administrative burden. Coupled, though, with the disclosure from the individual, the 
individual knows that they have to be absolutely forthright and forthcoming what was in 
there. That dual kind of disclosure ensures the fullest kind of disclosure. 
Turning quickly I realize time is short to the other two issues here, 
judicial review. We do support the institution of appellate review so long as the PUC 
insists that it is not going to operate like a judicial body, we should not treat it as 
a judicial body. The fact of appellate review exclusively in the California Supreme 
Court is rare and carries with it the notion that the body being reviewed should have a 
very, very high degree of trust if we're only going to review at the very highest level 
the discretionary only, particularly given the heavy docket of the Supreme Court with 
other matters, Bar matters, death penalty cases, and so forth. We want to be sure that 
what comes up is the very best possible. The very best possible is an appellate-like 
review. 
Therefore, we would support either direct review to an appellate or discretionary 
review with the Supreme Court with the ability to refer it back down to an appellate 
court for preliminary review. Either of those, in our mind, is worthy of review. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Why do you think the tradition has been to go directly to the 
Supreme Court rather than an appellate review? 
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MR. WHEATON: I think it's an anomaly stemming from the PUC's existence of around 
the turn of the century as a constitutional body, not an administrative body, created 
by statute. There are a couple of other boards that go directly to the Supreme Court. 
One is the Bar because of the unique position of the Bar as an Article 6 agency and 
Supreme Court's power to regulate attorneys. But I know of no particularly good public 
policy reason that should be so. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, I can give you one that appears to me that you've got a 
rate case that's $500 million and it goes to an appellate court. How long do you think 
it will take the appellate court to get to that decision and to render a decision? 
MR. WHEATON: The best way I could see to do it would be to require that the review 
be by extraordinary writ which gets a fast track in the Courts of Appeals. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What's a fast track in the Courts of Appeals in terms of time? 
MR. WHEATON: I have actually a writ in the First District Court of Appeals, which 
has the most loaded docket, that got filed in July, just argued it yesterday, and I'll 
have a decision next month. That's about six months from start to finish which is 
about as fast as an appellate court can physically operate. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And you'd advocate that that same kind of requirement would be on 
the -- in this case? 
MR. WHEATON: I would advocate very swift review in that court of appeals. I can 
tell you that the mere magnitude of the decision, though, is not what determines it. 
For instance, the Department of Insurance is in the process of making decisions that 
amount to some $25-to-$30 billion for auto consumers and those are going to go first to 
the superior courts, and then to the appellate court and then to the Supreme Court. 
That's a worrisome thing to me, but I don't know what to do about it. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So, six months in the appellate court, which then might get 
appealed to Supreme Court. 
MR. WHEATON: Which has the opportunity to review or not review within 60 days. 
The third issue here is the question of the administrative law judges. We do not 
support 1126 in its present form, but we do believe that some reform is necessary. The 
principle concern we would have is moving the ALJs out of the PUC. We believe that the 
Public Utilities Commission is so specialized that to having the ALJs within the 
commission and that come from within the commission and return to the commission is 
part of career paths and so forth, is an important thing. Indeed, we have supported 
the creation of separate classes of ALJs within sub-agencies, in other instances, for 
instance the Bar, the Medical Board for review of decisions, and others. And we would 
continue to support here at the PUC, but we're happy to work on amendmentory language 
with you. 
Thank you for the opportunity. 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you vary much. Audrie Krause, Executive Director of 
TURN. Welcome. 
MS. AUDRIE KRAUSE: Thank you. I want to start out by contradicting something that 
commissioner Wilk told you, which is that there is no problem with the processes at the 
Public Utilities Commission. TURN believes that there are a lot of problems at the 
Public Utilities Commission with their processes, with the lack of a general ax parte 
rule, with the way the ALJs must now have their decisions reviewed. And I'd like to 
take the opportunity and just go over briefly what soma of the concerns 
the process are. We were asked to indicate what those concerns are, as 
specifically about the two bills. 
we have with 
well as talk 
TURN is concerned that the expedited -- the increased use of expedited proceedings 
and workshops in place of formal proceedings is creating problems because there's a 
loss of the due process, there's a loss of the right to file and receive testimony, and 
to cross-examine witnesses under oath. And in the case of workshops, there are no 
transcripts provided, so there is no record available of those, of what happened in 
these proceedings. And if commission action is based on them, there should be a 
record. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
stirring up the 
workshop? 
What's the purpose of a workshop? Workshop sounds like you just 
facts so everybody knows what we're talking about. What is a 
MS. KRAUSE: Well, the commission seems to, in recent years, be holding workshops 
more and more on a lot of issues related to the cases. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: As opposed to a formal hearing? 
MS. KRAUSE: As opposed to a formal hearing with a record. In the decision on the 
Phase II of the alternative regulatory framework for telephones, for example, a number 
of items were left up in the air pending workshops next year. Those workshops will 
take place off-the-record. And yet, they are 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What's the objective of a workshop? As opposed to a formal 
hearing? What's the objective? What is the difference, in your opinion, what is the 
difference? 
MS. KRAUSE: In our opinion, it just appears to be a way of getting around the more 
formal proceedings and create a record. We don't see any particular advantage to doing 
that at all. We're not in support of having informal workshops. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What are they trying to achieve in a workshop? 
MS. KRAUSE: That would depend specifically on what the workshop's about and who 
ordered it. I mean, they will ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, give me an example. What the workshop you attended, what 
was the objective, what was discussed, what are they trying to achieve in a workshop 
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that you've attended? 
MS. KRAUSE: I haven't been to any workshops. I'm not a member of the legal staff 
at TURN. The lawyers on our staff attend the workshops if they're involved in a 
proceeding and a workshop is scheduled. In some cases, it allows an opportunity for 
all the parties to informally present their views; but they could also do so formally 
on-the-record, and then there's a record of what they've said. There won't be in a 
workshop. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, it sounds like the difference between a workshop and a 
formal hearing may be a lot of record keeping and published documents resulting from 
what went on. Is that the difference? 
MS. KRAUSE: There are no records. There is no ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But what you're saying is that you want those records, you want a 
bigger case, you want a 6-foot high stack of information rather than a 4-foot. 
MS. KRAUSE: The stacks are already well over 6-feet high. What we .•• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You want more than that then, 12-feet. 
MS. KRAUSE: That's not what I'm saying. We would like the proceedings on which 
decisions about rates are going to be made, to be conducted in -- we would like the 
process to involve a public record in all cases. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is Mr. Franklin still here? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: He's still here. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Oh. 
MR. FRANKLIN: Unfortunately. (laughter) 
SENATOR RUSSELL: May I ask you a question, please? 
MR. FRANKLIN: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: If you would 
microphone. Come forward, please. 
get is what, in your opinion, as 
between a workshop where there are 
come up. I guess you'd better speak into the 
And as you're coming forward, what I'm trying to 
the Acting Executive Director, is the difference 
no official records and a formal proceeding where 
there are records. Why do you use a workshop rather than a formal proceeding? 
MR. FRANKLIN: The workshop is an informal -- it is a vehicle by which the 
commission is trying to facilitate the process. There are a number of items that could 
best be talked out among the parties. Usually workshops, all the ones that I'm aware 
of, are chaired by staff people. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: To get the facts ... 
MR. FRANKLIN: It's to get the facts. It's to, in effect, the informality is not 
to avoid the record. It is to sometimes the formality itself keeps the process from 
moving along. It's an attempt to again facilitate our processes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Then, when you have a workshop and the wheat is separated from 
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the chaff and everybody knows then what the facts are or what the issues are, then you 
go back into a formal hearing. 
the workshop into the record 
everyone knows? 
Is there any relationship then from what was deduced at 
of the formal hearing? Or is it just information that 
MR. FRANKLIN: Well, the results of the workshop to the extent that they find their 
way back into the formal record. Workshops, again, sometimes relate to implementation. 
Take the telephone case that's just come out. There are a number of workshops. There 
are a number of things that still have to be worked out in implementation. Should you 
do that formally? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I see. 
MR. FRANKLIN: Or do you allow the staff that's going to implement this, along with 
the utilities, to sit down and work some of the implementation concerns ... ? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In other words, we think these ought to be the rules in the 
formal thing. Then you go to workshop, how practical is this going to work out? 
MR. FRANKLIN: Practical implementation is often addressed in the workshop. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And then you discuss back and forth all sides being part of the 
workshop, and you find out that the rule or the goal or whatever it was, is not 
practical, won't work out for the various reasons developed in the workshop, and then 
you go back and you take a second cut at it in the formal hearing? 
MR. FRANKLIN: Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. 
MR. FRANKLIN: The workshop itself is not going to create new commission policy. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. Thank you. 
MS. KRAUSE: Let me just add that nothing that Mr. Franklin has said indicates that 
there's any reason to have a workshop off-the-record in place of a proceeding 
on-the-record 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Unless you like bureaucratic documents to read. 
MS. KRAUSE: Well, another way of looking at that is that provides a record for the 
public to look at if they want to know what the Public Utilities Commission is doing. 
And they are a public agency, and the public has a right to know. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you think the public is interested in a 12-foot high bunch of 
documents on a policy that can't be implemented because it's impractical? 
MS. KRAUSE: I think the public is interested in the results and the results are 
what you get by going through that process. And if the process is not public, there is 
no way to question the results or to review them or to know what's going on. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is the public excluded from these workshops? 
MR. FRANKLIN: No, and interested parties are notified of the workshops. 







MR. FRANKLIN: It would 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Wait a 
MR. FRANKLIN Well, I can' 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL 
public 
~~. FRANKLIN: Pete Arth. 
there 
or 
no because there may or there may 
not 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah, 'm ust curious as to whether or not before 
gets decided official whether there 
up in a workshop. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
MR. PETE ARTH, 




I don't know 
that the use of 
Pete 
on ects that 
Arth's my name, representing the 
-- which I would characterize as 
a collaborative way to solve an issue rather than adversarial hear room way-- it's 
a method of but it's a commission-created device and it doesn't 
change the law that requires the commission to decide and to base its decision 
evidence. So there might not be a formal before an ALJ after the workshop. 
But there would still be the commission decision based on the workshop results the 
opportunity to chal before the commission or judicial 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How does if there's no record and it 
didn't go to a , but it just this How does chal the 
decision? 
MR. ARTH: Well, let's .•. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: There's no record. 
MR. ARTH A concrete An issue we' familiar with, the trust fund. 
There has been a cont effort to reform In it is for the 
center, for the , telecommunication other equ What sort 
should we have? Shou it have three bells and whistles or two? You 
have a of all the parties before an ALJ that be burdensome for the user 
that wishes to use that It's Wouldn't it be better 
have a where 's can well, we all agree that 
ought to this machine? That would be to the ALJ that oversees the docket. 
That would be in the decision where the commission says for the next iterat of 
program, based on what the ies have said in the and based on comments 
the decision, this is what it is. And if some was excluded, unhappy with the 
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result, then they would have the same right-of-review as any other decision. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How is a decision made to make a particular subject a matter 
of a workshop as against a hearing? 
MR. ARTH: Sometimes I -- they happen both ways. They happen at the front end of a 
proceeding where it might be either the administrative law judge or the assigned 
commissioner that says let's try this to see if we can resolve some facts; or as Audrie 
was mentioning, a major decision, a milestone decision that says we decide parameters 
A, B, and C, but we leave to workshops how we're going to settle high coat fund for 
little telephone utilities, how universal service is going to be affected, that you use 
it after for implementation purposes as well. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So, you're suggesting that the workshops really don't deal 
with policy? 
MR. ARTH: No, it 
basically a procedural 
typically -- it's more technical implementation, but it's 
alternative to having everything done by formal adversarial 
hearings. 
MS. KRAUSE: Everything the commission does has to do with technical 
implementation. They're talking about ratemaking processes. 
The fact that workshop -- the discussions in workshop can then go to the commission 
for a decision without there being any kind of a formal proceeding afterwards brings up 
yet another concern we have with the process which is that the commission does not seem 
to be in compliance with the Bagley-Keene Act in terms of making records public. The 
process by which the ALJs draft decision has become public was something that took 
place with encouragement and support and pressure from the Legislature because the 
commission was not making anything public at one point before they acted. Now what 
they are doing is circulating a draft decision which is then commented on, and then 
working on revisions. And when the commission gets together at their conference to 
take action, they are acting to vote their approval or disapproval of a document that 
has not been made public to anybody at that point. And TURN believes that this is a 
violation of the Bagley-Keene Act, which does require that any document that's 
circulated to the majority of the appointees of a public board be made public. We 
assume that all five commmissioners have seen what they're voting on before they vote 
on it. And yet nobody in the public has. Neither, in most cases, have the utilities 
unless they've obtained it secretly. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What's the penalty for violating the Bagley-Keene Act? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I don't know. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you know? 
MS. KRAUSE: The penalty? No, 
MR. WHEATON: I do actually. 
I don't know. I'm sorry. Do you? 
It's injunctive and declaratory relief and there's 
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the possibility of criminal , but it's never That's Brown Act. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, can't then, if what you say is true and it's a 
legitimate of an action? 
MS. KRAUSE: Well, I'd ike out that when he was on the Public Utilities 
Commission, Bill Bagley, who is one of the authors of that act, complained about it. I 
spoke with him about the act to the issues we were concerned about, 
and he indicated to me that there was a difference of between him as author of 
the bill and the counsel at the Public Utilities Commission as to the 
interpretation of that act. The commission s 
applying to themselves in that way. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: don' you test it, then? 
MS. KRAUSE: don't we test it? TURN doesn• 
this point. 
chooses to interpret it as not 
have the resources to test it at 
SENATOR RUSSELL: doesn't the Public -- Center for Public Interest Law test it? 
MR. WHEATON: Nobody's asked us. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Oh. Well don't you ask 
MS. KRAUSE: We'd be to ask... ) ... the Center for Public Interest 
Law to test it. We do have some concerns about that, and I understand that for the 
utilities who aren't able to know in advance what the decision, it would be a problem, 
too. 
In terms of the two bills that you're , we do the ex parte bill 
and believe that there' a need kind of disclosure that it in terms of 
what's been going on at the commission. We think that there's way too much of an 
opportunity now for , secret contacts and for decisions coming out of the 
commission to reflect conversations that the ic record. 
And in terms of Senator ssell' earlier ion about how do we know that this 
is happening? I don't think on the commission makes a secret of the fact that 
they talk to people from the utilities before make a decision. We certainly talk 
to them whenever we have the we have to, because of the way the system 
works now. And the commissioners don't that utility representatives come in and 
talk to them about cases. We calls and letters and from people who work 
at the commission who are concerned about this. So we are aware that there is pressure 
being put on to make and decisions that reflect comments off-the-record. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: It seems to me that 's on-the-record and they have to 
follow the record and then they make the decision. Well, in the decisionmaking 
process, philosophical, social, political, whatever that is over here, it seems to me 
that these contacts, couldn't 're like lobbyists that come to us. We've 
got a bill that we're to evaluate the facts; we listen to the facts; and then 
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the lobbyists on both sides come and say this is this and that's that and so forth; and 
then we stir that into the pot, and we make our political decision. Facts are part of 
it, also what the other people say. Aren't these kinds of discussions, couldn't they 
be categorized in that political, social, philosophical partisan, whatever you want to 
call it, milieu which is the PUC's function of making those decisions? 
MS. KRAUSE: Well, the Public Utilities Commission is not the Legislature, and they 
aren't making law. They're setting rates. And those rates are supposed to be based 
on-the-record of the case that is developed during the proceedings. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But we also have agreed -- I think at least everybody is agreed 
that said -- that's come up here that they have the right to make their decisions, 
politically, socially, philosophically based upon the record as they interpret it. And 
I thought that basically what everybody has said is yes, that's right. Is that not 
right? 
MS. KRAUSE: Based on-the-record is the crucial issue here. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Yeah, but they're not, they're not robots. They take the record 
and they -- Senator Rosenthal and I would take the record and we would come up probably 
with two different opinions as to what the record says to us. And part of that 
decision might be from the things that we hear from our constituents, from the 
lobbyists, from everybody else. That's part of the social, philosophical, political, 
partisan decisionmaking process which we're involved in, plus the facts. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, let me just give you an oversimplified idea. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Good, I'd like that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: On-the-record there's a decision that a utility overcharged a 
ratebase by $300 million. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay? Now, somebody from that utility whispers in a 
commissioner's ear and says, hey, you know, we really -- we're bad guys, but it's not 
$300 million, it's only $1 million --or $100 million, it's only $100 million. Now if 
the decision is based upon that kind of a conversation --you see what I'm talking 
about? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Yes, yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And that's an oversimplification. I'm not suggesting that that's 
exactly the way it happens. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: No, but you made a good point. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But, how do you deal with that? Now the commission comes out 
and says it's $100 million. But the record and you and I might disagree with whether 
they should philosophically, but facts are given which both of us could agree should 
have been $300 million. Anyway, would you sum up. 
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MS. KRAUSE: Yes, I will. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And I'l shut up 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No this have been very 
MS. KRAUSE: I'd like to out in terms of the issue of the ALJs and 
their independence. TURN much more independence for the ALJs in their 
proposed decisions. We believe that should be able to release their decisions 
without review. Those decisions become a of the record. And the 
commission is, of course, free to them. But I think it's important to point out 
that the commissioners , if ever, read the full record, if they read any of it. 
So they are on the ALJs who have read the record for their advice. That's the 
role that ALJs are there for. 
We think that one reason pass that the commissioners want to have these 
proposals reviewed and circulated is that it allows them to avoid having to explain why 
they make changes in the j •s And if those are based upon ex 
parte contact, it would be very difficult for them to explain. 
I'll conclude with that, thank you. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you both individual commissioner, assigned 
commissioner? Or not 
MS. KRAUSE: We don't. We think that the ALJs would have more independence if they 
weren't deal with an commissioner. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But ian' there a 
commissioners don't read all 
at least in theory, a commissioner who is ass 
into it more deeply than the other four. At 
reasonably well informed. With what you're 
who are partially informed. 
with just what you said. The 
upon the ALJ. But here you have, 
this particular project, so they go 
least you've got one commissioner who is 
, you'll have five commissioners 
MS. KRAUSE: I would 
informed on all the decisions 
the commissioners would make enough effort to be well 
make. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: No, no, no. The record 
that you said, they don't read the full th 
one who is familiar. 
1 show, if we're keeping a record, 
And so I'm saying, well, at least have 
MS. KRAUSE: I doubt even that the ass commissioner reads the record on a 
case. In some cases, the record is roomfuls, truckloads of documents. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: , I would st late that would be the case. But isn't that 
one commissioner more informed, better informed, more expertise -- he has greater 
expertise on that subject than the other four? 
MS. KRAUSE: I don't know. We do know that the one assigned commissioner could 
exert influence on the ALJ which we would like to see eliminated. 
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I think another thing to consider in terms of the commissioners being prepared is 
that they all do have aides, and their aides are going to informed. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Say you have a commissioner and his aide who is expert in one 
area, the other four commissioners and their aides are not. Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. We will break. We'll be back here after lunch at 2:00. 
(LUNCH BREAK) 
Okay, witnesses for this afternoon. The next panel is on transportation. Let me 
indicate that we have now had pretty long dissertations, education, questions, and what 
have you, and you're all going to be limited to 5 minutes so that we give everybody an 
opportunity who would like to tell me what their concerns are. 
And so we'll start first with Barbara Eastes, who is Director of Legislative 
Affairs for the California Trucking Association. 
MS. BARBARA L. EASTES: Yes, thank you, Senator. I wanted to answer the question 
of Senator Russell before I go into my testimony. You raised the issue right before 
the luncheon break. I wanted to clarify something on the question of developing the 
public record in the case and what that means and why -- and also address why it's 
important for the commissioners to be bound by the record. 
The case law in California, it's been litigated a number of times, and for over 50 
years the case law has substantiated that while the commissioners certainly can make 
policy decisions, that the decision has to be based on what is developed in the record. 
So it's very, very important that the record be developed fully, that it not be 
impeded, and that so that the bases for appeal can be granted. This has been 
litigated and won on due process, the basis of due process, but it's at the Supreme 
Court, the u.s. Supreme Court and the federal district courts. So there's quite a body 
of case law that requires that. 
What I'm going to do is I handed out my testimony which I'd like to have made 
part of the record -- I'll comment on ex parte after I go into the judges and the 
decisions because I think really you want to hear some examples of what's going on and 
where the problems are. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Right. 
MS. EASTES: And what I'd like to go into today is the recent general freight 
decision in trucking and what's been happening with that and some of the problems. 
Recently the general freight decision, the PUC judge opened the proceeding by 
telling the parties that he had been ordered by the assigned commissioner to have the 
hearing wrapped up within two months. The ALJ prescribed time schedules which did not 
allow for discovery of evidence, and he suppressed subpoenas which would have compelled 
discovery in the proceeding. After issuing his first proposed decision for public 
comment, the ALJ wrote the decision for the commissioner's eyes only. It was never 
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seen again by anyone. A substitute ALJ was in within the course of the 
and no further 
was allowed. And 
was when the commissioners 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
that? 
MS. EASTES: Well 
resigned. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
MS. EASTES: No, 
commission. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
Did he make 
I think he 
No review or comment 
the decision 
December -- sorry, on October 12. 
put in? Was there any rationale for 
think the , the assigned judge 
statement as to 
elsewhere. Got a job outside of the 
MS. EASTES: So the course of the he left and he was replaced by 
a substitute j who was reass to the case. 
The final order that was 








on the 12th, 
of fact 
the record. 
the first time many of us saw 
which over 100 were not based 
CTA filed an application for 
on November 1, 
ication for 
and we have addressed each of those 
I have for you, I handed out 
an attachment. I asked my staff to prepare for me some of the major findings of fact 
that were and of the or due process violations that 




MS. EASTES Pardon 





if weren' on the facts? 
MS. EASTES: Some of 
could find--we 
were based on , some of them were based on nothing 
that we 
gamut. And I 
application which our 
detail for you. 
could ind no basis for the f It really ranged the 
l del to your ice Senator, the almost 200 page 
associat f which will go into each of those in great 
, I just had them 
typical , both with 
1 out some of the very specific -- or some 
that weren't supported by the evidence 
the course of the hearing with respect to and also some of the or 
what the judge allowed and did not allow. 
The commission, we believe -- the exists or there needs some correction in 
the area of the freedom of the j in developing the record. We think that it's 
very clear that the commissioners do have the ability to come out with the final 
decision, but as to how the of the record occurs we think that's where an 
area of grayness exists and also where some of the abuses are occurring today because 
we don't believe that the judges can fully develop a record unless they are given some 
sort of autonomy. And I've heard some other suggestions today mentioned separate and 
apart from SB 1126, ranging from removing the judges out of the jurisdiction of the PUC 
to perhaps modifying how the decisions or proposed decisions are given to the public. 
That may, in fact, be something that you should pursue. But we think that because the 
record has to be developed fully and that due process all parties must be allowed to 
testify. Give you an example of due process violations in the general freight case are 
a number of our carriers were told that they could not testify even though they raised 
objections because they are affected parties by this decision. We, in fact, had 79 
carriers who wrote in writing asked to be allowed to testify and they were denied the 
right to testify. 
That's just again, we've got four or five examples on the sheet up there for you. 
Those kinds of abuses that clearly violate due process. And we think that the judges 
have to be allowed the record from which we can then appeal if necessary. I will find 
out on the general freight case, we in all likelihood will go to the State Supreme 
Court if the PUC wants to test it. And will probably already go to the federal -- also 
go to the federal district court on the general freight case. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Let me just so we have on the record, 




With respect to ex parte, we feel that 
we do have access in that area. We don't want 
because they have 
to see that altered 
too much because it's just like my coming to talk to you. And we think in that area 
clearly there should be open, as in you should be allowed to go in. 
Now, with respect to the judicial functions of the commission, we believe right now 
that there already exists some restraints, and that you should follow the formal 
judicial guidelines. However, if that needs to be strengthened or specifically 
clarified, in the hearing arena that may be appropriate. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Douglas Hill, President of the California Moving & 
Storage Association. 
MR. DOUGLAS HILL: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Russell, members 
of the committee. First of all, for the record, my name is Douglas Hill, H-I-L-L. And 
I am President of the California Moving & Storage Association. CMSA is a statewide 
association with a membership of approximately 600 permitted carriers which represents 
some 70-75 percent of all the permitted household goods carriers in the State of 
California. 
The household goods industry has been regulated by the Public Utilities Commission 
for over 50 years. And since 1951, the framework for that regulation has been found 
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exclusively in the Household Goods 
Bil 
Carriers Act. And in 1989 this Act was 
s amended Senate 10 which 




with all do respect 




commission's zeal to 
was carried Senator Russell and 
January 1 1990. CMSA has 
been 
of the commission, it is the 
some sort of regulatory 
commission has simply lost its 
sense of fairness and j Now, a point in 
fact, in 1988, in November of 1988, this association on behalf of the industry filed a 





In the first 
been 
the 
workers comp, other mandated 




11, 1989, one of the commissioners came down to the room and indicated 
because an OII, thorough felt that these should be 
invest ion of this was imminent and would be down in the next 2-or-3 
weeks. Well, we sat there for 1, 2, 3, 4 months and happened. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Invest who? 




The commission indicated the commissioner indicated that he would make a 
and balanced decision on whether to either postpone those hearings or go ahead. 
made a dec the commission was to hold those hearings and 
listen to the evidence as this increase Now, these 
hearings were held several because some of the 
people in the division staf to be on vacation until October; 
we got and we final concluded this hearing process on 
October 31, which was On the fol November 3, the commission 
issued its order institut ion. Now, that's one thing, and the timing 
is kind of a little ludicrous. But in that order, indicated that they were going 
to suspend and hold in any ition of the investigation which 
even the commission -- none of this expects to be concluded until the end of 1990. But 
all of the evidence that have been heard this year and during the entire process 
of those we're to be and held in abeyance until the 
disposition of this OII, is be another year down the road. 
Now let me say, Mr. Chairman, that this has cost this industry -- and that petition 
alone cost this industry and this association in excess of $100,000 in attorney's fees, 
consultant fees expense studies, all those other ansolary costs that go 
into this. And then to make matters worse, it's our own transportation rate 
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fund fees that paid for the transportation division's staff participation as well as 
the Division of Ratepayers Advocates. In the meantime, this whole thing is held in 
abeyance. 
Now, I think that this whole thing is just a waste by an unjust and inequitable 
order by the commission which in effect is telling the carrier industry after the fact 
that you spent your time, your money, your energy and we knowingly allowed this to 
occur, but we will not decide the issues which were the subject of those extensive 
hearings. CMSA has told the commission in writing that we view its action as a serious 
injustice and we feel very strongly that this is true. Mr. Chairman, I brought copies 
of our petition for rehearing regarding that particular section and left them here with 
the Sergeant at Arms that I'd like you to take a look at. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What I'd like to get to, what do you think is the major 
process concern that you have? 
MR. HILL: I think -- you mean, as far as our industry is concerned? 





Mr. Chairman, we had a prehearing conference 
law judge has been assigned to this case, and 
conduct some sort of oversight observation in 
well as some of the hearings as it goes 
on December 4. An 
we would invite your 
the next prehearing 
along, because this 
administrative law judge, in the most important case that this industry has ever been 
involved in, this administrative law judge has never heard a transportation case ever. 
And as far as I can tell, and I haven't been advised anything of the contrary, I'm not 
so sure this administrative law judge has ever heard a case of any kind. And this is 
the most important case for this industry. And the way the first prehearing conference 
was held, I really have to wonder about that. 
We also have another procedural problem with respect to this current OII in that it 
appears that the procedures that are going to be followed in the household goods OII in 
this particular case are going to be very similar to those that were conducted in the 
procedural process of the general freight OII, in that the administrative law judge and 
the commission is going to set hearings dates consecutively for weeks and months on end 
which is going to preclude interested parties, including our attorney, the California 
Moving and Storage Association -- I don't have a bunch of inhouse attorneys, I've got a 
staff of three and myself as a representative of this industry from really appearing 
during the course of all of that testimony. If they do this day in and day out, week 
in and week out, it's going to preclude interested parties, everybody, except the 
Division of Ratepayers Advocates, from appearing and monitoring the activity of that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Really what I'd like to ask you. You are not opposing an OII? 
MR. HILL: Not especially, no. 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What is your concern about what you think will ... ? I 
guess I'd like hear from the witnesses as to what think is unfair about the 
process. I'm not about some decis made that you don't like. I'm 
talking about process. 
MR. HILL: Well, we think that the process that evolved out of our petition 
modification which we started of this year and those were allowed 
to be conducted and that was to come down, and 
then wasted all that time and energy, we'd like that to be amended. Now we're 
concerned about the process or the lack of due process in this OII proceeding that's 
being undertaken. 
Mr. Chairman, as far as the CMSA, and California Movers are concerned relative to 
SB 1125 and 1126, we're in favor of both of those; and I think that, frankly, the 
reasons for our favoritism towards both those of have been well 
spoken on behalf of other witnesses who have testified before you today. Thank you 
very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Mr. Biddle, representing Larry 
Owners, I believe. Farrens, California and 
MR. CRAIG BIDDLE: Mr. Chairman, I think I have several hats, Mr. Chairman 
and members, not and Storage, but Farrens was unable 
to be here , and I also the California Truck Owners Association; 
and I'm behal of association, the CCA, and I have submitted 
his written statement, which the has, that he and asked me to bring 
with me because he was unable be here. 
In both situations the 1,600 carriers from those two dump truck owners 
associations, are both of 125 and 126; and they would even like them 
strengthened a little bit. would like to see in 1126 that it be mandatory that 
the decisions be made ic. It's says "may" over on Line 19 on Page 4, and they'd 
like that because this is one -- you say what are the major problems? -- this 
is one of the or is that you don't to see the proposed decision until 
after it's a fait accompli. And would like to see both associations would like 
to see that, and also the ex communication. 
Let me just tell you that the associations, I think in answer to your question you 
just asked Mr. Hill about that, I think, two Two major problems that we 
perceive. One is, that the hear process is real a sham. What happens is an end 
result is determined to get to, and then after you want to get to that result, you then 
hold a and evidence to justify that decision that you've already made. 
That's you so much direction, on the ALJ. It's our belief that 
what happens, whether it's the OII and household goods, or whether it's the dump truck 
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deviation that they did last year in 1989, that the political or policy decision was 
made to do that, and then they say, okay, let's have an ALJ look at it, let's hear 
testimony, and they back up that which they have already decided to get to. So, it's a 
sham. Why even have the hearing? If that's what they decide to do, then they can go 
ahead and do it. But the Constitution provides that they must do it, so therefore 
they're going through the motions of coming up with that result. That's the first 
thing. 
Then the second thing we believe is that there's not adequate supervision or 
control. You talked about it this morning. Let me tell you what happens. When you 
disagree with an opinion or decision of the PUC, you have a right to file a petition 
for a writ before the State Supreme Court. Now what does that entail? That entails 
that we file a petition and we prepare it and we attach the transcript, those pages and 
12 feet, Senator 
months of testimony. 
Russell, you were talking about 
You submit it to the Supreme Court. 
the entire transcript 
They have 60 days. 
from 
They 
have 60 days, the Supreme Court, and you know not one of those seven justices look at 
it. Some clerk looks at it, reviews it, then says yes or no, we will either hear it or 
we deny it. Traditionally, they deny it. we in my office have filed several of these 
over the last few years. They just deny it and they send you a one page petition, 
denied. That's not a hearing. We don't get a hearing before the Supreme Court. Their 
alternative is to grant a hearing, then we file briefs and we have an argument before 
the Supreme Court. You really effect don't have any remedy. 
You were talking this morning, well, why aren't these decisions upset? They're not 
upset because there is some evidence, some little evidence that somebody can point to 
of months and months of testimony to just the decision. What I think you need, and 
that's what our associations would like to have, all of them, would like to have an 
intermediate court of appeal take a look at this. Take a look at it. Have a hearing, 
have argument, have an opportunity, a judge's eye, not just some clerk who is not 
going to pay any attention to you, which is really what happens today. 
But I think those are the two major abuses we see in the process, is the 
supervision in the judicial process, and also that the hearings are just a sham. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any questions? Thank you very much. 
The next panel has to do with telecommunication witnesses. We'll take the first 
four: Bruce Jamison, James Lewis, Robert Stechert, and Alan Gardner. 
We're doing very well, gentlemen, if you will restrict yourselves to the 5 minutes, 
we can get out at a reasonable time today. 
We'll just hear the-- all right, Mr. Jamison. We'll get to the other four on the 
telecommunications following this one. 
Mr. Jamison, Executive Director, State Regulatory Proceedings, Pacific Bell. 
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MR. BRUCE JAMISON: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Russell. I'm Bruce 
Jamison for Pacific Bell. 
Relative to SB 6 1, Pacific bel 
as described at this is 
that the process in place 
and sees no need for change. 
Relative to SB 1125, Pacific is not 
parte rules the lines FCC has. 
to ex parte rules, but ex 
I do not believe this bill meets that 
bill were amended to parallel the FCC, criteria, or meets those criteria. If the 
Pacific would not oppose. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The FCC, don't they have strict ex parte rules? 
MR. JAMISON: have ex rules, but are clearly divided into various 
of certain have no restrictions; certain 
have restrictions that ex contacts are permitted, but must be 
reported; and certain proceedings have no ex parte contacts allowed whatsoever; in 
addition during certain proceedings there are sunshine periods when there are no ex 
parte contacts allowed whatsoever. Additional 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So actual go farther than my bill. 
MR. JAMISON: No, I believe that they actual clarify and make various conditions 
recognize that there are various conditions that under certain circumstances there 
should be free and open access, and under certain other circumstances there should ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No ex 
MR. JAMISON: be no ex , and there is a middle ground there where there is 
a to 
Additionally, al advocates, advocacy for someone else are subject 
ex rules. The way the bill is written now, SB 1125 is written, the DRA would be 
exempt and that's I believe all advocates should be subject to those 
rules. 
Finally, there was mentioned this that there should be a requirement that 
ex contacts be served on all to a proceeding. I don't believe that's 
necessary. The FCc has a where they're filed in an office, the docket 
office, that kind of that would seem to me to be sufficient. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Would it accomplish anything if the PUC were required in every 
case to make a decision there shall be, there shall not be, there shall be partial ex 
parte so that everybody knows up front that they have to a decision one way or the 
other? Would it accomplish anything? 
MR JAMISON: I suppose that would be one way to go at it. At least in that case 
then you are assured that the question of whether there is a need or not has been 
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addressed. That's a little bit less stringent than having a structure that says every 
proceeding has to be assigned to a particular category. You turn that around and say 
for every proceeding you'll decide whether there will be ex parte. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Heard this morning that the commission in some cases has decided 
that there shall be no ex parte proceedings. How does -- does that come at the 
beginning or during or at the end or what? 
MR. JAMISON: The one that I'm familiar with, it did not come at the beginning, 
came there was, I believe, a Pacific Bell rate case, a 1986 rate case was mentioned 
there was an ex parte rule established and I believe that was during the case. I 
was not part of the regulatory organization at that time, but I believe at the 
beginning of the case, there was no ex parte restriction, and that that was applied 
during the case. So it can come any time. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And so if it comes based upon certain circumstances which arise 
which seem to support no ex parte. 
MR. JAMISON: Presumably that's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Mr. James Lewis, Director, External Affairs for MCI. 
MR. JAMES L. LEWIS: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Senator Russell. With 
respect to -- I'm going to try and beat the 5 minute limit, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
MR. LEWIS: With respect to SB 1125, we think that is a reasonable middle ground 
between the position that was staked this morning by the first panel, and the position 
that was taken by the commission representatives later on this morning. We think it 
recognizes that the commission has dual roles, both quasi-legislative and 
quasi-judicial. And we don't think it would be terribly onerous to require disclosure 
of ex parte communication. 
I would echo Mr. Jamison. Should the commission wish to -- I'm sorry, should the 
committee wish to hear our views on the FCC's model, I don't think we would oppose an 
amendment to this bill which would essentially adopt the FCC model for the California 
Public Utilities Commission. That model recognizes the distinction between ajudicatory 
proceedings, for example, complaints in which there are no ex parte communications. 
Those are clearly quasi-judicial proceedings; and quasi-legislative proceedings such as 
rule makings, in which communications are permitted up to a certain point in time, but 
must be disclosed. We think that would be appropriate. 
With respect to 11 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that point. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, Senator. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The FCC, the pink sheet that the Chairman held up, what does that 
really accomplish? I mean, it says here that receive Southwestern Bell 
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presented to common carrier bureau some information on a certain docket. 
MR. LEWIS: Senator Russell, that ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How does that .. ? 
MR. LEWIS: The that ishes is it tells the insiders what's going 
on. It doesn't really tell members of the public what's going on. I would go a little 
further than the FCC rule 
knows what docket appears 
terms of the 
that 
of disclosure. Only a telephone company 
sheet. If an interested member of the public 
happened that docket off he or she could ask and learn. But I would 
favor a broader disclosure. I'm not sure I would require service on all parties on the 
service list. But an agency where I used to work, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, that a of an ex communication be placed in the 
record of the 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah. 
MR. LEWIS: That kind of disclosure puts the parties on notice, not only that an 
event occurred, but the nature of the communication which happened. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The ect matter. 
That's MR. LEWIS: That's 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL I also think that if it's on the record, anybody at a hearing 
discussing that subject can then say to that individual, you know, tell me about this 
communication that you had. In other words, I think people would be law abiding if 
there was a law which said that certain things are permitted and other things are not. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: This situation, rather than send it to everybody, this is filed 
with some ic agency, ? 
MR. LEWIS: That's filed at the docket office of the FCC. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And so all of those who are involved in this process know 
that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah. 
MR. LEWIS: That's correct. 
can get it. SENATOR RUSSELL: And 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: can it. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So you don't have to burden the government that was putting out 
reams of this, mailing, and all that stuff. 
MR. LEWIS: And then it's for , MCI has people check the docket 
office on a basis. If we see a contact that we're interested in, and let's say 
it's from Pacific Bell, we can ask Mr. Jamison or one of his colleagues what was the 
nature of the communication. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And you may or may not rely upon his representation of 
what that was, if that's the case, if you ... 
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MR. LEWIS: If it's Mr. Jamison, I certainly would, Senator. (laughter) 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, let's say it's not Mr. Jamison, let's say it's Mr. X and 
you're not -- and he's pretty closed mouthed. What then would you do? 
MR. LEWIS: Well, we would probably file a formal information request in the docket 
with the party, or at the FCC you have to ask the commission for permission to file 
discovery. We would do that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So then, what would then happen? Then he'd have to go into the 
hearing and verbalize or ... ? 
MR. LEWIS: Well, there wouldn't be a hearing. They would either have to respond 
or not. And then it would be up to us to decide what to do if they failed to respond. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What could you do? 
MR. LEWIS: We could take a compulsory order requiring them to respond. We could 
also ask the staff member of the FCC who is a party to that communication what his or 
her side of the story was. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that process, that's existing now with the FCC? 
MR. LEWIS: That is. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Does that get into a lot of nitty-gritty, picky-picky obstruction 
of process? 
MR. LEWIS: Not so far as I understand it, Senator. I don't have direct 
responsibility for FCC proceedings, but I have talked to the people in the company who 
do. And I'm advised that that has become a fairly routine part of doing business at 
the commission. These communications do go on, and when you go over to speak to 
members of the staff or to a commissioner at the FCC you take with you the written 
summary of what you're going to present to the commissioner or the staff member, and 
that is prepared and everybody sees it, and it's not that burdensome. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Bill? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Basically. 
Okay, thank you very much. Bob Stechert, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, 
AT&T. 
MR. ROBERT B. STECHERT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am 
Bob Stechert, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs at AT&T. I should tell you, at 
least from AT&T's standpoint, we don't see that there are particular issues with 
respect to the processes and procedures at the commission that give us concern about 
the fairness of the process. 
Now, having said that, I would hasten to add that we do think that there are 
procedures at the commission that could be substantially streamlined without 
threatening due process of the parties to the proceedings. I can give you an example 
of AT&T's case that was concluded a year ago in which the commission granted AT&T a 
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degree of price inflexibility. That case went on for three years through a 
whole series of submission of a number of pleadings and 
briefs. And we believe that that kind of proceeding in 
which the commission 
better be conducted 
is establ rules that have application could 
a paper process such as existed at the FCC. The FCC, a 
number of years ago, much moved away from overseen by 
administrative law j And instead, file written pleadings with the 
commission. There's an for responses between ies. And the commission, 
based on that written record, can reach a decision in a rulemaking proceeding and 
establish rules and regulations. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Who hears that stuff if you don' have a judge do that? 
MR. STECHERT: No one does, Senator. It's taken account by the commission and 
the commission's staff and the written submissions. Based on those written 
submissions, a decision is reached by the co~~ission, without the need for an 





matters are presented and California commission 
gathered together for 
proceeding where you're not deal with 
commission. 
facts 
And in a rulemaking 
primarily, but you're 
establ some ive , that evident process really 
doesn't facilitate matters very much. 
The FCC's and has been 
complete due process. And it' worked well 
quicker than what was 
we don't believe that that's a 
commission. Indeed, as parties 
quasi-judicial and a quas 
have 
lative role 
as affording parties full and 




were held in the past. Now, 
evident hearings at the 
the commission has both a 
And in quasi-judicial 
proceedings, such as , there is an role for an evidentiary 
hearing and an administrative law j But we think that a significant 
savings could be made if the commission would in more cases and rulemaking 
proceedings this kind of paper process that I'm describing. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you say then that a staffer of the PUC really then in -- with 
your proposal or suggestion takes the 
MR. STECHERT: Essentially, that's 
of the administrative law judge? 
what At the FCC, it's the 
commission's common carrier bureau who exercises that role, who assembles the written 
pleadings filed by the parties and reaches some decision initiately about what the 
decision of the commission should be, and then that's carried for to the commission as 
a whole for a final decision. The same kind of process could take place here in 
California under the auspices of the commission's advisory and compliance division 
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staff. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And there's no discussion back and forth on the written documents 
that are put in? 
MR. STECHERT: Not before an administrative law judge, no. But there is full 
chance for parties to present both sides of the question. Usually there is a series of 
pleadings that are filed. An initial position is filed by all of the parties, and then 
all of the parties have a right to reply to those initial positions filed by the 
parties 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In writing. 
MR. STECHERT: In writing, so that a complete record is developed and all sides of 
the issues are fully illuminated. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So this guy with the green eye shades sits in a cubicle, reads 
this pile of stuff, and comes up with some conclusion; and everybody's putting in 
opinions and rebuttals to the other guy's rebuttal, and he's reading all this. And 
nobody gets in a room together and talks about it. 
MR. STECHERT: That's right. But there is a complete written record developed. 
And the decision that the commission makes must be made on that written record. Rather 
than have an evidentiary hearing where witnesses appear and testify before an 
administrative law judge, the record is developed through a series and an exchange of 
written pleadings. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Bet all these written pleas are written by lawyers. 
Do you have any disagreement with what Mr. Lewis said about this FPPC (sic) process 
and the further steps he would take? 
MR. STECHERT: Well, as far as the ex parte rules, Senator, we haven't seen abuses 
of ex parte process as it exists today. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But, do you have any objections to what he said? 
MR. STECHERT: Having said that, I would agree with Mr. Lewis that the procedures 
at the FCC work very well. And if you were to legislate an ex parte arrangement, 
that's the kind of arrangement that we would support. We would also want to ensure 
that all parties to the proceeding, including the commission's Division of Ratepayers 
Advocates, are subject to those ex parte rules. If contacts are going to be limited or 
disclosed, they must be limited and disclosed by all the parties including members of 
the commission staff who participate in the proceedings. But I think a process like 
the FCC has, which allows for access to the commission, but also provides parties with 
notice about what those contacts have been is a fair way to go about addressing the 
kind of ex parte concerns that others have raised. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And the contactee, the one who is supposed to write out what he 
talked about ••• ? 
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MR. STECHERT: That's the way it works at the FCC. And that memorandum of what the 
contact was about is filed with the commission, and it appears in the kind of a notice 
that Chairman Rosenthal has there before you, and it 
idea of what contacts have been made and a way to go about 
with a reasonable 
contacts of their own 
if they see that contacts have been made in 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is that process in the law books somewhere? 
MR. STECHERT: Yes. It is ied, both, I believe in statute as well as written 
FCC rules. The Federal Communications Commission's Restricted Procedures. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank very much. We'll next hear from Mr. Alan Gardner, 
Vice President, Affairs California Cable Television Association. 
MR. ALAN GARDNER: , Chairman Rosenthal. I have brought along written 
testimony today which I would appreciate included in the record, along with the two 
additional exhibits. I'd like to take this first to thank the members of 
this committee and the lature who were interested in some of the concerns we 
expressed this year in the Phase I , and who about them or 
supported them or otherwise became involved. 
Our interest in the future of the process here in this state is to have 
a workable structure. One, where there's a full 
an opportunity to know about contacts, where we have 
to be heard, where we have 
as potential competitor of the 
telephone effective cross-subsidies and anti-competitive protection from the 
dominant carriers and where we think the evident record doesn't support a 
decision, we have a and one that means 
Our experience in the Phase II process was of both hope and concern as to how 
we would view the future. PacTel's was very aggressive with respect 
to our interests. we felt that were looking to cross-subsidize their way into our 
business. The telecos the last two years have had a very aggressive strategy to enter 
the cable business congressional and modified final judge approval to do 
so. We felt the closed door that came out in did not reflect our concerns about 
cross-subs and didn't reflect an for the commission to review whether 
such new investment would be cost-effective or in the ic interest. And our desire 
was to have where the commission did their job and looked at that. 
Now, we had the for ex parte contacts and we did, in fact, employ them. 
We came to the and asked for some with to these issues. And 
the commissioners were very forthcoming in giving us an opportunity to listen because, 
you know, as a practical matter the commissioners don't read the record; and with the 
assigned commissioner situation, I think one commissioner is truly very knowledgeable 
and the others do the best can. So the ex parte contact for us meant that 
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at least our concern was heard by the people who are making the decision because they 
wouldn't normally read the briefs, they wouldn't normally see the record, and so they 
wouldn't normally hear about what we want them to be concerned about. And frankly, I 
don't think there's anything wrong with that. I don't think that in a state this size 
with the complexity of the issues that PUC would work if there weren't some form of 
contact permitted. And I think it did work because the final order was fair to our 
industry and I think to the telephone industry. It lets them go forward with the 
network to a certain point, and beyond that point makes them come in and if they're 
ready to do it today there's no time requirement or anything. As soon as they think 
it's cost-justified to proceed further they're allowed to come in and make a showing 
and go ahead. And that's fair because that's what we're interested in. This is fair 
level playing field competition, and that's what we want the process to reflect. 
So, in looking at that, the commission now has proceedings that are going to try 
and implement that, and they're going to try and implement these anti-competitive and 
cross-subsidy using workshops to do that. It's premature for me to suggest whether or 
not that's going to be effective. That's the process they've chosen to try and use. 
And today is the day that the commission (sic) . has called for everybody to comment on 
how that should actually work. We are submitting comments where we think they should 
have a series of workshops of several days each. For example, where we believe the 
telephone company should come in, put all the reports on the table, talk about what's 
needed, and have a real process to try and develop a procedure at that commission that 
will be effective for the future. Not overburdening to the telephone companies or to 
the commission, but something that effectively allows the process under this new 
framework to try and work. Now in about three or four months, we'll have an idea 
whether that's going to happen or not. And if you ask me the question again then, I 
might have a different answer. 
But, with respect to the specifics that you've asked for today, on the ex parte 
contact, I think we need some form. But as a participant in the process, what I want 
to know is when somebody else does it. Now, do I need something as extensive as has 
been proposed? No, but I could live with it if you had it. What I really need to know 
is that the contact has happened. And so I'd like somebody to have to file just the 
name and everybody they saw, and have it on file at the commission office, and if they 
submitted any documents or used any, that those ought to be part of it. That's all I 
need to know, otherwise I'm not doing my job right. 
With respect to ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Before you move on there, you've heard what Mr. Lewis said, and 
Mr. Stechert sort of acquiesced to. Is that okay with you? 
MR. GARDNER: Sure, I could live with it. But all I'm suggesting is, is something 
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that necessary? For me, no. can do with knowing that it's occurred 
and who with. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: 
and so on such and if 
ust Joe Blow saw so 
more information you'd ask 
them; and if stonewalled go some sort of a procedure where 
you would have a 
MR. GARDNER: Yeah a matter I'm I mean, I've 
been this since 1972 a company. was 17 years on the side 
of the house until 1. And if I'm my as a regulatory lawyer or 
in this case a familiar with the issues and the 
timing, and I should be able understand what's going on and to be very 
specific and go know, it's interest , but it's expanding the 
process. I can live with it. can do it. I've done it before the FCC and understand 
how it works. But I real want to know is simply the fact that it 
happened, and if paper went across, that should be ic record paper and I should get 
a copy because I'm not to 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You should copy or you should be able to go ... 
MR. GARDNER: I copy, I mean it's available there in the clerk's office and 
if I want a copy in the of ice can do that. That's effective knowledge for 
the people that are involved. If the ic wants to go and look, they can get it. 
On the ALJ issue, I think that some relat may be necessary simply to keep 
two left ield orders think that a solution for that really 
isn't clear the ideas been discussed today, you know, 
might be effective. So 
reviews would be worthwhile 
that one, we kind of think probably some more studies and 
to a definitive idea out. 
I do have two ideas 'd like to ion further. The first is, we do 
think that the as matter of is a idea. I think the most recent 
Phase 
of 
II order is 
it 
a heck of a time 
to with the result, and 
the record. And when that 
now there's no effective 
And the second one is ... 
far goes. They did a good job 
with it, I think they'd have 
be occasions when anyone's going 
to based on the evidence and 
to have a to appeal it. And right 
So that's one, I think, is worthwhile. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You don't think that will slow grind the process down into a 
crawl? 
MR. GARDNER I've iced util law in , Washington, Idaho, Colorado, 
North Carolina, Washington, D.C., New York. Many of those allow for that, I mean, so 
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my answer is based upon experience, no, I don't because granted that there's -- if 
there were an order from the appellate court saying it's so obvious there's a problem 
that we will not allow this order to go into effect, the commission's order to go into 
effect, then it would grind into a halt for a short time. You could require the 
expedited procedure that was discussed before, and I think that would be very 
effective, but to deny the intermediate appeal denies any effective appeal. There is 
no effective appeal in this state right now, and I think that's an honest issue. You 
know, this commission or any commission occasionally they make a mistake or they do 
something that's simply not based on record evidence, and when they do that folks who 
are aggrieved ought to be entitled to call them on it. And you can't effectively do 
that now, and I think it's fair that you be entitled to do it. And I don't think 
that's going to tie things down. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You don't think all the disgruntled losers would be immediately 
run to the appellate court? 
MR. GARDNER: Sure, but that's not going to stop the decision from going into 
effect. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Does it stay the decision? 
MR. GARDNER: Not if anybody disagrees with me let me know, but that normally 
doesn't stay a decision unless they obtain a specific order doing so. The only way 
re to do that is to take such as sufficient showing that they have a 
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of appeal and that's not very common, very rare. 
So I don't think as a practical matter that does it because it makes more work for 
sure, but that's writing some briefs and lawyers are used to writing briefs and the 
commission has a counsel's office can handle that. I don't think it expands it 
that much. It provides for reasonable remedy. 
The last I'd like to make is with respect to commission staff under the new 
framework. You know, the order in Phase II changes where the responsibility -- at 
least from our view is going to be. It's been in the ALJs which were a pretty good 
group of folks. And it changes it to the ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you pull the mike a little closer. I hear people trying 
to reach 
MR. GARDNER: Okay. It changes it to the CACD group. And in shifting away from 
the general rate case to what is going to become a series of smaller type proceedings, 
that puts a much heavier burden on those folks. And the commission has the 
responsibility for managing their own staff. But I would suggest that they may need 
some additional help for budget or staff in that area because that group is now going 
to undertake a new and significant burden in making this regulatory framework work 
properly. And it's simply an area that we think bears some watching sometime later in 
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1990. 
Thank you for the to 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL you now cal the next four: Kevin 
Payne, Sam Williams John McDonald 
yourselves to the same time of 5 
and we'll be out of here at an earl 
very much. We' 
and John 
minutes, we'd 
And lemen, if you'll restrict 
it. We'll keep moving 
hour than ant 
Okay, Mr. Payne, Director of State Affairs for GTE. 
MR. KEVIN PAYNE: Thank you Chairman Rosenthal, members of the committee. My name 
is Kevin and I'm here on behal of GTE California this afternoon. 
I'd like to that GTE California does not perceive any problems with 
the current process as we it in terms of fairness or access to the commission. 
And I'd like to we've taken that position. 
We currently feel that the PUC does indeed have the authority to impose ex parte 
communications rules on an ad hoc basis or on a case-by-case basis, and has clearly 
done so in the past. And as as those rules do not compromise anyone's rights to 
due process, they have every to do so. And we think they've done so 
very responsibly. 
Unilateral ex communications rules we feel could potentially restrict the 
provision of information to the decisionmakers at the commission as well as the 
commissioners themselves in information that is very valuable in the 
decisionmaking process that has become increas complex. The issues involving new 
technologies, the veloc of some of the are such that we are involved in some 
rather broad based issues do involve the consideration of a good deal of data. We 
think that the commission has very in terms of broadening the 
access, for the ic in conduct ic witness hearings. They open what 
we commonly refer to as open mike sessions or commission meetings throughout the state. 
They have instituted the office of the ic advisor which encourages public 
part ion in the process. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: didn't create that office. I did. 
MR. PAYNE: I stand corrected. But, with all do respect, they have been 
very successful, and I believe that the ic advisor has submitted a report to you 
this year chronicl that success and their activities. 
In clos I would say that, if , the commission has sought to broaden 
access to the process, at the very same time they are making strides in 
the cost of regulation prospectively, streamlining that process and actual 
which I believe we would all agree are very commendable activities. 
On the ect of SB 1126 the relocation of the ALJ division to the 
Department of General services. GTE ... 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The bill will not be in that form. 
MR. PAYNE: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Indicate to me what you think about the relationship of ALJs 
wherever they are. 
MR. PAYNE: I can state that very quickly and very simply in that we feel that 
they dispatch their responsibilities appropriately now, and we feel it would make 
little difference whether they were a part of the commission or a part of the 
Department of General Services. And frankly 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How would you have felt if the decision had gone against you 
at the commission? 
MR. PAYNE: Over my experience in the regulatory field I've had decisions which you 
could consider going against GTE and also being favorable to GTE, and it wouldn't 
change my opinion on that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Fine. 
MR. PAYNE: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I have a question. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The discussion we had with Mr. Lewis which was supported by Mr. 
Stechert and which Mr. Gardner could live with as it relates to this FCC process of 
exposure, do you have any problem with that? 
MR. PAYNE: GTE California would certainly comply with it. We simply feel that the 
authority the commission has currently and has exercised is sufficient. If there were 
a different process formalized, we would ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: It was specifically. Did you hear the testimony? 
MR. PAYNE: Yes, I did ... 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you have any problem with it? 
MR.PAYNE: •.. and we certainly could respond it. Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You don't have any problem with it? 
MR. PAYNE: Not materially, no. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: They deal with it at the FCC right now. 
MR. PAYNE: We deal with it at FCC now. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, okay. So you don't have any problem with that if we were 
to institute that in California? 
MR. PAYNE: Not materially, no. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I'll ask you the same question, Mr. Williams, when you get to it. 
-78-
MR. SAM WILLIAMS: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Williams Manager, Governmental Affairs, u.s. Sprint. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Senator the opportunity 
to test 
u.s. 
before you on this and 1126 in 
Sprint feels that, first of all, we are becoming very, very 
complex. We've got the framework kinds of that have been going on, 
the number of the it 1 and the impact is 
becoming that much to on 1 these We feel that it's necessary to 
ensure a fair and balanced process. We think we certainly have to minimize the 
paperwork and the We 't want to -- you have to balance the fairness of 
the process with not it slow. 
But basical we think what's been on ires additional safeguards to 
make sure this balance among the is created regardless of the size of the 
organization. So we're concerned about what we call institutional integrity, and that 
is the , all of the , whether 're or small, they have to feel 
that can 
footing. And 
believe in a process, that 're to have access on an equal 
if don't believe in that, you just don't have that kind of 
integrity, even if a lack , it' just not 
And the process is very very 
for the process. 
think that if you have ex 
parte, you've got who can on a timely basis in terms of 
disclosure. The PUC can see more contrast views among the participants. There's a 
better information 
But we think that balance 
(SB) 1125 does not 
We think this 
therefore, we support 1125. 
, you have to worry about how much time this takes. 
be worked out. 
contact. In fact, we're just talking about disclosure. 
government. It sound public policy. And 
As far as the administrative law 
judges; but at the same time, we're 
j , we believe in the independence of those 
not convinced that putting the law judges in the 
Department of General Services wil real achieve that ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I've come to that conclusion as well. 
MR. WILLIAMS: The j of the administrative law judges is that they 
play an important role as does the PUC, but certainly this physical relocation is not 
necessari the answer. But we're will to work with the commission as to what else 
can be done to ensure that this kind of is maintained. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Not removing them from the PUC, do you have any concerns about 
the relationships that exist and what they might be suggesting? 
MR. WILLIAMS: U.S. is more concerned about the relationship -- we're more 
concerned about ex and the relationship between the commission and the other 
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parties and the ability to communicate there on sort of an equal footing. 
In terms of the administrative law judges, we don't have any real problems there. 
We think it really important that whatever comes out of these hearings and further 
deliberations that it's spelled out with a degree of clarity. We don't think it's --
we don't want to be in a situation where the participants have to feel that there's 
going to be some sort of regulatory reprisals or they may or may not be following the 
rules. So we ask that -- we'd like to work with the commission and the Legislature to 
make sure that that happens. And so basically, in summary, we support 1125; but 1126, 
not as present. (cross talking) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You could live with the FCC approach as we've heard today? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, we can. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. McDonald, Vice President and General Counsel for Reuben 
Donnelley Corporation. 
MR. JOHN P. McDONALD: Well, I, too, appreciate being here, mostly because it's 15 
degrees in New York City today. I and my company have been appearing before the Public 
Utilities Commission for the last four years. And in that time, we have yet to see one 
matter come to final resolution. It's not a matter of the commissioners not working 
hard or the staff not being talented. It's become our view that the process itself 
isn't designed to achieve what needs to be done today. The process as it works today 
is largely a legislative one. It's designed to cover policy matters and it does that 
very well. The problem is as the various enterprises that the commission regulates 
become competitive, become partially in the regulated arena, partially in the 
competitive arena, there's a second function that the commission must pay much more 
attention to. That second function is that of dispute resolution. Plain and simple, 
there are going to be controversies. 
The present system is far too cumbersome to handle that. We think that the bills 
that you gentlemen are considering today are a correct step forward. There has to be 
more formalization, there has to be more procedure. There has to be separation between 
the tryer of fact and the ultimate decisionmaker. We think both of the bills proceed 
in that direction, but would like to see you go further; would like to see the process 
fully separated; that when a matter comes up before the commission that it should be 
decided whether it is of a legislative nature or whether it is contested matter. If 
it's a contested matter, we would like to see it farmed out to an administrative law 
judge who has separate and quite clear responsibilities. He is to be the tryer of fact 
to prepare a record for the commission to make its decision on. 
For things that are legislative or investigative on the part of the commission, we 
think the present process works reasonably well. 
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We do have a modest concern on the ex rules simply because matters before the 
commission flow from one docket to another and then back again, and it would 
almost that you cover not the docket that you're in, but the surrounding 
dockets as ~;Jell. We think 's of the in dispute resolution. 
There aren't clear issues before the commission or its staff to decide. 
With respect to the administrative law j we'd like to see them have clear 
responsibility. In the bill, as it's put now, still are some sort of 
agent of a particular commissioner. •re responsibility for running the 
hearing, but it's not clear whether 're acting in fulfilling their own discreet 
role, or whether 're at the behest of a particular commissioner. You 
never know whether you're to the person. 
The current before the commission, there to be a right to appeal a 
decision to an appellate court other than the 
opportunity to contest an administrative law j 's 
Court. There ought to be better 
factual findings. The present 
standards for review are narrow. You have to find a blatant error in order 
to be able to attack it. These matters are not ible to blatant error; there's 
too much other 
I had one more 
going on; it's 
, but I've it. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Mr. Ayers, President of Bay Area 
Teleport. 
MR. NICK SELBY: Good afternoon, Senator Rosenthal--Mr. Chairman, and Senator 
Russell. 
Nick 
Actual I wish I were John , but I'm not. My name is 
I'm an in ice, and I have had the pleasure of 
representing Bay Area 
I used to work for 
as its counsel before the PUC for the last five years. 
the commission as a commission staff attorney, and I was also a 
commissioner's advisor for over two years. 
Ayers could not come His testimony was 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, we have his test 
And I believe, 
to the marshal. 
unfortunately, Mr. 
MR. SELBY: I believe the reason he asked me to appear in his place is because of 
the experience that I did have at the commission, and I would like to offer that 
experience to the committee this afternoon. 
First, wholly from my experience as an advocate, simply as an attorney, I've 
wrestled with the issue of ex parte contacts ever since I began working as a 
commissioner's legal advisor back in 1980. And the conclusion that I've come to in my 
own mind is that the contact is necessary to make the commission work. I think that's 
a regrettable conclusion because I think everybody would feel happier if everything was 
on the record, everything could be done from known documents. It just 
doesn't work that way because the procedure is too the matters, the subject matter 
-81-
whom I worked for, the 
great commissioners in the 
parte contact was necessary to 
is too complex. And the commissioner 
Gravelle, whom I consider one of the 
commission, very strongly felt that ex 
commission's business. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you support the FCC approach? 
late Richard D. 
history of the 
accomplish the 
MR. SELBY: Senator, I believe that more is required for the notice and comment 
rulemaking which the FCC does, primarily to accomplish its business as a national 
agency. I think that type of disclosure is fine there. Here, the commission operates 
pursuant to statute. The statute does not permit notice and comment rulemaking in a 
large number of proceedings that are going on before the commission right now. 
Contrary to what Mr. Stechert for AT&T said, I think that on a state level to move in a 
hurry and substantially toward notice and comment rulemaking would be a mistake; it 
would remove the commission from the people. I think that cross-examination serves a 
very useful purpose. And most noticeably in the alternative regulatory framework 
proceeding, I know from my own experience the cross-examination helped bring out many 
of the strengths of the general proposal which was essentially adopted and exposed some 
of the weaknesses of the specific proposal. And at the start of the hearing, many of 
those things were not known; they would not have been known without cross-examination. 
If you have cross-examination, then you should disclose more in the nature of ex parte 
contact than simply the fact that it occurred. I believe it would be ..• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that point. 
MR. SELBY: Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Apparently as I understand it, you state the fact that it 
occurred, and everybody knows where to go get that information. Then if you as an 
attorney representing somebody want to know more about that, you go ask or you have a 
means whereby you can get more information. But in every case, we're not required to 
divulge all that, go through that paperwork. Isn't that satisfactory? 
MR. SELBY: I think we need a little bit more of the detail that was disclosed, and 
I also think that it should be mandatory that any written submission that was given to 
the commissioners or to a commissioner's legal advisor or to an ALJ should also be 
disclosed, should also be put in the record of the case or filed with a docket office. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The availability alone would not suffice? 
MR. SELBY: That would be helpful. I believe that it would be a more workable 
process, given the large number of participants, if somewhat more of the substance of 
the contact was disclosed for the record. The FCC, being a national agency, it just 
operates differently than the CPUC, and it would not be possible in the proceedings 
before the commission, by my experience, to call up every single party and try and 
track down the information that was disclosed. A workable rule would be to require a 
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party having such contact to prepare a one-page summary of the contact and to file that 
one-page summary with the docket office. 
And I also believe that would feel 
because now we have a situation 
I've represented small as 1 as Area 
parte contact. Yet I know that it has to occur. 
comfortable with such a rule 
where I as an attorney -- and 
have misgivings about ex 
Now, in terms of the overall structure of the process at the commission, the one 
thing that I wanted to to your attention which I believe would be a necessary 
complement to whatever is done with SB 1125 is to approach the process from the point 
of view of requiring the commission's findings of fact be based upon substantial 
evidence. If you -- that is Public Utilities Code 1705 to require 
f of fact to be based upon substantial evidence, and couple that with 
intermediate appellate then you really have taken the sting out of all ex parte 
contact by saying it doesn't matter so much that the contact occurred, the decision 
must be based upon substantial evidence in the record. And forgive me if I'm making an 
advertisement for my ion but I really do believe that cross-examinations serves 
a useful purpose, and I would say substantial evidence should be evidence which has 
been subject to cross-examination. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. We'll now call up our final-- dealing 
with the energy utilities: Joe Kloberdanz, John Hemphill, James Lehrer. These are the 
energy utilities: San Diego Gas, Southern California Gas, and Edison. 
Okay, San Diego Gas & Electric. If you'll ident yourself, please, for the 
record. 
MR. JOE KLOBERDANZ: I'm Joe Kloberdanz, Regulatory Affairs Manager, San Diego Gas 
& Electric. 
Mr. Chairman? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: My comments focus on the ex parte issue, Senate Bill 1125, and we 
are to that bill as written. before me have said very well many 
of the s I wanted to make, so I will be brief, and this will come across as 
summary, I suppose. 
The CPUC does act as a quasi- lative body in most of the proceedings and 
invest ions it conducts, and that puts it in a very similar bailiwick to the Senate 




MR. KLOBERDANZ: True. Give you that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: Their ready access to significant information is critical to their 
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ability to arrive at fair and appropriate decisions, just as it is in the Legislature. 
Senate Bill 1125 would inhibit the free flow of information, in my opinion. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You mean you'd be afraid to divulge to somebody that you 
wanted to talk to somebody, to a commissioner about an issue? 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: I think the extent to which the communications, under the present 
condition and I'll talk about that condition in just a moment-- that the extent of 
the need for those communications is extensive. And simply the need to document each 
and every contact, each and everything that might be construed as ex parte contact 
would have a chilling, hindering effect on the free flow of information. The point 
that I wanted to get at was that 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How? 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: the commission in its regulation of five major industries 
involving literally hundreds of companies, it makes it impossible for five people, any 
five people no matter how good they are, to be familiar with the written or hearing 
record in every matter they must decide. It's simply impossible. I have observed them 
for 10 years, and in my experience I've seen their workload become larger and more 
complex as they sought to deregulate or re-regulate certain of the industries they're 
responsible for in the state. 
You can often have multiple interpretations of what the facts in a written record 
mean. That's why we have such a large membership in our legal profession, I'm sure. 
The commission must be entitled to informal communications to round out its knowledge 
on these issues, in the time frames they have to deal with these issues. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The bill does not disagree with that. The bill doesn't say 
that we're doing away with ex parte. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: No, it doesn't. 
bill would have a chilling effect 
communication needs to occur. 
But as I mentioned earlier, I believe that the 
on the extent to which what is termed ex parte 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I'm trying to understand. You don't want Southern California 
Gas to know that you spoke to a commmissioner about some particular issue that's 
relevant to both of you? 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: That particular example causes me no concern, no. That's not what 
I'm getting at. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: I'm getting at the burden it places in particular on the 
commissioners and/or the people practicing before the commission. 
As I said, I believe 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What about the ratepayer? 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: The ratepayer is represented and I'm glad you mentioned that --
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a number of groups, one of whom you heard 
have because don't want to indicate 
that you spoke to a commissioner about you to be interested in. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: They have that concern. 
Another that the is the Public Utilities 
Commission staff Division Advocates. , the bill 
appears to exempt any of the commission staff. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL should be included. I'm looking for a way to deal 
with a that, in fact, because you're able to talk to a commissioner, you're 
able to influence whatever the decision comes out of the commission. I'm not saying 
that that happens all the time. But I'm convinced-- you know, one of the things we 
did in the Legislature a number of years ago, and it's unrelated specifically. The 
Legislature looked at pharmacies that were owned by doctors, okay? and suggested that 
there's conflict of interest in a doctor owning a pharmacy, and removed that perception 
of impropriety. Now that was done because there was a perception that doctors, because 
they owned this and there's lation now trying to deal with doctors 
owning labs that are the testing that in fact consciously or unconsciously 
that you have to by that particular entity that maybe they ought to be 
separated. More and more in the we're beginning to look at that kind of a 
concept which says that because of your size or because you've got some favorable 
benefit, you what How did the that you deal with feel 
about whatever took which wasn't of a record in which they were not able to 
question? You see, if we had a situation of an late situation, maybe that 
wouldn't have the same concern. But to go to the Supreme Court because you 
think that first of all, 're not going to take the case, have never 
taken one, I'm not sure •re going to take one even though the trucking industry is 
to with it. 
When I hear say that don't think that the subject matter ought to be 
open to the 1 of , I begin to that maybe they've got something they're 
to hide. 
Now, tell me when I'm wrong. Give me some indication of why the Legislature 
shouldn't have that ion. And all I'm trying to do is to allow for an even 
playing field where anybody who has to say, you know, just listen by the 
subject matter. I'm not saying to go into details, as some people have suggested. But 
if I see that you spoke to somebody on a certain docket and I'm able to question you at 
the hearing, tell me what you talked about, and you don't necessarily talk about 
something without present some piece of paper because nobody's going to remember 
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what you talked about. Why isn't that part of the record? I'm struggling to try to 
solve what is perceived to be an uneven playing field for people dealing in the same 
issues that you are because of your size, perhaps. Help me. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: I've never been a commissioner at the Public Utilities Commission, 
but I can presume that to the extent access is allowed to some parties in a case, 
access is allowed to all parties in a case who choose to approach the commissioner, 
advisors, staff, whatever. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And I don't want to limit that access. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: And I'm not suggesting that it is. And you and I may disagree on 
the perception, and I think we each have a right to disagree with each other on that 
perception. My perception is that the commissioners do simply to the complexity of 
what they're doing and the sheer volume of issues they have to handle in the time frame 
they have to handle them need more of a free flow of information than is possible 
simply by their reviewing the record in every case or their relying on one source for a 
summary of that record. And that multiple sources, multiple views of what the facts 
suggest are necessary for them to come to the kinds of decisions they need to come to 
in the public interest. That's all I'm getting at. 
If there is to be an ex parte regulation passed, it must cover all parties, and in 
particular I'm referring to the Public Utilities Commission staff who, under the laws 
drafted, the bill is drafted, are not included in this provision. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Right now they have to lobby the commissioners like anybody 
else. And maybe they ought to be included as part of that same system, whatever is 
agreed upon. I don't have any bias in that respect. I'd just like to open up the 
process. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: My concern with doing that, with limiting the access even ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I don't want to limit the access. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: ... that the Public Utilities Commission staff has is that the 
commissioners need more information than they can get. (cross talking) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I suggest to you that your argument leaves me to believe that 
we need this kind of a legislation, you see. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: Then I'll stop. (laughter) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, but you know, we think people test too much. Is there 
something uncomfortable about not wanting to let anybody else know the subject matter 
that may be discussed before a commission, I don't want to limit it to .•. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: Perhaps I've led you astray there. I have no fear of this kind of 
a law. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: You've asked for our input and I've come to give the input. My 
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concern is that it will hinder the process, not assist it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All The PUC appears to be attempting to move 
on a lot of matter of fact, I've to Mr. Wilk on a 
number of occasions that in a number of situations where 've made decisions where 
the Legislature is out of session and in my , on purpose, so that we didn't 
have an to that there to be a "wait until at least we're 
back in session isions have been made on a number of issues in October 
and Noverr~er because want to beat us to some comments about what 
they're The PUC also has indicated to me that real , in some instances, 
don't think that the should have overs on whatever they do. Now, those 
kinds of lead to this kind of , I'll off this one. 
MR. KLOBERDANZ: Those are all the comments I had. If there are any questions? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. , Mr. 1, representative of Southern 
California Gas of State Regulatory Affairs. 
MR. JOHN HEMPHILL: Good afternoon. I'm 
Southern California Gas. 
to be here to testify on behalf of 
you're here, too. CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL I'm 
MR. HEMPHILL: Thank you. Given this late hour, and the wealth of information, 
although it must admit, that you've received today, I'm not sure 
there's much I can add. I don't feel like I'm really batting fourth, but rather that 
I'm in ninth I don' want you to think I'm complaining. I used to play 
baseball as a kid, and I usual batted ninth, but I think ... (cross talking) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL You're a hitter. 
MR. HEMPHILL I' not I understand what you're 
here and I'm not sure that there is the truth in terms of a 
sure, quite there's much I can add at this in time. 
to the bottom line. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL 
to get at the truth 
answer. And I'm not 
So let me just cut 
MR. HEMPHILL: SoCalGas essential is to SB 1125 primarily because we take 
the that the commission does. We think the commission has the discretion, 
when necessary, to ex Otherwise, at other times, on balance we believe 
there's benefits in having to the of information. We realize it's 
a trade-off but if you want to, you know, if you look at the bottom line, one of the 
critical s that a commission needs in making a decision is information, 
information, information. And we think any policy that inhibits the exchange of 
information -- and , we believe this does, even though all it requires is 
reporting. We think it does have an iPhibit fact, and for that reason we oppose it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL Do you deal with the FCC? 
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MR. HEMPHILL: No, we don't. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, you don't deal with the FCC. How about FERC? 
MR. HEMPHILL: FERC is a -- we do. We are not parties directly in FERC activities, 
but indirectly through the interstate pipelines that supply us, we are parties to FERC 
settlements, and so on. And I think FERC is a good example of some of the problems 
that ex parte presents. If you're familiar at all with former FERC commissioner 
Charles Stalling's position with respect to ex parte, he was very, very concerned and 
went around stumping against the ex parte for the reasons that I mentioned, that what a 
commission needs to make an informed opinion is information. And I think that's why we 
oppose this bill. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah. And you don't think that they get the information out 
of a hearing process? 
MR. HEMPHILL: Well, they certainly do. We are not at all suggesting that hearings 
shouldn't take place, and that hearings aren't an important part of the process, and a 
very important part of the process. But the fact of the matter is that the commission 
is not strictly a -- it's a body that combines both legislative-type activities as well 
as procedural legal-type activities. And I think you have to have both. We personally 
believe that if one went on-the-record we'd win every time. The problem is the record 
is not black and white, although it may be black type on white paper, the record is 
very ambiguous and there isn't a need for clarification. 
Let me just make one additional point kind of as an aside. I do want to join with 
TURN on one issue. It sort of not really has to do directly with ex parte. But we do 
have a concern about perhaps the potential abuse of workshops as opposed to formal 
proceedings. We do believe there is a time and place for workshops, but we're becoming 
concerned that perhaps it may be overly used, and I would join TURN's comment with 
respect to that. I won't go so far as to say that there is not a place for workshops, 
but we think it needs to be considered carefully. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah, there needs to be a place where there's something on the 
record so that you can take a look at it. 
MR. HEMPHILL: Correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And perhaps better define what a workshop is or isn't. 
MR. HEMPHILL: That is correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you. Mr. James Lehrer, the Law Department of 
Southern California Edison. 
MR. JAMES M. LEHRER: Chairman Rosenthal, and members of the committee staff, Good 
Day. For the record, my name is James M. Lehrer. I am an attorney with Southern 
California Edison. I've represented the company for almost nine years in matters 













that some of the 
where to go with this 
on Senate Bills 1125 
and 1126. I'd also at the end my remarks, like to add a few comments with respect 
to appellate review commission decisions and of the commission, if I may. 
Southern Cal is fundamental in to ex 
parte rules, the disclosure rule such as 1125. We believe that those 
procedures are not needed. PUC process, in our opinion, works well. It produces 
timely decisions that we believe are to conditions, and sometimes 
rapidly conditions. And we believe it does afford due process for all 
has the authority to put ex parte parties. The PUC, as you've heard, 
rules into effect in cases in which those rules are appropriate. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Did you their position in the merger case? 
MR. LEHRER: President Wilk indicated from his perspectives the reasons why the 
rule was in the merger case. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL I mean, what was the 
it relates to that? 
MR. LEHRER: I was not the 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Oh, 
MR. LEHRER: ... so I real 
handl 
don't know . 
of Southern California Edison as 
that matter ... 
CHAIRMAN 
what should 
know whether the just said, hurray, that's 
MR. LEHRER: believe there was a -- well I just shouldn't speculate on it, Mr. 
Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All 
MR. LEHRER: But to go, we believe that an ex parte rule, such as 1125, would 
remove that the commission now has and hamper it's ability to 
effect process literal thousands of cases that come before it. We just don't 
think there' a need to it on a blanket basis. 
I'm sure that the intent of the ex parte rule, such as SB 1125, is to 
improve the process. But the real problem in my view, and this is going to 
sound from a member of the legal profession, is that it tends to 
overemphasize the istic adversarial aspects of the process. And in a time when 
the commission is harder than ever and I think with some success -- to make 
it a more inviting user forum, if you will, for the average person on the 
street, on another layer of rules, particularly with those with criminal 
sanctions, sends the wrong So we're not just concerned from Edison's 
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perspective, but from the perspective of the perceptions that everyone has about what 
it's like to go to the commission. 
You've heard people indicate that the commission should have rules like this 
because courts have rules like this. But the PUC is not a court, and it was never 
intended to function as a court. The Legislature in its wisdom enacted Public 
Utilities Code Section 1701 which says that these strict rules of evidence won't apply 
at the commission. And I have seen the living proof of the wisdom of that decision 
every day in hearings when a member of the public wants to participate. I have seen 
administrative law judges and I've seen other counsel, both at the staff and other 
utilities and interveners, react with a welcoming attitude, if you will, and I haven't 
seen people treated in a manner that would tell them that they're not welcome in this 
forum. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Were you here earlier when we heard testimony from individuals 
about how unfair they thought the process was? 
MR. LEHRER: Well, yes, I have. And everybody's entitled to their 
Sometimes that opinion may be a result of the particular result that they 
opinion. 
got in a 
given case. But being there literally day after day for hundreds of hearing days, I 
have seen examples where people have come in literally off the street and wanted to 
participate or understand what was going on, and the people that were the more 
experienced, more sophisticated participants, including Edison, bent over backwards to 
make them welcome. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, I'm sure that's true. 
MR. LEHRER: An example of this would be the bill insert notices that were required 
by law to put in our bills when we're coming up on a hearing or when we've filed an 
application. I remember the days when those were pretty obscure. And in the past few 
years, I'm very happy to say, we have made a real effort to write those in a more 
understandable fashion. The public advisor's office, formed as a result of the 
Legislature's direction, has done an outstanding job in promoting that kind of open 
communication. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Before the law was passed, did you support it? 
MR. LEHRER: Did I support the concept of ... ? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah, did Edison support the concept of that insert? 
MR. LEHRER: Oh, the law about having the inserts at all has been there for a 
considerably long time, Mr. Chairman. (cross talking) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I understand, you know ... 
MR. LEHRER: The law didn't ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You know, one of the things that we find is that people object 
vociferously against any kind of a change. We resent change as human beings, but 
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somehow learn to live with it if it And I'm sure that all the utilities 
any that except their own 
advert we accommodate. Most 
opposed the advisor bill. all the utilities opposed it, okay? And that 
gave me to understand that real don• want the light of day on these 
things. don' want the average Joe to understand what's happening. And I 
find the same issues. 
Now the bills are not the proper form, and I've suggested to everybody I'm 
willing to work with the commission with the utilities. The average person out there 
thinks that you are 
them for 
change that 
them. Understand what I'm That you are over 
Somehow or other we need to 
about not a reality, but in many people's minds, 
perception becomes reality. And so when I hear the that we shouldn't have to 
tell else the ect matter of what we're talking about, I begin to wonder 
what is there to hide? I'm not there are others who said there shouldn't 
be an ex at all. That's not what I'm 
MR. LEHRER: Mr. Chairman, I agree with you with respect to the importance of 
perceptions. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL 
MR. LEHRER: And what I'm at is that, from my perspective, from Edison's 
the ions of our customers and our ratepayers are very important to 
us. 
CHAI&~N ROSENTHAL: 





CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You're 
ial number of people devoted to answering our 
them understand. And I believe that if you talk to 
your job in that respect, yes. 
MR. LEHRER: , it sounds from a lawyer •.• 
CHAI~~N ROSENTHAL: Yes, no I ... 
MR. LEHRER: But when you talk to someone in plain English, you treat them with 
, and you tell them what's on your mind, you communicate openly, then you may be 
able to perhaps change an enemy into a friend or to convince someone the merits of your 
position. 
But ing back to ions, the perception of the commission as a forum which 
is open to all players and which the average person can participate in as well as 
anyone else I think would be 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay • 
MR. LEHRER: ... let me 
a blanket rule such as this because ••. 
you an example. If an individual wanted to telephone 
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a commissioner's advisor and just tell him what's on their mind or clarify a point or 
ask a question about the process, they would be required under this bill to disclose 
that. And the great bulk of people out there don't have the secretarial resources; 
don't have xerox machines; they're not local to San Francisco; they don't 
understand the filing process; and on and on down the line. That's the crux of our 
concern. 
I need to move on because ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Go ahead, yes, right. 
MR. LEHRER: I realize that we're towards the end here. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I've been kind of blowing off a little steam here, taking some 
of your time. Go ahead. 
MR. LEHRER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to move on briefly to 
1126. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
MR. LEHRER: There's some important points that I'd like to make there. We believe 
that the public interest would be better served if ALJs are appointed by the PUC and 
remain under the control of the PUC. ALJs are generally appointed from within the 
ranks of the PUC staff. Most serve in supervisory or legal positions and they've had a 
lot of exposure to the regulatory process and to the policies and to the past decisions 
of the PUC. And that knowledge and that experience is absolutely invaluable. 
Now, under the bill as written the PUC would still have the opportunity to input 
because they would be providing a list of candidates. However, the final decision 
about who would be working a particular case or who would be an ALJ at all would be 
made someone who is, or an office, or an agency that is completely divorced from the 
process. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, that is not the way the bill is going to be. In other 
words, I'm not moving it to another entity. I just-- I'd like to at least give the 
that the ALJ, based upon their input, makes a recommendation. Now, whether 
the commission likes it or doesn't like it, that's -- I don't have any problem with 
that. concern you may have heard me express it before is that I am now 
convinced by a number of individuals who have spoken to me that some of the ALJs are 
now coming out with a decision based upon what that commissioner wanted to happen. 
Does that bother you? 
MR. LEHRER: I'm not convinced, having listened to that testimony, Mr. Chairman, 
that that accurately describes the great bulk or really any part of the commission's 
process. 
the area 
I just, from my perspective, believe that it is a-- and again, I'm mostly in 
of ratemaking, I believe that it is a legislative function, and I very 




MR. LEHRER: ... the way that the decisions are handled. I would point out that 
the my understanding of the assigned commissioner process is that each assigned 
commissioners generally focused in an area that either have some expertise in 
already or develop some as they go along, whether it be 
telecommunications or energy or a third power And that to me is 
something that facilitates getting the decisions through the PUC process effectively. 




MR. LEHRER: I wanted to make a comment about the appellate review. I don't think 
it's appropriate to assume here that having an intermediate level of review will reduce 
the number of appeals. I think it will be just the opposite effect; it will increase 
the number of appeals. Once all the points and authorities and arguments have been 
drawn for an intermediate level court, it's a very s matter if you don't get the 
answer you like there to slap on some new covers and submit the thing to the 
Supreme Court. So what you're doing, if you go that route, in my opinion, is just 
automatically increas the time involved in the appellate process. 
The reason that's to Edison let me just give you an analogy. If your 
entire for the year were held in or in ion, you didn't know if 
you were to be able to down the line, it would be very difficult for you or 
the average guy to his activities in the year. Now ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We're not suggest that anything be held up. 
MR. LEHRER: I understand that, but parties do, when go to appeal, have the 
abil under various conditions ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let's not hold it up. Let's after the fact make a decision, 
sometimes that the PUC does now. 
MR. LEHRER: All right, but ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: don't hold up anything. 
MR. LEHRER: Well, they do place the utilities revenues at risk because if the 
commission finds, or if the Supreme court, let's say, 
that the commission had incorrectly set rates, then the 
back and make an adjustment to those rates. 
found at the end of an appeal 
commission would have to go 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: They do it all the time. On 
procedure. They do it all the time. 
MR.LEHRER: But I .•. 
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every rate case, on every 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Even determine, for example, and I thought it was kind of 
incorrect, even suggested retroactively that the gas companies should have paid a 
different price for gas sometime in the past. And penalized the company. I don't 
think that that's what should happen. 
MR. LEHRER: Maybe I haven't been clear about the adjustments that I had in mind, 
Mr. Chairman. What you're speaking of are prospective adjustments that the commission 
makes on an annual basis in the energy cost proceedings, on a three-year basis in 
general rate cases and on an annual basis in cost of capital proceedings, and those are 
just to name a few of the regulatory proceedings ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I understand. I understand. 
MR. LEHRER: ... that set rates and affect large amounts of money. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, so you don't think that the appellate approach is 
necessary. All right. 
MR. LEHRER: Not the intermediate level, because it would be abused by parties who 
would hang up, if you will, the finality of a decision. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
MR. LEHRER: And it's not in the public interest because the finality of decisions 
is very important so that the utilities can plan ... 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah. 
MR. LEHRER: •.. and more effectively meet their obligation to serve. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Right. 
MR. LEHRER: Finally, just one brief remark with respect to workshops. I've 
participated in workshops and I've heard a few statements about what people's 
perceptions of them are. And I just think it would be helpful for you to know that the 
outcome of workshops does get in the record eventually. It gets in the record in the 
form of a summary. Whoever is presiding over it, be it an ALJ or a staffer, will make 
a presentation to the record, and then the parties all have the opportunity to make a 
statement or comment on that if they disagree that it hasn't been properly 
characterized. But we think there's a lot of value in workshops. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you very much, panel. We have at this point an 
opportunity for anybody who hasn't been on the panel who would like to make a 
two-minute statement in an open mike. 
Mr. Pepper? Anybody else feels ... ? 
MR. ALAN L. PEPPER: Thank you, Senator Rosenthal. 
represent the Western Burglar & Fire Alarm Association. 
My name is Alan Pepper. I 
And we have been interested 
parties in telecommunications cases for approximately 20 years. 
I just have three comments that I would like to make. First, we do support 1125 
with a major exception; we do not believe you can exempt the CPUC staff from its 
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purview, and I will give you an example. In a recent proceeding 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah, well, that's a fair comment •.. 
MR. PEPPER: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: .•• and that's already been made and that would be part of the 
consideration. 
MR. PEPPER: Thank you. I would like to make a second comment with regard to the 
hearing process. There is a proceeding before the California Public Utilities 
Commission now that deals with the cellular telephone industry. That entire proceeding 
has been done without hearing. It was done on comments and rebuttal comments in both 
Phase I and Phase II. It is a or issue before the commission. In order to expedite 
it and get it done quickly, the commission unilaterally determined that hearings were 
not necessary. We think that is an abuse of their power, and it is something that this 
body and your committee should address. 
Finally, I really didn't find anything very disturbing about what anybody had to 
say in these proceedings until the gentlemen from the energy utilities had an 
opportunity to speak. All three of them have suggested that the hearing process is 
insufficient to provide the commissioners with the information they need to render a 
decision, which either means one of two things. Either they are incompetent to present 
their case during the hearings and feel that the only way they can make their point 
known is to walk the halls of the commission to get the information across; or the 
process itself is fundamentally flawed. I don't believe that is true. 
Finally, we believe that 1125 does not go far enough. With respect to complaint 
cases, there should be no ex parte permitted, period. That's a pure judicial form. 
With respect to application cases, ex parte comments should be permitted through the 
hearing process, but should be cut off when the case is submitted for decision. At 
that point in time, neither the commissioners nor the ALJs should be receiving 
information off-the-record and ex parte as to how that decision should be rendered. 
And I thank you for giving us the opportunity to speak. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. Pepper. I want to thank those of you who have 
stayed to the end, who didn't have to do that, for this insightful hearing on a 
difficult issue. But it is the role of the Legislature, and of this committee 
specifically, to oversee the PUC and its process and its concept of fairness. I want 
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the ex parte 
to the Com-
have discussed these issues with PUC staff, administrative law 
judges, and private practitioners. 
I express qualified support SB 1125 on ex parte contacts. 
As to SB 1126, I support abolition of the assigned commissioner 
system, but I believe that the PUC's ALJs should not be moved 
to an independent agency. 
1. Ex parte contacts. In my opinion, the existing prac-
tice whereby ex parte contacts are tolerated, even encouraged, 
in PUC on-the-record hearings is unacceptable and should be 
prohibited. I would prefer a bill that entirely prohibited 
such contacts in on-the-record ratemaking and other ad-
judicatory proceedings. SB 1125 does not go this far (in gen-
eral it calls for disclosure of ex parte contacts rather than 
prohibiting them); nevertheless, I support it as a politically 
realistic fallback position. As for rulemaking, my own prefer-
ence would be to impose no restrictions on oral ex parte con-
tacts; again, I support the disclosure approach of SB 1125 as 
an expedient compromise. 
a. Ex parte contacts in on-the-record proceedings: 
The PUC determines rates and many other matters relating to 
California public utilities by conducting on-the-record hear-
ings. Typically, a PUC ALJ conducts detailed adjudicatory 
hearings that may last for weeks or months. The ALJ prepares a 
detailed proposed decision after hearing all these arguments 
and factual submissions. It offends generally accepted notions 
of fair play and substantial justice that all of this can be 
brought to naught by a few well chosen words whispered into the 
2 
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of a PUC 
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La Prade v. 
2d 13 (1945). 
determine matters relating to a specific utility, such as the 
value of its assets, its costs or a fair rate of return, it 
must provide notice, hearing, and an unbiased decisionmaker. 
If the agency acts through generalized rulemaking, such as a 
proceeding to establish a fair rate of return for utilities in 
general, due process does not apply. 5 
One essential element of a trial-type hearing--whether it 
is a hearing required by statute or one required by due 
process--is the exclusive record requirement: all of the fac-
tual inputs to the decisionmaker must come from the record made 
at the hearing. It is contrary to the fundamental norms of ad-
judication embodied in due process for the decisionmaker to 
receive factual inputs in a form that does not permit opposing 
parties to rebut them. 6 Even as to non-factual inputs, such as 
arguments over discretion and policy, it is contrary to due 
process for one party to make arguments to adjudicatory deci-
sionmakers except in the course of a proceeding at which all 
parties are represented and can counteract those arguments. 7 
5united States v. Florida East Coast Ry., supra. 
6see, e.g., English v. City of Long Beach, 35 Cal.2d 155, 
217 P.2d 22 (1950); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. city of Burlingame, 
170 Cal. App. 2d 637, 647-48, 339 P.2d 933 (1959) .. 
7 In the famous New Jersey case of Mazza v. cavicchia, 15 
N.J. 498, 105 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1954) the court said: "That is 
why it is a fundamental principle of all adjudication, judicial 
and administrative alike, that the mind of the decider should 
not be swayed by materials which are not communicated to both 
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11 Id. at 
constitutional law, some on statutory hearing requirements, 
some on the power of reviewing courts to supervise agencies, 
some based on administrative procedure acts, some based on the 
failure to follow agency rules. Numerous statutes ban ex parte 
contacts in adjudicatory proceedings, including public utility 
proceedings. 10 Even where no statutes apply, agency rules fre-
quently prohibit ex parte contacts or at least require both 
oral and written comments to be placed on the record. 11 Final-
ly, ethical guidelines applicable to attorneys prohibit them 
from making ex parte contacts to judges or judicial officers; 12 
administrative adjudicators deserve no less respect. 13 All 
this reflects an impressive consensus of judges, legislators, 
agency rulemakers, and commentators: ex parte contacts are im-
proper in an on-the-record proceeding. 
10The general rule banning ex parte contacts in California 
is set forth in Government Code §11513.5. However, this rule 
only covers contacts with ALJs, not with agency heads and only 
applies to APA agencies (mostly licensing agencies, not includ-
ing the PUC) . The federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
prohibits ex parte contacts at all levels (including decisional 
advisers) in both formal adjudication and formal rulemaking (it 
treats individualized ratemaking as the latter) . 5 USC 
§557(d) (1). The Model State APA of 1981 specifically prohibits 
ex parte contact at the levels of both ALJ and agency heads. 
§4-213. The Model Act applies this rule to individualized 
ratemaking. §1-102(5) and Commissioner's Comment. The 1981 
Model Act can be found in 14 Unif. Laws. Ann. 69 (1989 Supp). 
11For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), the PUC's federal counterpart, absolutely prohibits ex 
parte contacts in on-the-record proceedings. 18 CFR §2201. 
12california Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-300(B). 
13 rn an opinion rendered on an earlier version of this 
rule, the State Bar opined that ALJs and agency heads were 
judicial officers within the meaning of this rule. State Bar 
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self defense, the DRA attorney may flout the PUC's separation 
of functions and make his or her own informal approach to a key 
commissioner. If the PUC wants separation of functions to 
work--and it is in the interests of everybody concerned with 
PUC adjudication that it should work--it should abandon its 
practice of tolerating ex parte contacts from either outsiders 
or from DRA. 
The defenders of ex parte contact at the PUC make two 
basic arguments, both of which I reject. 
First, they say that the commissioners are isolated from 
the realities of the utility industry and need ex parte con-
tacts to obtain information to help them regulate properly. Of 
course, the Commissioners need information about the regulated 
industry and nobody favors placing them in an ivory tower. 
They can and should gather information and hear the views of 
anybody they want in the course of many regulatory functions, 
including planning and researching. 15 
However, when the commissioners set out to make the rates 
for a single utility through a structured adjudicatory deci-
sionmaking process, they should be limited to on-the-record 
submissions. Anybody who wants to influence them with respect 
to that matter can do so by offering testimony at the hearing 
or submitting a brief. There is no need for the commissioners 
15As explained below, I have reservations about restrict-
ing oral ex parte contacts about pending rulemaking proceed-
ings, since I think that might well cut off commissioners from 
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f proceeds via ad-
fundamental ad-
favor prohibi-
contact in all PUC ad-
far. provides only 
for disclosure of ex parte proceedings (except that it en-
courages the Commission to designate specific proceedings in 
which such contacts are prohibited entirely). I am particular-
ly skeptical of whether the provision relating to disclosure of 
oral ex parte contacts is workable. The communicator is obli-
gated to supply a written memo of his data and arguments; but 
it is far from clear whether this memo will accurately reflect 
the substance of the conversation that actually occurs. 
While this bill does not go as far as I would prefer, it 
represents a politically realistic compromise and it should be 
adopted since the existence of a disclosure rule will have a 
major effect in deterring ex parte contacts. 16 
A few technical points: The bill should ban contact with 
decisionmakers (both Commissioners and ALJs) as well as with 
staff members who engage in advising these decisionmakers. 17 
The bill appropriately distinguishes contacts by people 
outside the Commission (which it regulates) from contacts by 
people inside the Commission (which it does not affect) . 18 
Contacts by staff members with decisionmakers present more sub-
16I hope that California will ultimately adopt an APA ap-
plicable to all agencies that contains a uniform ex parte 
rule--one that bans such contacts in on the record proceedings. 
However, until that day arrives, it would be better to have a 
provision like SB 1125 in place than to permit unchecked ex 
parte communication with PUC decisionmakers. 
17The bill prohibits contacts with an "advisor to a com-
missioner." In fact it should cover contacts with the Com-
missioner's Advisory and Compliance Division (CACD) whose func-
tion is to furnish advice to the commissioners. 
































I would also suggest that the Bill prohibit all ex parte 
communications (rather than simply require disclosure) until 
adoption of the rules provided for in proposed §355(a). That 
would stimulate prompt action by the Commission in adopting the 
regulations. Otherwise, substantial delay in adopting the 
rules might be anticipated. 
b. Ex parte contacts in rulemaking: SB 1125 treats 
rulemaking and adjudication identically; thus it requires both 
written and oral ex parte communications to be disclosed. It 
is interesting that the rulemaking provisions of the California 
APA (as revised in 1979) do not limit oral ex parte contacts22 
but do apparently require the inclusion in the record of writ-
ten ex parte communications and apparently prohibit the submis-
sion of such comments after the closing of the public comment 
period. 23 It seems anomalous to subject the PUC to more severe 
limitations on ex parte contact in rulemaking than are imposed 
on any other California agency. 
22The 1981 Model State APA requires the inclusion in the 
rulemaking record of all written materials submitted to the 
agency, but it refrained from limiting or requiring disclosure 
of oral communications. §3-112(b) (3); §3-112, Comment. 
Similarly, Congress amended the federal APA to ban ex parte 
communications in formal adjudication and formal rulemaking, 5 
u.s.c. §557(d) (1), but it did not ban them in informal rulemak-
ing. 
23 Govt Code §11,347.3(a) (6) requires inclusion in the file 
of every rulemaking "All ... written comments submitted to the 
agency in connection with the adoption, amendment or repeal of 
the regulation." The law also prohibits the agency from adding 
any material to the record of the rulemaking proceeding after 
the close of the public comment period, unless adequate provi-
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F.2d 458 (D.C.Cir. 
must fall. Contacts that would be unacceptable in a judicial 
context may well be entirely appropriate in a legislative con-
text. 
In line with the Model Act, the California APA, the Admin-
istrative Conference recommendation, and the Sierra Club deci-
sion, I favor inclusion in the record of written ex parte com-
munications. I think that it is unnecessary and probably 
counterproductive to limit oral ex parte communications. To do 
so would cut off the Commissioners too much from the regulated 
industry and from public interest groups. Rulemaking can and 
should be more informal, uninhibited, and political than ad-
judication, and there seems to be little harm in allowing free 
oral communication with the commissioners. 
Nevertheless, SB 1125 seems a defensible compromise. By 
treating rulemaking and adjudication identically, the Bill has 
the advantage of avoiding any need to decide whether a particu-
lar hybrid proceeding is in fact adjudication or rulemaking. 
The rulemaking provision of SB 1125 may well have some 
desirable effects. It probably will encourage people to submit 
written, rather than oral, comments on the rule. It may well 
limit the degree to which people with political influence over 
the commissioners can get together and negotiate the outcome of 
the rule. Therefore, it seems a reasonable call for the Bill 
to treat adjudication and rulemaking the same. 
2. Administrative law judge independence. I believe the 
costs of shifting the PUC ALJs to the Office of Administrative 
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procedural decisions, and in writing the proposed decision. I 
am told that this system works unevenly. Some ALJs resent it 
and will not work with the assigned commissioner nor negotiate 
their opinions. Other ALJs like the system and work smoothly 
with the commissioner. Some commissioners welcome the op-
portunity to play a role in important matters before they get 
to the commissioner level; other commissioners have little or 
no interest in involving themselves in cases at this 
preliminary stage. 
The assigned commissioner system does have some advantages 
in terms of educating commissioners about pending cases and 
perhaps avoiding ALJ missteps that must be corrected later at 
greater cost. However, I believe that the system probably 
should be abandoned. It is a source of ALJ resentment; ALJs 
understandably want to be judges and to control their own cases 
without having to negotiate each step with a commissioner or, 
in particular, to negotiate the contents of their proposed de-
cision. Moreover, it seems inappropriate for a single com-
missioner to have such great influence over pending cases when 
that commissioner's view may or may not be representative of 
that of his colleagues. Also, in light of the pervasive in-
fluence of ex parte contact at the PUC, one wonders whether the 
assigned commissioner system functions as a conduit for trans-
mitting the views of some of the parties to the ALJ. I also 
question whether immersion in the nuts and bolts of cases at 
the ALJ level is an intelligent use of a commissioner's time. 
16 
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his or her 
proposed 
decision may cause the ALJ to press the Commission to affirm 
that decision. Thus the ALJ may, very much like ORA, not be 
able to approach the process of issuing the final decision with 
an open mind. Consequently, it might be wise to preclude ALJ 
involvement in the process, just as the PUC now informally 
precludes ORA involvement. 29 
My feeling is that ALJ involvement with PUC final decision 
preparation is valuable, particularly in the existing environ-
ment in which decisionmaking is tainted by ex parte contact. 
~would be less significant if ex parte ~~s were b~~~d.) 
<·-~-----·-""·" 
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that PUC cases gen-
erate vast records that may be inaccessible to anybody who did 
not sit through the hearing; and it is also important to real-
ize that PUC final decisions often involve exceptionally dif-
ficult exercises of prediction and of discretion and are vital-
ly important both to the utilities and to the public. Con-
sequently, I conclude that ALJ participation in final decision 
preparation is an important resource that should be preserved, 
even if ex parte contacts are banned. SB 1126, shifting ALJs 
outside the PUC, would probably inhibit or even prohibit ALJs 
from taking any role in PUC decisionmaking after the proposed 
decision is prepared. For that reason, I am inclined to oppose 
the Bill. 
29The 1981 MSAPA prohibits ALJ involvement with decision-
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71 One of the main features of the regulatory program is open 
entry. The Carmission totally ignores its role as the only 
state agency with the power and expertise to regulate capacity 
of for-hire trucking. 
75 Finding 75 says that the CPUC is adopting sufficient safeguards 
against discriminatory pricing practices. In fact, the decision 
places further pressure on carriers to discriminate by alla.-dng 
l~r rates to those shippers already enjoying the nost benefi-
cial deals. The fact remains that carriers IrO.JSt make up losses 
sarewhere. Large, powerful shippers will continue to get the 
best deals, while smaller shippers will foot the bill. 
83 The CPUC tries to make a blanket finding that rates within its 
new "zone of reasonableness" will be reasonable. Rates which do 
not cover the total cost of service are unlawful, and therefore 
unreasonable. 
88 Conflicts with Finding 33. Finding 88 says that data used in 
the TPCI (fran outside the record of the case) are reasonable 
for establishing variable cost floors. The finding itself 
violates the law because it incorporates evidence fran outside 
the record. Finding 33 says that the TPCI is not reasonable for 
adjusting rates. 
92 Finding 92 directly contradicts the record by saying the vari-
able cost floor will not ccmprcmise safety. By encouraging rate 
reductions to care out of wage payrrents, the variable cost 
system directly affects safety in an adverse way. 
94 The CPUC tries to establish a ten-day notice period for carm::m. 
carrier rate filings. This violates Public Utilities Code 
Section 491. In addition, the CPUC transportation staff has 
said there is no way it can administer to rate filings with a 
ten-day notice period. 
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ESS TO OSED 
THE 
MI SI-JUDICIAL 
I S. N AN 
LI E BETWEEN I N 
A SI-L IS ION. s ON THAT AN 
PARTE IN IVE ION WILL 
SEV ABR OUR CONST R TO ss 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 
TODAY, THE PUC IS AUTHORIZED TO EMPLOY ITS OWN ADMINISTRA-
TI LAW JUDGES (ALJs) WHO ARE UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE 
COMMISSION. HOWEVER, FOR MOST GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, THE OFFICE 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES 
EMPLOYS THE ALJs, AND THEN ASSIGNS THE ALJs TO VARIOUS STATE 
AGENCIES AS NEEDED. JUDGES ASSIGNED BY GENERAL SERVICES ARE 
UNENCUMBERED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP FACTS AND FINDINGS 
THROUGH EVIDENTIARY PROCEEDINGS. WE BELIEVE THE PUC's ALJs, 
WHO ARE EMPLOYEES OF THE COMMISSION, DO NOT HAVE THE SAME DEGREE 
OF AUTONOMY TO FULLY DEVELOP THE RECORD AND MAKE FINDINGS OF 
FACTS BASED ON THE RECORD, AS TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED ALJs. 
AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEM OCCURRED IN THE RECENT GENERAL 
FREIGHT DECISION. THE PUC-EMPLOYED ALJ OPENED THE PROCEDING, 
TELLING THE PARTIES HE HAD BEEN ORDERED BY THE ASSIGNED COMMIS-
SIONER TO HAVE THE HEARING WRAPPED UP WITHIN TWO MONTHS. THE 
ALJ PRESCRIBED TIME SCHEDULES, WHICH DID NOT ALLOW FOR DISCOVERY 
OF EVIDENCE, AND HE SUPPRESSED SUBPOENAS WHICH WOULD HAVE COM-
PELLED DISCOVERY. AFTER ISSUING HIS FIRST PROPOSED DECISION 
FOR PUBLIC COMMENTS, THE ALJ REWROTE THE DECISION FOR COMMIS-
SIONER'S EYES ONLY. THEN, A SUBSTITUTE ALJ WAS ASSIGNED TO THE 
PROCEEDING. NO FURTHER HEARINGS WERE HELD AND NO PUBLIC REVIEW 
OR COMMENT WAS ALLOWED ON THE REVISED DECISION. THE FINAL ORDER 
ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION ON OCTOBER 12 CONTAINED 195 FINDINGS 
OF FACT OF WHICH OVER 100 WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
(SEE CTA APPLICATION FOR REHEARING AND STAY OF DECISION NO. 
89-10-039 WITH POLICY STATEMENT AND POINTS OF AUTHORITIES, NOVEM-
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